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Men would be angels, angels would be gods,
Aspiring to be gods, if angels fell,
Aspiring to be angels, men rebel:
And who but wishes to invert the laws
Of order, sins against th' Eternal Cause.
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This Article attempts to provide an introduction to North
Dakota constitutional law by examining the content of the North
Dakota Constitution and reviewing the methods of analysis that the
North Dakota Supreme Court has employed in its interpretation of
that document over the last ninety-six years. The first part of the
Article summarizes the content of ti' North Dakota Constitution.
The second part of the Article examines the two methods of
constitutional analysis used by the Nor:h Dakota Supreme Court,
determines which method the court generally employs, and reviews
the decisions in which the court has refused to give substance to the
plain language of the North Dakota Constitution. The next part of
the Article reviews the early history of North Dakota and discusses
the sources used to determine the intent underlying the state
constitution. The Article then concludes with the author's critique
of the two methods of constitutional analysis and a proposal for the
exclusive adoption by the court of one of the two methods,
supplemented by considerations involving proper legal analysis,
the role of judges under our form of government, and the proper
interpretation of ambiguous language contained in the North
Dakota Constitution, especially language that creates inherently
abstract standards of conduct.
Although helpful to a better understanding of the constitution,
the first part of the Article - containing an overview of the
contents of the North Dakota Constitution - is not essential to an
understanding of the rest of the Article.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF
THE PRESENT NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION
The North Dakota Constitution as adopted in 1889 was
approximately six times longer than the United States
Constitution. Its overall length has diminished only slightly over
the years. The constitution presently consists of thirteen articles,
containing a total of 176 sections. As a result of its great length and
extreme detail, the North Dakota Constitution is often unwieldy
and rarely studied in its entirety. Nonetheless, a general
understanding of the structure and content of the state constitution
[VOL. 63:157
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should be sufficient to ensure recognition of the important and
often subtle issues that may be based on the document. In addition,
ready access to the relevant constitutional provisions is facilitated
by the detailed index contained in volume 13 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 1
The North Dakota Constitution can be divided into five
distinct groupings:
(1) declaration of rights (art. I);
(2) elective franchise and reservation of powers to
the people (arts. II and III);
(3) branches of government (arts. IV, V, and VI);
(4) miscellaneous concerns (arts. VII, VIII, IX, X,
XI, and XII); and
(5) compact with the United States (art. XIII).
This structural analysis is illustrated in the following diagram:










1. N.D. CONST. index.
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To provide a common framework for further discussion as well as a
basic understanding of the content of the North Dakota
Constitution, this portion of the Article contains a review of the
provisions within these five groupings.
A. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Article I, entitled "Declaration of Rights," contains the most
fertile ground for expansive constitutional interpretation. As its
title denotes, this article confers certain fundamental rights. Some
of these provisions focus exclusively on criminal matters, 2 while
other provisions concern both criminal and civil areas of the law.
3
In addition, article I includes specific individual rights of the
people, 4 rules of construction, 5 the subordination of the military to
civil power, 6 the prerequisites for conviction of treason, 7 and
various traditional restrictions on the power of government. 8
Although many provisions contain language identical to the
federal constitution,9 almost all of these provisions contain either
additional language or differences in wording. Some provisions
2. N.D. CONST. art. I, S 10 (indictment or information); id. art. I, S 11 (bail). Although S
12 of article I, which deals with the rights of the accused, appears to apply exclusively to criminal
matters, the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied the due process clause of this provision to civil
as well as criminal matters. See, e.g., Hjelle v. Sornsin Constr. Co., 173 N.W.2d 431, 434-36 (N.D.
1969) (considering the due process clause of this section in evaluating the constitutionality of a
compulsory arbitration statute).
3. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, 5 6 (involuntary servitude); id. art. 1, S 8 (searches and seizures); id. art.
I, J 12 (rights of the accused); id. art. 1, 513 (trial by jury); id. art. I, 514 (habeas corpus); ud. art. I,
5 15 (imprisonment for debt).
4. Id. art. I, 5 1 (inalienable rights); id. art. 1, S 2 (inherent political power); id. art. 1, 5 3
(freedom of religion); id. art. 1, S 4 (freedom of speech); id. art. 1, S 5 (freedom of assembly); id. art.
1, 5 7 (freedom of employment); id. art. I, 5 9 (administration of justice); id. art. I, § 16 (private
property not taken without just compensation); id. art. 1, $ 20 (rights retained); id. art. I, S 21
(privileges and immunities),
5. Id. art. I, S 22 (uniform operation of laws); id. art. I, 5 23 (supreme law of the land); id. art. I,
5 24 (interpretation of constitution).
6, Id. art. !, 5 19 (military subordinate to civil power).
7. Id. art. I, 5 17. Section 17 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution provides as follows:
"Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies or
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the evidence of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court." Id.
8.. Id. art. 1, 518 (bill of attainder, ex post facto laws, impairment of contract obligations).
9. Compare N.D. CosT. art. I, 5 6 (involuntary servitude); id. art. I, S 8 (searches and seizures);
id. art. I, 5$10 (indictments and information); id. art. I, S12 (rights of the accused); id. art. I, S14
(habeas corpus); id. art. I, S 17 (treason); id. art. I, S 18 (bill of attainder, ex post facto laws,
impairment of contract obligations); id. art. I, S19 (military subordinate to civil power); id. art. 1, S
21 (privileges and immunities) with U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (involuntary servitude); id. amend. IV
(searches and seizures); id. amend. V (indictments); id. amends. V, VI (rights of the accused); id.
art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (habeas corpus); id. art. 111, 5 3, cl. I (treason); id. art. I, 5 9, cl. 3 (bill of attainder,
ex post facto law); id. amend. III (quartering soldiers); id. art. IV, 5 2, cl. I (privileges and'
immunities).
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expand greatly on their federal constitutional counterparts,10 while
other sections of the North Dakota Constitution find their origin
separate from the United States Constitution. 1
1. Rights Involving Criminal Law
Rights involving the criminal law under article I include the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 12  the
requirement that warrants be issued only upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized; 13 the right to bail by
sufficient sureties;' 4 the requirement that bail not be excesssive; 15 a
prohibition against excessive fines, and against cruel and unusual
punishment;16 the requirement that witnesses not be unreasonably
detained, nor confined in any room where criminals are actually
imprisoned;17 the right to a speedy and public trial;' 8 the right of
process to compel the attendance of witnesses; 19 the right to appear
and defend in person and with counsel; 20 the requirement that no
person be placed in double jeopardy;21 a prohibition against self-
incrimination; 22 the requirement that no person be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; 23 the right to trial
by jury;24 the right to a twelve member jury in felony cases, and a
jury of at least six members in all other cases; 25 the requirement of
10. Compare N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 3 (freedom of religion); id. art. 1, S 4 (freedom of speech); id.
art. I, 5 5 (freedom of assembly); id. art. 1, S 11 (bail); id. art. I, 5 13 (trial by jury); id. art. I, S 16
(private property not taken without just compensation); id. art. I, S 21 (privileges and immunities)
with U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (freedom of religion, speech, and assembly); id. amend. VIII (bail); id.
art. III, S 2, cl. 3, amends. VI, VII (trial by jury); id. amend. V (private property not taken without
just compensation); id. art. IV, 5 2, cl. I (privileges and immunities).
11. See, e.g., N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S I (inalienable rights) (cf. the Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776)); id. art. I, 5 2 (inherent political power) (c the Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776)); id. art. I, S 9 (administration of justice) (cf DEL. CONST. art. I, $ 9'
(administration ofjustice); PA. CONST. art. I, S11 (administration ofjustice); TENN. CONST. art. I, 5
17 (administration ofjustice)).
12. N.D. CONST. art. 1, S8.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. I, S 11. Bail need not be provided, however, "for capital offenses when the proof is










24. Id. art. I, S13.
25. Id.
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unanimous jury verdicts;26 the right of habeas corpus, unless
suspended in the event of rebellion or invasion, or when public
safety may require suspension of the right;27 and a prohibition,
with certain exceptions, against imprisonment for debt. 28 The
constitution prohibits involuntary servitude, unless for the
punishment of a crime, 29 and requires prosecution by indictment or
information.3" Article I also provides the legislature with the
authority to change, regulate, or abolish the grand jury system. 3 1
2. Rights Involving Civil Law
In addition to those rights already listed that apply to civil as
well as criminal matters (such as the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the prohibition against excessive fines and
self-incrimination, the right of a jury of at least six persons, the
requirement of a unanimous verdict, the right to habeas corpus,
and the right to due process of law), the constitution grants the
right to enjoy and defend life and liberty; 32 the right to acquire,
possess, and protect property and reputation; 33 the right to keep
and bear arms for the defense of person, family, property, and the
state, 34 and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful
purposes; 35 the right to alter or reform the government; 36 the right
of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference; 37 the right to freely write,
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 1, 5 14.
28. Id. art. I, 5 15. Section 15 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution provides that no
person may be imprisoned for debt "unless upon refusal to deliver up his estate for the benefit of
creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law; or in cases of tort; or where there is a strong
presumption of fraud." Id.
29. Id. art. 1, S 6.
30. Id. art. I, 510.
31. Id. Section 10 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution, which alludes to the grand jury
system that was instituted as part of the laws of the Dakota Territory, provides that "[uintil
otherwise provided by law, no person shall, for a felony, be prosecuted against criminally, otherwise
than by indictment, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual
service in time of war or public danger." Id. Section 2 of the transition schedule provided that "[aill
laws now in force in the territory of Dakota, which are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall
remain in force until they expire by their own limitations or be altered or repealed." N.D. Cosr.
transition schedule, 5 2 (1889, repealed 1978).
32. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 1.
33. Id.
34. Id. The clause on the right to bear arms was added in 1984 by initiative. See Constitutional
Amendment, Approved, ch. 702, 1985 N.D. LAws 2289.
35. N.D. CoNsT, art. 1, 51.
36. Id. art. I, S 2.
37. Id. art. I, S 3. Although 5 3 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution provides for
the free exercise of religion, it also provides that "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not
be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this state." Id.
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speak, and publish opinions on all subjects;3 8 the right to assemble
together in a peaceable manner; 39 the right to apply for the redress
of grievances by petition, address, or remonstrance; 40 the right to
be free to obtain employment wherever possible; 41 the right to a
remedy by due process of law for any injury to lands, goods,
person, or reputation;42 and the right to just compensation before
the taking or damaging of private property for public use.
4 3
The constitution also provides that no person shall be rendered
incompetent as a witness or juror on account of his opinion on
matters of religious belief;4 4 that it is a misdemeanor for any
person, corporation, or agent thereof to maliciously interfere or
hinder any citizen from obtaining employment or enjoying
employment already obtained; 45 that all courts shall be open, and
right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,' or
delay;46 that suits may be brought against the state as provided by
the legislature; 47 that no right of way on private property may be
appropriated to the use of any corporation until full compensation
is paid;48 that the state, when seeking to acquire a right of way, may
take possession of the designated property upon making an offer to
purchase and depositing that amount with the clerk of district court
of the county wherein the right of way is located; 49 that no special
privileges or immunities may ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked, or repealed; 50 that no citizen or class of citizens
may be granted privileges or immunities not granted to all
citizens;5" and that all provisions in article I are excepted out of the
general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate.
5 2
3. Rights and Provisions of a General Nature
Article I also contains general statements which may be used
38. Id. art. I, S 4. Section 4 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution, in addition to
guaranteeing the right of expression, also provides that truth is a defense in all civil and criminal
trials for libel "when the matter is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Id.
39. Id. art. I, §5.
40. id.
41. Id. art. I, S7.
42. Id. art. 1, 59.
43. Id. art. 1, §16.
44. Id. art. 1, S3.
45. Id. art. 1, S7.
46. Id. art. 1, S 9.
47, Id.
48. Id. art. 1, § 16, The amount of compensation must be ascertained by a jury, unless waived.
Id,
49. Id.
50, Id. art. 1, 521.
51. Id,
52. Id. art. I, S20.
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to clarify other provisions, guide the construction of those
provisions, and illuminate the purpose of the constitution. The first
section of the constitution begins with the statement that all people
are by nature equally free and independent and possess certain
inalienable rights.5 3 The next section states that all political power
is inherent in the people, and that government is instituted for the
protection, security, and benefit of the people. 4 In addition, the
preamble states that the people of North Dakota ordained and
established the constitution "grateful to Almighty God for the
blessings of civil and religious liberty."
55
Concerning the interpretation of the document, the
constitution provides that all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation; 56 that the provisions of the constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless, by express words, they are
declared to be otherwise; 57 that the State of North Dakota is an
inseparable part of the American union, 58 and that the Constitution
of the United States is the supreme law of the land. 59
4. Prohibitions
Article I explicitly restricts certain legislative powers and
prohibits specific governmental conduct. In addition to the matters
already mentioned,60 the declaration of rights prohibits bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing contract.
61
Military power is subordinate to civil power; no standing army
may be maintained in time of peace; and no soldiers may, in time
of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war except as prescribed by law.6 2 The
constitution allows conviction of treason only for levying war
against the state, adhering to its enemies, or giving its enemies aid
and comfort.63 Moreoever, a person may not be convicted of
treason except on the evidence of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or upon confession in open court.
6 4
53. Id. art. I, S .
54. Id. art. I, S 2.
55. Id. preamble.
56. Id. art. 1, S 22.
57. Id. art. 1, S 24.
58. Id. art. I, 5 23.
59. Id.
60. For a discussion of limitations that the North Dakota Constitution places on governmental
conduct, see supra notes 1-59 and accompanying text.
61. N.D. CONST., art. 1, S18.
62. Id. art, 1, S 19.




B. ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND RESERVATION OF POWERS TO THE.
PEOPLE
1. Elections and Qualifications of Voters
Article II of the North Dakota Constitution concerns the
elective franchise. 65 It requires that biennial general elections be
held6r and provides that every citizen of the United States residing
in North Dakota who has attained the age of eighteen years may
vote.6 17 The legislature is required to provide the law for the
determination of residence for voter eligibility, secrecy ir voting,
absentee voting, administration of elections, and nomination of
candidates.6 8 Article II also provides that persons who have been
judged mentally incompetent by an appropriate authority are not
qualified to vote, and that persons convicted of a felony are not
qualified to vote until their civil rights are restored.
69
2. Reserved Powers
Article III, entitled "Powers Reserved to the People," gives
the voters of North Dakota the power to propose and enact laws by
initiative; the power to approve or reject legislative acts, or parts
thereof, by referendum; the power, by initiative, to propose and
adopt constitutional amendments as well as the power to call a
constitutional convention; and the power to recall elected
officials. 70 The provisions contained in article III, although not
unique to North Dakota, 71 plainly exhibit both the trust reposed in
the electorate and a distrust leveled at the legislature. 72 While laws
may be enacted that facilitate and safeguard the powers that are
reserved to the people, any laws that hamper, restrict, or impair
these powers are prohibited by the constitution."7
65. Id. art. II.
66. Id. art. II, S 1, para. 1.
67. Id. art. II, S 1, para. 2.
68. id. art. 11, $ 1, paras. 2,3.
69. Id. art. 11, 5 2.
70. Id. art. I1, 51.
71. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II; CoLO. CONST. art. V, S1; IoAHo.CoNsT. art. III, S1; Ma.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, SS17-19; MICH. CONsT. art. II, S9.
72. See generally E. ROBINSON, HISTORY O NORTH DAKOTA 209, 215 (1966) (distrust, born of past
corruption, lead to constitutional provisions that placed severe restrictions on the North Dakota
Legislature, thus much of the burden of government falls upon the people of North Dakota). For a
discussion of the history of the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, see infra notes 654-768 and
accompanying text.
73. N.D. CONST. art. III, S1.
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a) Initiative
To initiate a measure the proponent of the measure must
submit a petition to initiate a law to the secretary of state. 74 The
petition must contain the names and addresses of the sponsors and
the full text of the measure. 75 The initial petition must be signed by
twenty-five or more sponsors of the initiative, one of whom is
designated as chairman of the sponsoring committee. 76 If the
petition is in proper form, the secretary of state must approve it for
circulation. 77 The petition may be circulated only by qualified
voters (electors), who must swear on the petition that the electors
who have signed the petition did so in their presence.78 The electors
signing the petition must also indicate the date of signing and
their post office addresses. 79 Once the petition is signed by electors
equal in number to two percent of the population of the state, based
on the last federal decennial census, 0 the petition is submitted to
the secretary of state. 81 An initiative petition must be submitted not
less than ninety days before the statewide election at which the
measure is to be voted upon. 
82
The secretary of state reviews the petition, and if the petition is
not sufficient, the secretary of state must notify the sponsors and
allow twenty days for correction or amendment.83 The secretary of
state's decisions regarding the sufficiency of the petition, or any
other matter involving the petition process,8 4 are subject to review
by the North Dakota Supreme Court.8 5 When insufficiency of the
petition is claimed, the burden is placed on the party attacking the
petition. 8
6
One interesting exception exists, however, to the supreme
court's power to review the decisions of the secretary of state
regarding the sufficiency of petitions or any other decision
involving the petition process: if the dispute arises after the




78. Id. art. III, § 3.
79. Id. But see McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 787 (N.D. 1979) (designation of only city
and state constitutes sufficient compliance with article III, 5 3). For a discussion of McCarney, see infra
notes 637-53 and accompanying text,
80. See N.D. CONST. art. III, S 4.
81. Id.
82. Id. art. III, S 5.
83. Id. art. III, S 6.
84. Id. art. III, S 7.




preparation of the ballot, the measure is nonetheless left on the
ballot and "no court action shall invalidate the measure if it is
approved at the election by a majority of the votes cast thereon.' '87
If the initiated measure receives a majority of votes, the
measure is deemed enacted and becomes law thirty days after the
election. 88 If conflicting measures are approved, the one receiving
the highest number of affirmative votes becomes the law.89 Once a
measure is approved by initiative it may not be repealed or
amended by the legislature for seven years from its effective date
except by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. 90
b) Constitutional Amendments
A constitutional amendment may also be proposed by an
initiative petition. 91 The same process and requirements that apply
to initiated legislative measures also apply to initiated
constitutional amendments, 92 except that the petition for a
constitutional amendment must be signed by at least four percent,
of the population of the state based on the last federal census. 93
c) Referendum
Specific laws enacted by the legislature may be approved or
rejected by referendum. The referendum process is a tool used by
voters to approve or reject a measure enacted by the legislature. 94
In general, the process and requirements of a referendum are the
same as for an initiative. 95 The only differences are that:
(1) a referendum petition must be submitted within
ninety days after the measure is filed with the
secretary of state;
(2) the submission of a referendum petition
suspends the operation of the measure, unless it
87. Id. art. 1ll, S§6, 7.
88. Id. art. 1II, 5 8.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 11, 5 9. The legislature's power to submit constitutional amendments to the electors,
which is derived from article IV, 5 16, is discussed infra at text accompanying note 166.
92. ND. CONST. art. III, S 9. For a discussion of the procedure that applies to traditional
initiated measures, see supra text accompanying notes 76-90.
93. N.D. CONST. art. III, S9.
94. See id. art. 11, 5 1.
95. For a discussion of the process and requirements of an initiative, see supra text
accompanying notes 74-90.
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is an emergency measure or appropriation
measure for the support and maintenance of
state departments and institutions;
(3) a submission of a referendum petition against
one or more items or parts of a measure does
not prevent the remainder from going into
effect;
(4) a referred measure may be voted upon at any
statewide election or at a special election called
by the governor; 96 and
(5) a referred measure that is rejected by the voters
(i.e., the referendum passes) is immediately
void. 97
Parallel to the superior status of initiated measures, legislation
referred but not rejected may not be repealed or amended by the
legislature for seven years from its effective date except by a two-
thirds vote of the members elected to each house.98 Thus, a person
considering use of the referendum process must consider the fact
that failure to succeed in the referendum attempt (i.e., the existing
law is approved by the voters and remains in force) will result in
making it much more difficult to change the law by subsequent
legislative action. Such a person faces the dilemma of either leaving
well enough alone and hoping to change the law at the next
legislative session, or attempting a referendum and risking the
stiffer legislative requirements for changing the law should the
referendum fail.
d) Recall
The final provision of article III permits recall of any elected
official of the state or any county, as well as any elected official of
any legislative or county commissioner district. 99 Recall results in
requiring an elected official to run for reelection prior to the end of
that official's term. Recall is effected by the filing, with the official
with whom a petition for nomination to the office in question is
filed, 100 of a recall petition signed by twenty-five percent of the
number of electors who voted at the preceding general election for
96. N.D. CONST. art. II1, S 5.
97. Id. art. III, |8.
98. Id.
99. Id, art. II, 510, para. 1.
100. Id. para. 2.
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the office of governor in the state, county, or district of the officer
whose recall is petitioned. 01 To prevent undue influence by elected
officials or their supporters upon those who have signed a recall
petition, electors may not remove their names from a recall
petition. 10 2 Upon receipt of a valid and sufficient petition, the
official who received the filing calls a special election, 10 3 unless the
official subject to recall resigns within ten days after the filing of the
petition. 10 4 Other candidates may be nominated, as provided by
law, and placed on the ballot. 10 5 The candidate receiving the
highest number of votes is deemed elected for the remainder of the
term. 106 -However, if the attempt at recall fails, the official may not
be subject to recall again during the term for which the official was
elected.107
C. THE.BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
The concept of separation of powers, although not explicitly
mentioned in part of the constitution until 1982,108 is a well-
established principle under North Dakota case law. 10 9 The
principle initially stemmed from the existence of three separate
governmental powers which serve to check and balance each
other. 110
1. Legislative Branch
a) Composition and Terms of Office
Article IV defines the structure and powers of the North
Dakota Legislature. This article creates a bicameral legislative
101. Id, para. 1.
102. Id. para. 2.
103. Id.




108. See id. art. XI, 5 26; Constitutional Amendment, Approved, ch. 720, 1983 N.D. Laws 2228
(June 8, 1982).
109. For a listing of case law discussing the separation of powers doctrine, see infra note 110.
110. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); State ex reL. Sanstead v. Freed,
251 N.W,2d 898, 903 (N.D. 1977); State ex ret. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 56 (N.D.
1971); Verry v. Trenbeath, 148 N.W.2d 567, 573-74 (N.D. 1967); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113
N.W.2d 679, 682 (N.D. 1962); State ex rel. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 710, 59 N.W.2d
514, 538 (1953); State ex rel. Syvertson v. Jones, 74 N.D. 465, 476, 23 NAv.2d 54, 59-60 (1946);
Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck LumberCo,, 70 N.D. 607,614, 297 N.W. 42, 46, rev'd, 314 U.S. 95
(1941); State v. Houge, 67 N.D. 251, 258, 271 N.W. 677, 680 (1937); State ex ref. Morris v.
Sherman, 63 N.D, 9, 15, 245 N.W. 877, 879-80 (1932); Baird v. Burke County, 53 N.D. 140, 150-
51, 205 N.W. 17, 20 (1925); State v. First State Bank, 52 N.D. 231, 242-43, 202 N.W. 391,
395-96 (1924); State ex rel. Langer v. Olson, 44 N.D. 614, 629-30, 176 N.W. 528, 534 (1920); State
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assembly, composei of a senate containing between 40 an i54
members, and a house of representatives containing between 80
and 108 members. 1 ' Representatives are elected to two year terms;
senators are elected to four year terms. t1 2 As nearly as practicable
and by a procedure established by law, one-half of the senators are
elected every two years. " 3
b) Apportionment
The number of senators and representatives is fixed by the
legislature. "14 Each senatorial district must have at least one senator
and two representatives." 5 The representatives may be elected at
large or from subdistricts of the district. 116 The legislature is
empowered to divide the state "into as many senatorial districts of
compact and contiguous territory as there are senators. 11 7 The
legislature may redistrict the state at any time, but must do so at
least every ten years because any existing apportionment plan
automatically discontinues at the adjournment of the first regular
session following each federal decennial census." 8
In any attempt to reapportion the state, the legislature must
"guarantee, as nearly as practicable, that every elector is equal to
every other elector in the state in the power to cast ballots for
legislative candidates. '" 119  Two senatorial districts may be
combined, but only when a single member senatorial district
includes a federal facility or installation that contains over two-
thirds of the population of that district. When senatorial districts
are combined, the legislature may provide for the election of the
senators and representatives at large or from subdistricts of that
district. 120
ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 665, 164 NW. 924, 935 (1917); State ex rel. Linde v. Packard,
35 N.D. 298, 322, 160 N.W. 150, 156 (1916); State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 61-62, 159
N.W. 281, 292-93 (1916) (Chriitianson,J., concurring).
111. N.D. CoNsr. art. 1 1.
112. Id. art. IV, S4.
113. Id. art. IV, S3.
114. Id, art. IV, S2, para. 1.
115. id. para. 2.
116. Id.
117. Id. para 1.
118. Id. Presumably any plan adopted as such a session would become effective after
adjournment and would survive the adjournment clause; otherwise, it would be necessary to call a
special session (or perhaps even a constitutional convention) every ten years to reapportion the state.




c) Qualifications for Office
A person elected to the legislature must be a resident of the
state for one year prior to the election and be a qualified elector on
the day of the election in the district from which that member is a
candidate. 121 Persons previously expelled from the legislature for
corruption, or convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous
crimes, are not eligible for election to the legislature; nor are they
eligible for any office of the legislature. 122 Each house is the judge of
the qualifications of its members, although election contests are
subject to judicial review as provided by law.' If two or more
candidates for the same office receive an equal and highest number
of votes, the secretary of state "chooses" one of them by the toss of
a coin. 124
d) Limitations on Employment and Grants of Immunities
While serving in the legislature no member may hold any full
time appointive state office established by the constitution or
created by law; nor may any member of the legislature be
appointed to any office created by the legislature or to any office for
which the compensation has been increased by the legislature while
that member was in the legislature. 125 In addition, members of the
legislature are immune from arrest, except for felony cases, during
their attendance at the session, and in going to or returning from
121. Id. art. IV, S5.
122. Id. art. IV, S 10.
123. Id. art. IV, § 12.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. IV, S 6; see State ex rel. Lyons V. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 213 (N.D. 1961). The
dispute in State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy stemmed from the enactment of three bills that were passed while
William Guy was a member of the North Dakota Legislature. One bill appropriated the sum of
$4500 for the purchase of a car to be used by the Governor of the State of North Dakota. Id. The
second bill appropriated the sum of $1500 for the calendar years of 1959 and 1960 to be expended by
the Governor of the State of North Dakota in the discharge of his duties. Id. The final bill increased
the amount of social security benefits to be paid to the Governor of North Dakota, Id After these bills
were passed, William Guy was elected Governor of North Dakota. Id. at 214. The issue before the
court was whether William Guy should be ousted from the office of Governor because, during his
term in the legislature, the above three bills were passed. Id. The plaintiff contended that,
because William Guy was a member of the legislature when the bills were passed, William Guy was
prohibited from retaining the office of governor because that act would violate § 6 of article IX
of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides that no member of the legislature may take any
office for which the compensation has been increased by the legislature while that member was in the
legislature, Id. The court concluded that the three bills did not, in relation to article IX, $ 6,
impermissibly increase the compensation paid to the governor because two of the bills were
appropriations for expenses, and the other was provided by federal law. See id. at 216-19. Thus, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that William Guy could retain the office of the Governor of North
Dakota. Id. at 219.
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the session.' 2 6 Nor may members of the legislature be questioned
in any other place for any words used in any speech or debate
conducted during the legislative proceedings.
127
e)The Session
i) Start and Organizational Meeting
The terms of the members of the legislature begin on the first
day of December following their election.' 28 The legislature meets
for organizational and orientation purposes at the seat of
government, Bismarck, 12 9 in the month of December following the
election. 3 0 At the beginning of the organizational session, the
house of representatives elects one of its members to act as
presiding officer.1 3' The lieutenant governor automatically serves
as president of the senate. 13 2 At the conclusion of the organizational
and orientation meeting, the legislature recesses until noon on the
first Tuesday after the third of January, or until such other time as
prescribed by law but not later than January 1 th. 133
ii) Procedure
A quorum of each house is constituted by a majority of the
members of that house. 13 4 A smaller number has the authority to
adjourn, as well as the authority to "compel attendance of absent
members in a manner and under penalty, as may be provided by
law.' 1 35 Each house determines its own rules of procedure, and
may punish its members or other persons for contempt or
disorderly behavior that occurs in its presence. 13 6 Additionally,
both houses have the power to expel a member with the
concurrence of two-thirds of its elected members. 137 All sessions,
including committee meetings, must be open and public. 13 8 Each
126. N.D. CONST. art. IV, 5 15. The constitution is unclear whether the arrest-for-a-felony
exception applies only to going and returning from the session, or whether the exception also applies
to arrest during attendance at the session. Set id.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. IV, 5 7, para. 1.
129. Id, art. IX, 512().
130. Id art. IV, 5 7, para. 2.
131. Id. art. IV, 58.
132. Id. art. V, 57.
133. Id. art, IV, S 7, para. 2.
134. Id. art. IV, S12, para. 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. para. 3.
137. Id.
138. Id. art. IV, S 14. For a discussion of the public nature of the state constitutional
convention, see infra text accompanying notes 676-78.
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house must keep a journal of its proceedings, and a vote on any
question may be recorded at the request of one-sixth of those
members present. 139
iii) Passage of Laws
A bill may embrace only one subject, which must be expressed
in its title. A law violating this rule is invalid only to the extent that
the subject is not expressed in the title.t4 0 Every bill must be read
on two separate natural days' which are defined as periods of
twenty-four consecutive hours. 42 The readings of the bill may be
by title unless a reading at length is demanded by one-fifth of the
members present. 143 Except in the case of definitions and
procedural provisions, no bill may be amended or extended in any
other bill by the mere reference to its title; nor may a bill be
incorporated into another bill by reference only to its title.144
Each bill must be passed by a recorded majority vote of both
houses, 145 and "no bill may be amended on its passage through
either house in a manner which changes its general subject
matter." 146 The presiding officer of each house signs all bills passed
and resolutions adopted, and the fact of signing is entered in the
journal.' 7 Laws enacted at a regular session by the legislature
which survive the governor's veto power '48 and judicial review 49
take effect on the first of July after being filed with the secretary of
state, or ninety days after being filed (whichever is later), or on a
subsequent date specified by law. 150 The only exception to this rule
is that the legislature may, by a vote of two-thirds of the members
elected to each house, declare the law an emergency measure. In
this event, the "emergency measure takes effect upon its filing with
the secretary of state or on a date specified in the measure."' 51
139. N.D. CONST. art. IV, 513, para. 1.
140. Id. para. 2.
141. Id. para. 3.
142. Id. art. IV, 1 7, para. 3. Although the definition employed in S 7 is explicitly limited to that
section, we may assume that the same definition is intended in S 13 because of the use of the same
term.
143. Id. art. IV, S 13, para. 3.
144. Id. para. 4.
145. Id. para. 1.
146. Id. para. 2.
147. Id. para. 5.
148. Id. art. V, S 9 (after a bill is vetoed by the governor, it may nevertheless become law if,
upon reconsideration, it is passed by two-thirds of both houses).
149. Id. art. VI, 5 4 (supreme court may declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional upon
four of five justices so deciding).
150. Id. art, IV, S13, para. 6.
151. Id.
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Laws enacted by a special session of the legislature take effect on the
date specified in the law. 
152
iv) Required and Prohibited Laws
The legislature is required to enact "all laws necessary" to
carry into effect the provisions of the constitution. 153 However, the
legislature is prohibited, unless otherwise authorized in the
constitution, from enacting local or special laws; nor may the
legislature indirectly enact special and local laws by the partial
repeal of a general law, although it may repeal local and special
laws. 154
v) Length and Recesses
A regular session of the legislature may not exceed eighty
natural days during the biennium, not counting the organizational
meeting, impeachment proceedings, or any days spent in session at
the call of the governor. 155 Days spent in regular session need not
be consecutive, 156 although neither house may recess or adjourn for
more than three days without the consent of the other house. 157 In
addition, the legislature may authorize its committees to meet at
any time during the biennium. 158
f) Prohibited Conduct, Expulsion, and Replacement of
Members of the Legislature
In the age of special interests and rampant vote swapping, it is
interesting to note that the North Dakota Constitution contains a
provision prohibiting vote swapping. Section 9 of article IV
prohibits persons elected to either house of the legislature from
offering or giving their "vote or influence for or against any
measure or proposition pending or proposed to be introduced" in
consideration or upon a condition that any other legislators of the
same house will give or have given their vote or influence for or
against any other measure. 159 A legislator who commits such an act
152. Id.
153. Id. para, 7.
154. Id.
155. Id. art. IV, 5 7, para. 3.
156. Id.
157, Id. para. 4.
158. Id. para. 3.
159. Id. art. IV, 59.
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is guilty of bribery and must be expelled from service in the
legislature, 160 in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law in
the civil courts. 16
1
As mentioned above,162 either house may expel a member with
the concurrence of two-thirds of its elected members for contempt
or disorderly behaior that occurs in its presence. 163 Should a
vacancy occur in either house for any reason, the governor must
issue a writ of election to fill that vacancy. 164
g) Proposa.- to Amend the Constitution
Either house may propose an amendment to the
constitution. 165 If both houses, upon a roll call vote by a majority of
the members elected, agree to a proposal, it is submitted to the
electors; the proposal becomes part of the constitution if it receives
a majority of the votes cast by the electors. 166
2. Executive Branch
a) Offices, Eligibility, Election, and Terms
The executive power is vested in the governor, who must
reside at the seat of government. 167 Other executive offices
described in the constitution include lieutenant governor, 16
secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, superintendent of public
instruction, commissioner of insurance, attorney general,
commissioner of agriculture and labor, tax commissioner, and
three public service commissioners. 16 9 The office of commissioner
of agriculture and labor may, at the legislature's choosing, be
divided into two "separate and distinct" departments, with the
commissioner of labor either elected or appointed, "whichever the
legislature shall declare. "1
70
160. Id. A legislator who is so expelled may not serve in the legislature following expulsion. Id.
art. IV, S 10.
161. Id. art. IV, S 9. The phrase "the civil courts" presumably involves civil or criminal
proceedings not held in the legislature (i.e., proceedings other than the legislative proceedings of
impeachment, expulsion, or sanctions).
162. See supra text accompanying note 137.
163. N.D. CoNsT. art. IV, S 12, para. 3.
164. Id. art. IV, § 11.
165. Id. art. IV, 516.
166. Id.
167. Id. art. V, 5 1.
168. Id. art. V, S 2.
169. Id. art. V, 512.
170. Id. para. 5. The legislature created the commissioner of labor in 1965, to be elected every
four years starting with the 1966 general election. Act of Mar. 19, 1965, ch. 236, § 3, 1965 N.D.
Laws 455 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE S 34-05-01.2 (1980)).
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To be eligible for the office of governor or lieutenant governor,
one must be a United States citizen, a qualified elector of the state,
at least thirty years old, and a state resident during the five years
preceding the election. 171 The other elected officials must be at least
twenty-five years old and be qualified electors. 17 The governor and
lieutenant governor are elected upon a joint ballot.17 3 If two or
more joint candidates for the positions of governor and lieutenant
governor have an equal and highest number of votes, the
legislature, at its next regular session and in joint session, chooses
one pair of joint candidates for the two offices.
174
The term of office for the executive officers is four years,
17 5
except that the members of the public service commission are
elected to six year terms that are staggered so that one
commissioner is elected every two years. 176 No person may be
eligible for the office of treasurer for more than two consecutive
terms. 177 The terms of all of these executive officers continue until
their successors are elected and duly qualified, 178 except that the
term of the governor begins on December fifteenth following the
governor's election. 179 Any persons elected to the position of
governor or lieutenant governor are not eligible for any other
elected office during the term for which they were elected. 180
b) Powers of the Governor
Although the powers of the governor primarily involve the
passage and execution of laws, the governor also acts as
commander in chief of the military forces of the state 81 and as a
member of the board of pardons. 182 As commander in chief, the
governor has the power to call out the military and naval forces of
the state to execute the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasion, except when those forces are called into the service of the
171. N.D. CONST. art. V, S3.
172. Id. art. V, 5 12, para. 1.
173. Id. art. V, S4.
174. Id.
175. Id. art. V, 5 1 (governor); id. art. V, 5 2 (lieutenant governor); id. art. V, 5 12, para. I
(other offices).
176. See id. art. V, 5 12, para. 3. The public service commission was formerly the board of
railroad commission. Id
177. Id. para. 1.
178. Id. art. V, S I (governor); id. art. V, S 2 (lieutenant governor); id. art, V, 5 12, para. I
(other offices).
179. Id. art. V, S 1.
180. Id. art. V, 53.
181. Id. art. V, 5 5.
182. Id. art. V, 56.
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United States. 18 3 The governor is an ex officio member of the board
of pardons, and, in conjunction with the attorney general, the chief
justice of the supreme court, and two qualified electors appointed to
the board by the governor, possesses the power to remit fines and
rirfeitures; and to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
after conviction for all offenses except treason and cases of im-
peachment. 184 In addition, the governor possesses the power to fill'
vacancies when not otherwise provided by the constitution or by
law185 and to temporarily suspend execution of a sentence for
treason. 186 Finally, the governor is required to transact all
necessary business with officers of the government, .civil and
military. 187
The governor's power in the legislative realm is both extensive
and influential. At the commencement of each legislative session,
the governor is required to communicate to the legislature the
condition of the state and to recommend measures as the governor
deems expedient. 188 But the governor's greatest power involves the
enactment of laws. Every bill that is passed by the legislature must,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor for his
approval. 189 If the governor approves the measure, the measure is
signed and it becomes a law; if the governor does not approve the
measure, it maybe returned with the governor's objections to the
house in which it originated. 190 The governor's objections are
entered in the journal of the house in which the bill originated, and
that body is required to consider the measure.' 91 If two-thirds of the
members agree to pass the bill, it is sent, with the governor's
objections to the bill, to the other house, which must also reconsider
183. Id. art. V, S 5.
184. Id, art. V, S 6. The governor is required to communicate to the legislature "at each regular
session each case of remission of fine, reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted by the board of
pardon, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he is convicted, the sentence and its date
and the date of remission, commutation, pardon or repriese, with the reason for granting the same."
Id.
185. Id. art. V, 5 8.
186. Id. art. V, 5 6. If the governor temporarily suspends execution of a sentence for treason, the
case must be reported to the legislature at its next regular session. Id. The legislature may pardcn or
commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant further reprieve. Id.
187. Id. art. V, 5 5.
188. Id.
189. Id. art. V, $ 9.
190. Id. A bill presented to the governor but not returned by the governor within three days,
Sundays excepted, becomes law unless the legislature, by its adjournment, prevents the return of the
bill, in which case the bill becomes a law unless the governor, within fifteen days after adjournment,
files the objections to the bill in the office of the secretary of state. Id.
Unlike the three day period while the legislature is in session, Sundays are not excepted in the
computation of the fifteen day period in which the governor may exercise the veto power. See State ex
rel. Watkins v. Norton, 21 N.D. 473, 131 N.W. 257(1911).
191. N.D. CONST. art. V, 5 9.
92. Id.
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it.192 If two-thirds of the members of the second house approve the
bill, it becomes law despite the governor's veto. 191 Otherwise, the
veto stands and the bill does not become a law. 1
94
The governor also has the power to implement what is
normally called a "line-item veto" in regard to appropriation
bills. 195 Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has construed
this provision as allowing line-item vetoes of appropriation bills
only, 196 it is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that the supreme
court could someday rule otherwise and extend this power to all
bills enacted by the legislature.
Finally, the governor is invested with the duties of expediting
measures resolved upon by the legislature and executing the laws of
the state. 197
c) Powers of the Other Executive Officers
The lieutenant governor has the power to serve as president of
the senate and to perform any additional duties prescribed by the
governor.198 As president of the senate, the lieutenant governor
may, when the senate is equally divided, vote on all procedural
matters, and, if the vote would be decisive, also on substantive
matters. 1 9 9 The constitution states that the powers and duties of the
other executive officers are those powers and duties prescribed by
law. 200
193. Id.
194. Id. Section 9 does not authorize a line item veto - the governor must veto the entire
measure; the effect of an unauthorized veto of one section of a bill is the passage of the entire bill.
State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979). However, the governor does have the line
item veto power with respect to appropriation bills. N.D. CoNsr. art. V, § 10. For a discussion of the
line item veto with respect to appropriation bills, see infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
195. N.D. CONST. art. V, 510.
196. State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979) (citing State ex rel. Sandaker v.
Olson, 65 N.D. 561, 260 N.W. 586 (1935)). In Link the Governor of North Dakota, Arthur Link,
vetoed one section of a bill that delegated certain duties and assignments to the lieutenant governor.
Link, 286 N.W.2d at 264-65. One of the issues before the court was whether the governor possessed
the power to veto only a portion of the bill, rather than the complete bill. Id. at 268. The court
concluded that J10 of article V of the North Dakota Constitution, which concerns the authority of
the Governor of North Dakota to issue partial vetoes, grants the governor partial veto power only
with respect to appropriation bills. Id. Thus, since the governor's veto concerned only the portion
of the bill that delegated certain duties to the lieutenant governor, the court held that the governor's
actions constituted an unconstitutional partial veto. Id. at 268-72.
197. N.D. CONST, art. V, 5 5.
198. Id. art. V, S 7.
199. Id. The phrasing employed in 5 7, which makes a distinction between substantive and
procedural matters, is curious, especially since it would have been much easier to require the
lieutenant governor to vote whenever the senate is equally divided on substantive or procedural
matters. If one attempts to give meaning to this peculiar and otherwise unnecessarily verbose
phrasing, the lieutenant governor may resolve a tie or abstain on any procedural matter, but must
render either a negative or affirmative vote on matters involving substance. But see State ex rel.
Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 904 (N.D. 1977) (the senate may prevent the lieutenant
governor from casting a tie breaking vote when the vote concerns the final disposition of a bill).




Aside from the prohibitions discussed above, such as the
prohibition against the governor or lieutenant governor filling any
other office during the term for which they have been elected, 20 1 the
governor is prohibited from asking, receiving, or agreeing to
receive any bribe upon any understanding that the governor's
official opinion, judgement or action shall be influenced
thereby. '202 The governor is also prohibited from giving, offering,
or promising official influence in consideration for a member of the
legislature's vote or influence in consideration for a member of the
legislature's vote or influence on a particular side of any question or
matter; from offering or promising any member of the legislature
an appointment or any particular person to any office in considera-
tion for that member's vote or influence on any matter pending or
thereafter to be introduced into either house; and from threatening
the removal of any person from office with the intent to influence
the actions of a member of the legislature. 20 3 If any of these
proscribed acts occur, the governor is to be punished "in the
manner now, or that may hereafter, be provided by law," and
upon conviction, the governor forfeits "all right to hold or exercise
any office of trust or honor in the state.' '204
e) Vacancies
The powers and duties of the office of governor devolve upon
the lieutenant governor in the event of death, impeachment,
resignation, failure to qualify, absence from the state, removal
from office, or disability of the governor; the lieutenant governor
retains these powers and duties for the remainder of the term, or
until the governor is acquitted or the disability is removed. 20 5 If,
during the vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant
governor is impeached, displaced, resigns, dies, or is incapable of
performing the duties of his office due to mental or physical disease,
the secretary of state acts as governor until the vacancy in the
position of the lieutenant governor is filled or the disability of the
present lieutenant governor is removed. 206
When any office becomes vacant and no mode is provided by
201. Id. art. V, S 3.
202. ld. art, V, S 11.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. art, V, S 2.
206. Id. art. V, S 7.
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the constitution or by law for filling such vacancy, the governor fills
the vacancies by appointment. 20 7
3. Judicial Branch
The constitution provides for the creation of a unified judicial
system consisting of a supreme court, a district court, and such
other courts as the legislature may provide. 20 8
a) The Supreme Court
i) Election and Terms of Office
To be eligible for a position on the supreme court, one must be
a United States citizen, a resident of the state, learned in the law,
and possess any additional qualifications prescribed by law. 20 9 The
court consists of five justices, one of whom is designated chief
justice in a manner provided by law. 210 The justices of the supreme
court are chosen by the electors of the state for ten year terms,
arranged so that one term ends every two years. 2"1 The justices
hold office until their successors are duly qualified.
212
ii) Jurisdiction and Powers
The supreme court is the highest court of the state. It has
appellate jurisdiction 21 3 over appeals taken from decisions of lower
courts as provided by law. 21 4 The supreme court also has original
jurisdiction with the authority to issue, hear, and determine such
original and remedial writs as may be necessary to properly
exercise its jurisdiction.215 The supreme court has the power to
promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to
be followed by all courts of the state. 216 Rules and regulations for
the admission to practice, and pertaining to the conduct, discipline,
and disbarment of attorneys, may be promulgated by the supreme
207. Id. art. V, 5 8.
208. Id. art. VI, S1.
209. Id. art. VI, $10.
210. Id. art. VI, 5 2.
211. Id. art. VI, $7.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. VI, 5 2.
214. Id. art. VI, S6.
215. Id, art, VI, 52.
216. Id. art. VI, S 3.
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court, unless otherwise provided by law. 217 The supreme court is
required to divide the state into judicial districts. 218
The chief justice is the administrative head of the unified
judicial system. 219 The chief justice possesses the power to assign
judges, including retired judges, for temporary duty in any court or
district under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by
the supreme court. 220 The chief justice is also required to appoint a
court administrator. 221 The powers, duties, qualifications, and
terms of office of the court administrator and other court officials
must be provided by the rules of court, unless otherwise provided
by the law.
222
A majority of the supreme court is necessary to constitute a
quorum or to pronounce a decision. 22" When justices have a
conflict of interest in a pending case or are unable to sit in court
because they are physically or mentally incapacitated, the chief
justice, or a justice acting in the chief justice's stead, assigns a
judge, or retired judge, to hear the case. 224
Article VI provides that the supreme court shall concisely state
in writing the reason for reversing, modifying, or confirming a
judgment or order.225 The court's opinion shall be signed by the
concurring justices and filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme
court, to be preserved with the record of the case. 226 Any dissenting
justice may, in writing and over the justice's signature, give the
reason for the dissent. 227 A legislative enactment may not be
declared unconstitutional without the agreement of at least four
members of the court. 228
Compensation of the justices is provided by law, although the
compensation of any justice may not be diminished during the
justice's term of office. 2
29
217. Id.
218, Id. art. VI, 5 9.
219. Id. art. VI, 5 3, para. 2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. By statute, the supreme court justices also appoint the clerk of court. See N.D. CENT.
CoDE S 27-03-01 (1974). The court must also appoint a supreme court reporter "who is experienced
and learned in the law and of known integrity to act as supreme court reporter, state law librarian,
and legislative reference librarian." Id. S 27-04-01. Moreover, the court may, at its own choosing,
designate the supreme court reporter, or any other person, to act as bailiff. Id. 5 27-04-11. The salary
of the supreme court reporter is determined by the legislature. Id. S 27-04-03 (Supp. 1985).
223. N.D. CONST. art. VI, S 4.
224. Id. art. VI, 511.
225. Id. art. VI, 5 5.
226. Id.
227. Id,
228, Id. art. VI, S 4.
229. Id. art. VI, S 7. Because the terms of office for the supreme court justices have specific
length' it is apparent that this provision does not prevent the legislature from lowering the
compensation of a justice at the end of that person's elected term.
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b) The Lower Courts: Election and Powers
As previously stated, the supreme court is required to divide
the state into judicial districts. 230 District court judges must have
the same qualifications as supreme court justices. 231 The electors of
each judicial district choose district court judges for terms of six
years, 232 with each district judge holding office until a successor is
duly qualified.233
The district courts have original jurisdiction over all claims
except as otherwise provided by law, and appellate jurisdiction as
provided by law or rule of the supreme court. 234 They also have
authority to issue such writs as are necessary for the proper exercise
of their jurisdiction. 
235
The same rules relating to conflict of interest or incapacity that
apply to supreme court justices also apply to district court judges.
236
The constitution also prohibits the diminishment of compensation
of a districtjudge during the judge's term of office.
237
In addition to the supreme court and district court, other
courts may be established by law.
238
c) Restrictions on Judges
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the district court
are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law or holding any
public office, elective or appointive, that is not judicial in nature.
239
Justices are not allowed to exercise any power of appointment
except as provided by the constitution. 240 Judges of every court of
230. Id. art. VI, S 9.
231. Id. art. VI, S 10. For a discussion of the qualifications for supreme court justices, see supra
text Lzcompanying note 209.
232. Id. art. VI, S 9.
233. Id.
234. Id. art. VI, 5 8.
235. Id.
236. Id. art. VI, S11. When a district court judge has a conflict of interest, the chiefjustice, or a
justice acting in the chiefjustice's stead, assigns a judge, or retired justice orjudge, to hear the case.
Id. For a discussion of the rules relating to conflict of interest and incapacity of supreme court
justices, see supra text accompanying note 224.
237. Id. art, VI, S 9. But see infra text accompanying notes 710-11 (it is probable that the framers
of the constitution had no objection to preconditioning the drawing of the salary of a district court
judge on the currency of the judge's docket).
238. N.D. CoNsr. art. VI, S 1.
239, Id. art. VI, S 10.
240. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 220-22, 224, 236 (appointment of supreme court
reporter, state librarian, and judges or justices who have a conflict of interest or who are
iticapacitated).
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the state may not be paid from the fees of their office. 241 Nor may
the amount of a judge's compensation be measured by the fees,
other moneys received, or the amount of judicial activity of that
judge's office.
24 2
d) Retirement, Discipline, and Removal ofJudges
The legislature may provide for the retirement, discipline, and
removal of the supreme court justices and other judges. 243 This
power is in addition to the power of impeachment, 244 and
removal, 245 discussed below.
246
e) Vacancies
Any vacancy in the office of a supreme court justice or district
court judge is filled either by appointment by the governor or by a
special election called by the governor to fill the vacancy for the
remainder of the term. 247 If the governor chooses to make an
appointment, the selection must be made from a list of
candidates nominated b1 the judicial nominating committee, a
committee which must be established by law. 248 Judges selected to
fill vacancies continue to serve until the next statevide general




Aside from the traditional matters, such as the name of the
state, its boundaries, its seal, and its motto, 250 the North Dakota
Constitution addresses numerous other matters.
241. N:D. CONST. art. VI, 510. Buz see supra note 237 and infra text accompanying notes 710-11
(framers of the constitution had no objection to preconditioning the drawing of a district court judges
salary on the currency of that particular judge's docket).
242. N.D. CoNsT. art. VI, 5 10.
243. Id. art. VI, SS 12, 12.1.
244. Id. art XI, 5 10. The legislature's power to impeach applies to judicial officers except
county judges, justices of the peace, and police magistrates. Id.
245. Id. art. XI, 511.
246. For a discussion of the impeachment and removal of judges and justices, see infra at text
accompanying notes 264-76.
247. N.D. CONST. art. VI, 513.
248. Id. But see State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920-21 (N.D. 1978) (governor's
appointment of a district court judge valid even in the absence of a nomination by a judicial
nominating committee). The judicial nominating committee consists of six permanent members and
three temporary members. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-25-02(1) (Supp. 1985). The governor, the chief
justice, and the president of the state bar association each appoint two permanent members for
staggered three year terms, and one temporary member from the judicial district having a vacancy.
Id. § 27-25-02(2), (3). When the vacancy concerns a supreme court position, only the six permanent
members serve. Id. 5 27-25-02(4). The committee has the power and duty to seek out qualified
judicial candidates and make inquiry into the qualifications of each candidate. Id. S 27-25- 05(1), (2).
249. N.D. CONST. art. VI, S13.
250. See id. art. XI, 55 1-3.
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1. Waterways
The constitution provides that "[a]ll flowing streams and
natural watercourses shall forever remain the property of the state
for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes." '251
2. Legislative andJudicial Oaths
Most members of the legislature and the judicial department
must, before entering the duties of their respective offices, take an
oath or affirmation that they will support the United States and
North Dakota Constitutions and faithfully discharge their duties to
the best of their abilities. 252
3. Open Meetings and Public Records
Unless otherwise provided by law, "public or governmental
bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, or agencies of the state or
any political subdivision of the state, or organizations or agencies
supported in whole or in part by public funds, or expending public
funds" must allow all meetings to be open to the public and all
records to be open and accessible for inspection during reasonable
office hours. 253
4. Expansion of Legislative Powers During Time of War
During periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused
by enemy attack, the legislature has the power and the immediate
duty to provide for prompt and temporary succession to the powers
and duties of all public offices and to adopt necessary and proper
measures for insuring the continuity of governmental operations.
25 4
251. Id. art. XI, S 3.
252. Id. art, XI, S 4, Inferior officers of the legislative and judicial branches may be
exempted from this requirement by law. Id.
At the end of the taking of the oath, the individual states "so help me God." Id. If an
affirmation, rather than an oath, is taken, the individual instead states "under pains and penalties of
perjury." Id. This portion of the constitution was intended to provide as follows: "'(If an oath). So
help me God. (If an affirmation). Under the pains and penalties of perjury.' "Journal of the
Convention 324 (Aug. 16, 1889). However, the final copy of the proposed constitution included the
following incorrect and nonsensical transcription of that portion of 5 4: "'..., so help me
God' (if an oath), (under pains and penalties of perjury) if an affirmation .... " The mistake in
punctuation has never been corrected. See N.D. CoNsT. art. XI, 5 4.
253. N.D. CONST, art. XI, 115,6.
254. Id. art. XI, 5 7. It is apparent from the language of this provision that the legislature does
not possess the increased powers when the disaster is caused by means other than by enemy attack,
See id.
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These measures may include waiving the restrictions on the
location of the place of government, the restrictions on the calling of
sessions of the legislature, the restrictions on the length of sessions
of the legislature, the restrictions on the subjects of legislation, and
the restrictions on the eligibility of legislators; the legislature may
also alter voting and quorum requirements, appropriation
requirements, and eligibility and residence requirements of
legislators. 255
5. The Militia: Composition and Organization
The militia of the state consists of all able-bodied male persons
residing in the state between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
years, except as exempted by the laws of the United States or of
North Dakota. 25 6 The militia is enrolled, organized, uniformed,
and disciplined in the manner prescribed by law. 57 Militia officers
are appointed or elected in the manner provided by law.
258
Commissioned officers are commissioned by the governor and may
not be relieved of such a commission "e. cept by sentence of court
martial, pursuant to law."
259
The legislature is required to provide laws for the
establishment of volunteer organizations of several arms of the
service, which are considered active militia. 260 In addition, no other
organized body of armed men, except the army of the United
States, may perform military duty in the state without the
proclamation of the governor.2 61 Except in regard to a charge of
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, members of the militia are
privileged from arrest while going to, attending, and returning
from musters, parades, and election of officers. 262 Finally, persons
whose religious tenets or conscientious scruples forbid them to bear
arms may not be compelled to do so in times of peace, but such
persons must pay "an equivalent for a personal service."
263
6. Impeachment and Removal
The house of representatives has the sole power of
impeachment. 264 The governor and other state and judicial officers,
255. Id.
256, Id. art. XI, S16,
257. Id. art. XI, S 17.
258. Id, art. XI, S19.
259. Id. art. XI, S20.
260. Id. art. XI, S 18.
261. Id,
262. Id. art. XI, S21.
263. Id. art. XI, 516.
264. Id. art. XI, S 8,
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except county judges, justices of the peace, and police magistrates,
are subject to impeachment for habitual drunkenness, crimes,
corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in office.
265
Impeachment is accomplished by the concurrence of a majority of
all members elected to the house of representatives.2 66 An officer
who has been impeached is prohibited from exercising the duties of
office after being impeached and before acquittal
267
A person may not be tried on impeachment unless served with
a copy of the impeachment entered by the house at least twenty
days before the day set for trial.2 68 Impeachments by the house are
tried by the senate.26 9 The lieutenant governor may not participate
in the impeachment trial of the governor.27 0 When either the
governor or the lieutenant governor is on trial by impeachment, the
presiding justice of the supreme court presides.
271
When sitting for the purpose of an impeachment trial, the
senators must take an oath or affirmation to do justice according to
the law and the evidence.27 2 The concurrence of two-thirds of the
members elected to the senate is necessary for a conviction, which
results in removal from office.
273
No person is subject to impeachment twice for the same
offense, 274 although a person accused, whether convicted or
acquitted, is nonetheless subject to indictment, trial, judgment,
and punishment according to law. 275 All officers not subject to
impeachment are subject to removal, in the manner provided by
law, for misconduct, malfeasance, crime or misdemeanor in office,
or for habitual drunkenness or gross incompetency.
276
7. Debtor Rights
Debtors possess the right to enjoy the comforts and necessities
of life, as "recognized by wholesome laws" exempting from forced
sale a homestead and a reasonable amount of personal property, as
limited and defined by law.2 77 This provision does not prevent liens
265. Id. art. XI, S 10.
266. Id. art. XI, 58.
267. Id. art. XI, 5 12.
268. Id. art. XI, S14.
269. Id. art, XI, S 9.
270. Id. art. XI, S 13.
271. Id. art. XI, S9.
272, Id.
273, Id.
274. Id. art, XI, S 15.
275. Id. art. XI, 510.
276. Id. art. XI, 11.
277. Id. art. XI, S 22.
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against the homestead for labor done and materials furnished in the
improvement of the homestead, as provided by law.
278
8. Property Rights of Womer
The constitution provides that the real and personal property
of any woman acquired before marriage, and all property to which
she becomes entitled after marriage, is her separate property, and
cannot be used for the debts of her husband. 27 9
9. Labor of Children
The constitution also prohibits the labor of children under
twelve years of age in mines, factories, and workshops.
280
10. Games of Chance
Games of chance, lottery, or gift enterprises may not be
authorized by the legislature except games of chance conducted by
bona fide nonprofit charitable, educational, religious, fraternal, or
veterans' organizations, civic and service clubs, or such other
public spirited organizations recognized by the legislature that
devote the entire net proceeds to educational, charitable, patriotic,
fraternal, religious, or other public spirited uses. 281
11. Compensation and Expenses of Elected Officials
The constitution provides that the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches are coequal branches of government. 282 The
constitution provides that elected members and officials of each
branch may receive for their services only the amount set by law,
and for their expenditures not more than the amount paid for
necessary expenses. 283
12. Political Subdivisions
The purpose of the article on political subdivisions is to
provide for maximum local self-government by all political
278. ld.
279. Id. art. XI, S 23.
280. Id. art. XI, S 24.
281. Id. art. XI, S 25.
282. Id. art. XI, S 26.
283. Id.
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subdivisions with a minimum duplication of their functions. 284
Political subdivisions are any divisions of the state government,
including counties, townships, and cities. The legislature is
required to provide by law for the establishment and government of
all political subdivisions.
285
a) County Government: Organization
The counties of North Dakota are those counties which existed
as of the last reenactment of the article on political subdivisions,
which occurred in 1982.216 Although the legislature has the
authority to relocate county seats within counties, it may not
remove a county seat from any county. 287 Unless the electors of a
county adopt an optional form of government, discussed below,
288
the fiscal and administrative affairs of the county are governed by a
board of county commissioners, as provided by law.289 County
commissioners, as well as all other elected county officials, are
elected for terms of four years.
290
b) Services Provided by County
Each county is required to provide law enforcement,
administrative, fiscal, recording, registration, and educational
services, and any other governmental services or functions as may
be provided by law. 291
c) Changes in Form of County Government
The method and standards by which all or any portion of a
county or counties may be annexed, merged, consolidated,
reclassified, or dissolved is as provided by law, and any change in
the form of county government must be approved by a majority of
electors of the affected county. 29 2 Optional forms of government for
counties must be provided by law, as promulgated by the
284. Id. art. VII, 51.
285. Id. art, VII, S 2.
286. Id. art. VII, S 3.
287. Id. art. VII, 5 4.
288. For a discussion of optional forms of county government, see infra text accompanying notes
292-95.
289. N.D. CoNs-r. art. VII, 5 7, para. 2.
290, Id. art. VII, 58,
291. Id.
292. Id. art. V.1, 5 5.
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legislature. 293 A change in the form of county government requires
approval of a majority of the electors of the affected county at a
special or general election. 294 Questions concerning the form of
county government to be adopted or the elimination or
reinstatement of elective county offices may be placed on the ballot
by a petition of electors of the county equal in number to twenty-
five percent of the votes cast in the county for the office of governor
at the preceding gubernatorial election. 
295
d) City Government: Operation of Public Utilities
The legislature is prohibited from abridging the power of a city
to franchise the construction and operation of any public utility or
similar service within the city. 2
96
e) Home Rule: Counties and Cities
The legislature is required to provide laws for the
establishment and exercise of home rule in counties and cities. 297
Home rule, when adopted by a subdivision, results in expanded
powers detailed by statute. 298 Home rule for cities and counties
may not become operational until approved by a majority of the
electors of that county or city. 299 In order to enhance the powers
and abilities of home rule cities, the legislature may allow home
rule cities to have higher debt limits,30° despite the debt limitations
contained in the constitution that relate to all other cities. 30 1
) Agreements Between Political Subdivisions
Political subdivisions are expressly allowed to make
agreements, including those for cooperative or joint administration
293. Id. art. VII, 5 7, para. 1.
294. Id. Section 7 of article VII does not state whether the special election approving the change
must be a statewide special election, or any special election, including one that is merely conducted in
the county opting for an optional form of county government. See id.
295. Id. art, VII, 5 9.
296. Id. art. VII, 511.
297. Id. art. VII, S 6.
298. See N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 40-05.1-06 (1983).
299. N.D. CoNsT. art. VII, S 6. Although changes in the form of government for counties must
be approved at special or general elections (i.e., statewide elections), the lack of a similar
requirement for changes in the form of city government leads one to believe that changes in the form
of city government may be approved at any citywide election.
300. Id.
301. For a discussion of debt limits that relate to cities other them home rule cities, see infra text
accompanying notes 394-97,
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of any powers or functions, with any other political subdivision, the
state, or the United States, unless otherwise provided by law or
home rule charter. 30 2 A political subdivision may also agree with
the county in which it is located to transfer any of its powers or
functions, as provided by law or home rule charter. 303
13. Education
North Dakota has always placed great emphasis on the
education of its citizens. 30 4 The constitution declares that a high
degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity, and morality on the
part of every voter in a government by the people is necessary to
insure the continuation of that government as well as the prosperity
and happiness of the people.305 The legislature is therefore required
to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a system of
public schools that are open to all children of the state and free from
sectarian control. 30 6 This requirement is "irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of North Dakota." 30 7
a) Uniform System of Schools
The legislature must provide for a uniform system of free
public schools throughout the state, beginning with primary schools
and extending through all grades up to and including schools of
higher education. 30 8 As far as practicable, the schools are required
to teach "those branches of knowledge that tend to impress upon
the mind the vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity,
public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind.''309 In
addition, the legislature is required to take such other steps as may
be necessary to secure a reasonable degree of uniformity in course
of study, promote industrial, scientific, and agricultural
improvements, and prevent illiteracy.
310
302. N.D. CONST. art. VII, S 10.
303. Id.
304. See generally E. ROBINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 299-316 (1966) (discussing the
evolution of the North Dakota school system).
305. N.D. CONST. art, VIII, 51.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. art. VIII, § 2; see Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 1978).
The supreme court in Cardiff ruled that free textbooks are included as part of the constitutional
provision relating to free public schools. Id. at 113. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held
that bussing of students is not required under article VI I, S 2. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1987). The constitutic-, does provide, however, that the
legislature may authorize the charging of tuition, fees, and service charges to assist in the financing of
public schools of higher education. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, 5 2.
309. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
310. Id. art. VIII, §4.
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The state retains absolute and exclusive control of all colleges,
universities, and other educational institutions that are supported
by a public tax or received a land grant through the state. 311 The
constitution also provides that no money raised for the support of
the state's public schools may be appropriated to or used for the
support of any sectarian school. 312
b) Board of Higher Education
i) Structure and Eligibility Requirements
Much of the article on education involves the structure and
duties of the board of higher education. The board of higher
education was created for the control and administration of the
various state institutions of higher education.3 1 The board consists
of seven members, all of whom must be qualified electors and
taxpayers of the state, and residents of the state for not less than five
years immediately preceding appointment to the board. 31 4 Persons
presently employed or previously employed within the last two
years by any institution under the board's control are not eligible to
be members of the board.315 Additionally, not more than one
graduate of any of the institutions under the board's jurisdiction
can be a member of the board at any one time. 31 6 A board position
that has been vacated is filled by a person nominated by the
governor.3 7  A person nominated by the governor who fails to
receive senate confirmation is not eligible for an interim
appointment. 318
ii) Appointment Procedure
Nominations to the board are made by the governor from a list
of three names. 31 9 These names are provided to the governor from
the unanimous choice of a special committee consisting of the
president of the North Dakota educational association, the chief
311. Id. art. VIII, § 5.
312. Id. A "sectarian school" is defined as a school affiliated with a particular religious sect or
denomination or under the control or governing influence of such a religious sect or denomination.
Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 450, 267 N.W. 127, 131 (1936).
313. N.D. CoNsT. art. VIII, S 6(I).
314. Id. S 6(2)(a), para. 1.
315. Id. para. 2.
316. Id.
317. Id. S 6(2)(c).
318. Id.
319. Id. 5 6(2)(a), para. 3.
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justice of the supreme court, and the superintendent of public
instruction. 320 The governor's choice is sent to the senate, and if
consent is obtained from a majority of the senators, the
appointment is completed. 321 If the nomination fails to receive the
consent of the senate, the governor is required to nominate a
candidate from a new list prepared by the special committee. 322
This procedure continues until the appointment is confirmed by the
senate or the session of the legislature is adjourned. 32 3 Whenever
the legislature is not in session, the governor may appoint a person.
from the list provided by the special committee, and that person
serves on the board until the opening of the next legislative session,
at which time the appointment is certified to the senate for
confirmation. 324 If the appointment is not confirmed by the senate
by the thirtieth legislative day of the session, the office is deemed
vacant and the governor must fill the vacany in the manner
described above. 325 If the.legislature is in session within six months
of the expiration of a board member's term, the governor is
required to advance the nomination to the senate within the first
thirty days of the session, 26 and if that nomination is confirmed,
the nominee takes office at the expiration of the term of the
incumbent. 2
7
iii) Term, Compensation, and Funding
The seven members of the board of higher education serve
seven year terms, with one term ending June 30th of each year.
3 28
When a vacancy is filled for a member whose term is not
completed, the appointment is made only for the balance of the
missing member's term.3 29 Members of the board receive such
compensation as determined by the legislature to be appropriate for
the time actually devoted to the duties of office; board members
also receive compensation for necessary expenses in the same
manner and amounts as other state officials for attending meetings
and performing other official functions.33 0  Moreover, the
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. 5 6(2)(b).
323. Id.
324. Id. S 6(2)(c).
325, Id.
326. Id. This requirement limits the governor's ability to make an interim appointment
following adjournment of the session.
327. Id.
328. See id. S 6(2Xa), para. 3.
329. Id.
330. Id. 5 6(4).
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legislature is required to provide adequate funding to support the
board in its functions and duties."31
iv) Officers
The board of higher education is required to elect one of its
members to serve as its president and another member to serve as
its secretary. 3 2 The position of president has a term of one
year.333 The secretary holds office at the will of the board and must
reside, during the term of office, in Bismarck. 334 The board is also
required to appoint a state commissioner of higher education, 3 5
who acts as the chief executive officer of the board and performs
such duties as are prescribed by the board. 36 The commissioner
must be a graduate of a reputable college or university and be
familiar, by training and experience, with the problems peculiar to
higher education. 337 The commissioner's principal office must be at
the state capitol in Bismarck, and the commissioner's term of office
may not exceed three years. 33" The commissioner is responsible to
the board and removable by the board for cause.
339
v) Duties
The board of higher education has full authority over the
institutions under its control with the right, among its other
powers, to prescribe, limit, or modify the courses offered at the
several institutions, to organize or reorganize the work of each
institution, and to do everything necessary and proper for the
efficient and economic administration of those educational
institutions. 340 In furtherance of its powers, the board has the
authority to delegate to its employees details of the administration
of the institutions under its control. 341 The board also has the
responsibility of prescribing for all of these institutions standard
331. Id. S 6(5).




336. Id. 5 6(7)(c).
337. Id. 56(7Xb).
338. Id. S 6 (7 Xa).
339. Id.
340. Id. S 6(6Xb). The board's power to reorganize the work of educational institutions is
subject to constitutional and statutory limitations. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional limit on
the board regarding the location of the various institutions, see iJfta text accompanying notes 368-69.
341. N.D. CONsT. art. VIII, 5 6(6Xb).
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systems of accounts and records, 342 the responsibility of submitting
a biennial report to the governor covering in detail the operation of
the institutions, 343 the responsibility of considering and revising
budget requests from the heads of the state institutions, 344 the
responsibility of preparing and presenting to the state budget board
and the legislature a single unified budget covering the needs of all
of its institutions, 345 and the responsibility of controlling the
expenditure of the funds of those various institutions. 346 Funds
appropriated by the legislature and specifically designated for a
particular institution may not be used for any other institution.
347
vi) Removal
The members of the board of higher education may be
removed only by impeachment for the offenses and in the manner
prescribed for removal of the governor. 348 Thus, board members
are subject to impeachment for habitual drunkenness, crimes,
corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in office.
3 4 9
14. Trust Lands
a) The Fund: Origin and Application
The article of the constitution relating to trust lands provides
certain basic rules regarding the administration of state owned
lands. The first section of this article provides for the existence of a
perpetual trust fund for the maintenance of the common schools of
the state. The fund is derived from all proceeds of public lands
granted by the United States for the support of the common schools
in the state; all percentage shares of proceeds granted by the United
States on the sale of public land; all proceeds of property that pass
to the state by escheat; all gifts, donations, or proceeds that come to
the state for the support of the common schools not otherwise
342. Id. 5 6(6)(c).
343. Id.
344. Id. S 6(6)(d).
345. Id. This budget must be contained in one legislative measure, except that the budgets for
the agricultural experimental stations and the extension division of the university of agriculture and
applied sciences may be included in separate measures. Id.
346. Id. S 6(6)(e).
347. Id.
348, Id. S 6(3). For a discussion of the procedures for the impeachment of the governor, see supra
text accompanying notes 264-76.




appropriated by the terms of the gift; all bonuses or similar
payments made upon the leasing of coal, gas, oil, or any other
mineral interest under state lands for the common schools; and all
other property acquired for common schools. 35 Property received
by the state for any specific educational or charitable institution, as
well as mineral proceeds from institutional lands, 351 must remain in
a separate fund for that institution and may not be commingled
with funds of other institutions unless otherwise designated by the
donor. 3 2 The same is true regarding gifts made to an institution for
a specific purpose but without designation of a trustee: the gift must
be placed in the institution's separate trust fund, and may be
expended only as the terms of the gift provide.
353
Only the interest and income of the fund may be expended,
the principal must be retained and devoted to the trust purpose.
354
The interest and income, together with the net proceeds of all fines
for violation of state laws and any other sums added to the fund by
law, are to be faithfully used and applied for the benefit of the
common schools of the state, and no part of the fund may be
diverted, even temporarily, from this purpose.
355
b) Administration of Fund
i) Board of University and School Lands
Subject to the provision of the article on trust funds and any
laws passed by the legislature, control of the appraisement, sale,
rental, and disposal of all school and university lands is placed with
the board of university and school lands. 3 6 The board is comprised
of the superintendent of public instruction, the governor, the
attorney general, the secretary of state, and the state treasurer.
357
All officers charged with the safekeeping, transfer, and
disbursement of the state school funds are required to give ample
bonds for all moneys and funds received by them. 358 In addition,
the legislature is required to pass suitable laws regarding the
administration of state funds. 35
9
350. N.D. CoNsm. art. IX, 5 1, paras. 1, 3.
351. Id. para. 3.
352. Id. para. 1.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. art. IX, 5 2.
356. Id. art. IX, 5 3. For a discussion of article IX of the North Dakota Constitution, which
addresses the trust fund for state operated schools, see supra notes 350-55 and accompaying text.
357. Id,
358. Id. art. IX, 5 11.
359. Id.
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ii) Prohibitions
The constitution, in relation to state school land funds, defines
the following acts as embezzlement: Converting any portion of the
fund to one's own use in any manner or form; loaning any portion
of the fund with or without interest in one's own name; depositing
any portion of the fund in one's own name or any other name other
than in the name of the state; exchanging any portion of the fund
for other funds or property; and purposely allowing any portion of
the fund to remain in one's own hands uninvested, except as
prescribed by law. 360 Moreover, any failure of an officer entrusted
with the fund to pay over, produce, or account for any portion of
the fund, as required by law, is deemed prima facie evidence of
embezzlement. 361
c) Boards of Appraisal
County boards of appraisal act pursuant to the authority of the
board of university and school lands.362 Each county board of
appraisal may, from time to time, recommend the sale of school
lands at their actual value and under the terms prescribed by
law. 363 Each board is charged with the responsibility of appraising
all school lands, and is required to select and designate the most
valuable school lands so that such lands may be sold first. 364
d) Conditions of Sale and Leasing Requirements
The provisions concerning the sale and leasing of public lands
are detailed and often cumbersome. It is unnecessary for the
purpose of this article to list each of these details; however, the
reader should be aware that the constitution has five sections which
include numerous restrictions and requirements relating to the sale
and leasing of state lands. 365
e) Occupation, Cultivation, and Improvement of
Public Lands
The legislature is prohibited from granting to any person,
corporation, or association any privileges by reason of the
occupation, cultivation, and improvement of any public lands
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. art. IX, § 4.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. art. IX, SS 5-8, 10.
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subsequent to the survey of those lands by the general government;
nor may any claim ever be recognized for the occupation,
cultivation, and improvement of public lands.3 66 Moreover, the
purchase price of public lands may not be diminished due to the
occupation, cultivation, and improvement of that land.
3 67
The constitution lists the various educational and charitable
institutions of the state and their permanent locations, 36 and
prohibits the establishment or maintenance of similar institutions
without an amendment to the constitution.
3 69
15. Finance and Public Debt
North Dakota's unique constitutional provisions relating to
finance and public debt demonstrate the state's independence,
progressiveness, and innovation. The provisions do more than
describe what may be taxed, the various methods of taxation, and
the limit of indebtedness of the state and all of its subdivisions.
They explicitly allow the state government to build' or otherwise
obtain grain elevators, which shall be operated by the state, 370 to
develop state hail insurance programs, 37 1 and to maintain a state
medical center. 37 2 But the most unusual provision allows the state,
or any county or city, to engage in any industry, enterprise, or
business not otherwise prohibited by the constitution.
37 3
a) Taxation
i) General Rules and Exempted Property
Taxes must be levied pursuant to law, and every law imposing
a tax must state distinctly the object of the tax, and apply only to
that object. 7 4 The power of taxation may not be surrendered or
suspended by any grant or contract of the state or any of its
subdivisions. 37 5 Taxes must be uniform upon the same class of
366. Id. art. IX, 5 9.
367. Id.
368. Id. art. IX, §§ 12, 13. The delegation of charitable and educational institutions to almost
every major city was a major factor in the passage of the constitution. See E. ROBINSON, I1|STORY OF
No'rTH DAKOTA 210-11 (1966) (providing a general history of the inclusion of these institutions into
the constitution). The framers of the constitution created ten new institutions at the formation of this
new and sparsely populated state, spreading these spoils throughout the state. Id, at 211.
369. N.D. CONST. art. IX, 5 13.
370. Id. art. X, §§ 19, 20.
371. Id, art. X, J57,9.
372. Id. art. X, S 10.
373. Id. art. X, S18.
374. Id. art. X, S 3.
375. Id. art. X, J2.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
property, although the legislature may exempt any or all classes of
personal property from taxation. 76 The legislature may define the
matter on which taxes are imposed or measured, and may define
the tax itself, by reference to the laws of the United States. 377 The
property of the United States, state subdivisions, and property used
exclusively for schools, religious, cemetery, charitable or other
public purposes are exempt from taxation.
3 78
According to the constitution, the legislature may not raise
revenue by a tax on the assessed value of real or personal
property. 379 However, smaller subdivisions, such as counties,
cities, townships, villages, and districts, may tax property as
prescribed by law.380 The state may also assist its subdivisions in
raising such revenue and fixing the situs of all property for the
purpose of taxation. 381 The property of businesses engaged in the
carrying of persons, property, or messages must be taxed by the
state board of equalization. 382 However, if a railroad should use
any of its railway for purposes other than the operation of the
railroad, that portion of the railway is taxed in the same manner as
any other type of real property. 38 3
ii) The Poll Tax and Special Purpose Taxes
The legislature is empowered to employ a poll tax of not more
than one dollar and fifty cents on every male inhabitant of this state
over twenty-one and under fifty years of age, "except paupers,
idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed. ' 3 84 The state may
also impose a tax for the purposes of indemnifying the owners of
growing crops against hail damage385 and maintaining a state
medical center. 386 Revenue from gasoline and other motor fuel
376. Id. art. X, S 5.
377. Id. art. X, § 3. The legislature can prescribe exceptions or modifications to any federal
provision used for the purpose of defining state taxation. Id,
378. Id. art. X, S 5; see also State ex rel. Linde v. Packard, 35 N.D. 298, 322, 160 N.W. 150, 156
(1916) (the legislature did not exceed its constitutional power in exempting from taxation Masonic
lodges and property).
379, N.D. CONST. art. X, 5 1.
380. id. art. X, 5 4.
381. Id. art. X, 5 5.
382. Id. art. X, 5 4.
383. Id.
384. Id. art, X, S 6.
385. Id. art. X, SS 7, 9. At the legislature's option, lands used exclusively for public roads,
rights of way of conmtmon carriers, mining, manufacturing, or pasturage may be exempt from the hail
indemnity tax. Id. art. X, § 7.
386. Id. art. X, 5 10.
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taxes, license taxes, and motor vehicle registration, are
appropriated for the sole use of construction, repair, and
maintenance of public highways.387 Additionally, not less than
fifteen percent of the taxes imposed for severing coal must be placed
in the permanent trust fund administered by the board of
university and school lands. 388
iii) Administration
The legislature is empowered to pass all laws necessary to
implement the provisions of the article on finance and public
debt.389 All public moneys received by public officials, from
whatever source, are paid over monthly to the state treasurer.3 90
The moneys are deposited by the treasurer to the credit of the state
and only disbursed pursuant to appropriation of the legislature,
except that specific appropriation is not necessary for the operation
of many state entities and special funds.3 91 These constitutional
requirements relating to the administration of public funds do not
apply to fees and moneys received in connection with the licensing
of trades and professions, such as professional fees received from
physicians, surgeons, dentists, and lawyers. 392 In addition, bills,
claims, accounts, and demands against the state or any of its
subdivisions cannot be audited, allowed, or paid until a full
itemized statement in writing is filed with the appropriate officer,
and the release of any funds must be only upon a warrant drawn
upon the treasurer by the proper officer.3 93
387. Id. art. X, S 11.
388. Id. art. X, S 21. The board of university and school lands has the authority to invest coal
severance tax funds and to loan money to political subdivisions. Id. For a discussion of the trust fund,
see supra text accompanying notes 350-61.
389. Id. art. X, 5 8.
390. Id. art. X, § 12(1), para. 1.
391. Id. Included in the list of state entities and special funds that do not require specific
appropriation are: (1) funds necessary in the financial transactions of the Bank of North Dakota; (2)
funds required for authorized investments made by the board of university and school lands; (3)
funds required for the financial operations of the state mill and elevator; (4) funds required for the
payment of interest and principal of bonds and other fixed obligations of the state; (5) funds required
for payments required by law to be paid through the teachers' insurance and retirement foind; (6)
funds derived from permanent trust funds; (7) funds allocated under law to the state highway
department and various counties for the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of public
roads; (8) funds paid through the state hail insurance fund, the state bonding fund, the state fire and
tornado fund, and workers compensation fund; and (9) refunds required under the provisions of the
Retail Sales Tax Act, the State Income Tax Law, tht, tate Gasoline Tax Law, and the Estate and
Succession Tax Law. Id.
392. Id. para. 2.
393. Id. art. X, § 12(2).
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b) Limitation of Debt
The North Dakota Constitution has three highly detailed
provisions relating to limitation of debt and bonding.3 94 Although
the specifics of each of these provisions will not be examined, two
general requirements deserve mention. First, section 16 of article X
requires all political subdivisions to provide for the collection of an
annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and principal of a political
subdivision's debt when due. 395 Any such laws or ordinances
providing for the payment of the interest or principal of the debt
when due may not be repealed until the debt is paid.3 96 Second, no
bond or evidence of state indebtedness is valid unless it has been
endorsed by a certificate of the auditor and secretary of state. 39
c) Government Enterprise
One of the most interesting aspects of the North Dakota
Constitution is the specific authorization of political entities to
engage in industry and business.3 98 The constitution provides that
the state and its subdivisions may not assist any individual, except
for reasonable support of the poor, association, or corporation by
loan, credit, donation or aid. 399 Thus, the constitution prohibits,
governmental assistance of businesses, but it does not prohibit
governmental participation in the business world. Section 18 of
article X provides that "[t]he state, any county or city may make
internal improvements and may engage in any industry, enterprise
or business, not prohibited by article XX of the constitution...
,"400 The supreme court has ruled that the restrictions in article
XX, which concern prohibition, still apply to this provision despite
the subsequent repeal of article XX.401 Other sections of the
constitution, enacted at the same time, authorize the erection,
purchase, or leasing and operation of terminal grain elevators by
394. Seeid. art. X, 5 13, 14, 15.
395, Id. art, X, 5 16.
396. Id.
397. Id. art. X, S 17. A political subdivision's debt is not valid unless endorsed by a certificate
signed by the county auditor or another officer authorized by law. Id. The certificates of the state
debt and political subdivision debt must state that they are issued pursuant to law and are within the
debt limit. id.
398. Id. art. X, S 18.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. See Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 10, 24 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (1946) (holding that
political entities may not establish liquor businesses despite the repeal of Article XX). Article XX
was repealed in 1932. See Repeal of Prohibition Clause in State Constitution, approved Nov. 8, 1932,
1933 N.D. Laws 492.
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the state.40 2 These provisions were passed in the heyday of the
Nonpartisan League, a political organization concerned with
fostering independence from eastern big business and the
railroads.403 Despite the repeated accusations that these sections are
socialistic, the eventual fall of the Nonpartisan League, and the
subsequent rise of the mythos surrounding "free enterprise," these
provisions have never been repealed.
16. Corporations Other Than Municipal
a) General Provisions
The term "corporation" is defined by the constitution as "all
associations and joint stock companies having any of the powers or
privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or
partnerships," excluding municipalities and political subdivisions
of the state. 404 The legislature is empowered to provide by general
laws for the organization of all corporations created after adoption
of the constitution. 40 5 No charter of incorporation may be granted,
changed, or amended by special law, except in regard to municipal,
charitable, educational, penal, or reformatory corporations under
control of the state.406 Moreover, a corporation may engage only in
the business expressly authorized in its charter.
4 0 7
Corporations may issue stocks or bonds only for money, labor
done, or property actually received. 40 8 An increase of stock and
indebtedness of a corporation must be pursuant to general law and
with the consent of the persons holding the larger amount in value
of the stock first obtained. 40 9 Any fictitious increase in stock or
indebtedness is void.410 With the exception of cooperative
402. N.D. CONST. art. X, SS19, 20.
403. See, e.g., E. RoBINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 340-45 (1966) (the Nonpartison
League's opponents claimed they advocated socialism).
404. N.D. CONST. art. XII, 5 1.
405. Id. art. XII, 52.
406. Id. The constitution also contains provisions regarding charters or grants of special or
exclusive privileges to organizations which existed at the effective date of the constitution. Id. art.
XII, SS 3, 4. Se ion 3 of article XII provides that such charters or grants "under which a bona fide
organization shall not have taken place and business been commenced in good faith at the time this
constitution takes effect" are invalid. Id. art. XII, 5 3. Section 4 of article XII provides that the
legislature may not alter or amend a charter existing on the effective date of the constitution and that
the corporation holds its charter subject to the provisions of the constitution. Id. art. XII, S 4.
407. Id. art. XII, 5 8.
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corporations that have adopted bylaws limiting the voting power of
its stockholders, each member or shareholder may cast all of his
or her votes for one candidate, or distribute them between the
candidates.411
b) Eminent Domain, Police Powers, and Local
Consent to the Use of Local Property
The constitution explicitly authorizes the use of the power of
eminent domain against the property and franchises of
incorporated companies, and prohibits the abridgment of this
power. 412 The constitution also provides that the exercise of police
power of the state may not be abridged or construed to permit
corporations to conduct their business in such a manner as to
"infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general well-being of
the state.'41 3 In addition, the legislature is prohibited from
constructing or operating a street railroad, telegraph, telephone, or
electric light plant within any city, town, or incorporated village
without the consent of the local authorities having control of the




The framers' distrust of big business, especially businesses
controlled or owned by outsiders, is clearly evidenced by special
provisions relating to corporations. The constitution requires each
foreign corporation to have at least one place of business and at
least one authorized agent in the state before it may do business in
the state. 41 5 Another provision prohibits any combination of
individuals, corporations, and associations from controlling the
price of any product of the soil, any price of an article of
manufacture or commerce, or any cost of exchange or
transportation. 416 This antitrust provision specifically provides that
such combinations are unlawful and void as a
matter of public policy, and that any business franchise granted by
the state is deemed annulled and void upon a violation of this
411. Id. art. XII, S6.
412. Id. art. XII, S 5.
413. Id.
414. Id. art. XII, 5 10.
415. Id. art. XII, S 7.
416. Id. art. XII, S16.
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prohibition.4 17 Moreover, intent is not required for a violation of
the provision: the constitution prohibits any combination having
the object or effect of controlling prices of products or costs of
exchange or transportation. -18 Finally, corporations are prohibited
from exchanging "black lists" between and among themselves. 419
The railroads, however, receive the special attention of the
constitutional limits imposed on corporations. E,,ery railroad
organized and doing business in the state must maintain a public
office in the state. 420 At this office, stock may be transferred and
books that list the names of owners of the stock, the amount owned,
the amount of assets and liabilities, and the name and place of
residence of each officer of the corporation must be kept, and must
be open to the public. 421 The directors must make an annual
report, under oath, to the auditor of public accounts or other officer
designated by law regarding "all their acts and doings"; the
legislature may specify what matters must be included in the report
and enforce the constitutional provision by passing suitable
penalties.4 22
All railroads, including foreign railroads, are prohibited from
consolidating their stock, property, or franchise with any other
railroad corporation owning a parallel or competing line.4 23 Any
consolidation otherwise allowed424 may not take place except upon
public notice given to all stockholders at least sixty days preceding
the consolidation.4 25 A violation of this provision - or any attempt
to evade it - results in the forfeiture of the railroad corporation's
charter.426
Railways are considered public highways under the
constitution, and all railroad, sleeping car, telegraph, telephone,
and transportation companies that transport passengers,
intelligence, and freight are considered common carriers subject to
legislative control.4 27 Moreover, the legislature has the power to
regulate and control the price rates of these common carriers,
provided that appeal may be had to the courts. 42 18 Railroad
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id, art. XII, S 17.
420. Id. art. XII,5 11.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423, Id, art. XII, S12.
424. Id. The only railroad consolidations allowed under S 12 of article XII are ones
between railroad corporations that do not own parallel or competing lines, See id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. ld. art, XII, 5 13,
428. Id. The price rates of the common carriers fixed by the legislature or board of railroad
commissioners remain in effect pending the decision of the courts. Id.
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corporations may construct and operate throughout the state,
connect at the state line with railroads of other states, and intersect,
connect, or cross any other railroads. 429 In return, railroad
corporations must receive and transport each other's passengers,
tonnage, and cars without delay or discrimination.
430
d) Banking Notes and Bills
A general banking law must provide for the registry and
countersigning by an officer of the state of all notes or bills designed
for circulation.4 31 Ample security in the full amount of the notes or
bills must be deposited with the state treasurer for the redemption
of the state notes or bills. 432
E. COMPACT WITH THE UNITED STATES
The compact with the United States primarily concerns the
division of the indebtedness between North Dakota and South
Dakota, 433 the ceding of jurisdiction to the United States of various
military reservations,4 34 the retention of federal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations unless otherwise altered by Congress, 43 5 and
the disclaimer of any right and title to unappropriated lands. 436 The
article consisting of the compact with the United States is
irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people
of North Dakota. 43
7
Three aspects of the compact with the United States deserve
special note. First, the state may provide for the acceptance of such
jurisdiction over the Indian lands as may be delegated to the state
by Congress. 430 Second, the state may not tax the lands or property
of the United States and may not tax the lands of nonresident
citizens of the United States at a higher rate than the lands
belonging to residents. 439 Third, the compact provides that perfect
toleration of religious sentiment is to be secured, and that the
inhabitants of the state may not be molested in person or property
on account of their mode of religious worship. 440
429. Id. art. XII, 5 14.
430. Id.
431. Id. art. XII, 5 15,
432. Id.
433. Id. art. XIII, S 1(3).
434. Id. art. XIII, 5 2.
435. Id. art. XIII, S 1(2).
436. Id.
437. Id. art. XIII, preamble.
438. Id. art. XIII, S 1(2).
439. Id.
440. ld. art. XIII, 5 1(1).
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II. METHODS OF INTERPRETING THE NORTH
DAKOTA CONSTITUTION
During the last ninety-eight years, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has applied two opposing methods in its interpretation of the
North Dakota Constitution, one based on the text of the
constitution and the other based on the intent of those who adopted
it.441 The traditional method of construction employed by the court
is a text based analysis in which the court looks first to the plain
language of the document; only if an ambiguity exists does the
court delve into the nontextual factors that demonstrate the object
of the language and the intention of the people who drafted and
adopted the particular provision. 442
Despite the general acceptance of text based analysis in
construing the constitution, the court has occasionally refused to
apply this method of analysis and instead looked directly to the
intent underlying the provision at issue. 443 The court's use of intent
based analysis, however, normally has been consistent with the
traditional text based analysis, either because the court's intent
based interpretation of the constitution was consistent with the
plain language of the text,444 or because the language being
construed was ambiguous and reference to the various nontextual
factors was required in any event. 445 Nonetheless, the court's
repeated, if not blithe, use of intent based analysis, without even an
initial examination of the text or the acknowledgment of the
existence of an ambiguity, has provided at least an ostensible
foundation for the view that the intent underlying a constitutional
provision has greater weight than the text itself.446 This dubious
foundation has been used by the North Dakota Supreme Court on
at least three occasions, and as recently as 1979, as an excuse to
ignore clear and specific constitutional language, thereby allowing
441. For a discussion of the two methods of constitution , interpretation, see infra text
accompanying notes 448-653.
442. For a discussion of the text based method of constitutional interpretation, see infra text
accompanying notes 448-567.
443. For a discussion of the intent based method of constitutional interpretation, see infra text
accompanying notes 568-653.
444. For an example of the consistency between text based and intent based interpretation, see
infra text accompanying notes 600-01.
445. For an example of intent based method of interpretation applied to ambiguous language,
see infra text accompanying notes 598-99.
446. For an example of the court's use of the intent based method without an examination of the
language under the text based method of interpretation, see infra text accompanying notes 580-97.
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the court to negate the permanent law of North Dakota and the
clearly expressed will of the people.
447
The remainder of this Article contains an examination of the
supreme court's two opposing methods of constitutional
interpretation, a review of the tools employed by the supreme court
to determine the intent underlying the North Dakota Constitution,
and an analysis of the two methods of interpretation, along with a
proposal for the development of a coherent and consistent system of
constitutional interpretation.
A. TEXT BASED ANALYSIS
The most cogent exposition of text based analysis is contained
in State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson. 448 Robinson involved a request by the
attorney general for a writ determining when the three newly
elected justices of the supreme court (who were elected in 1916)
were entitled to take office. 449 The dispute arose from a potential
conflict between the text of the constitution, which provided that
the first set of justices assumed office on the first Monday of
December 1889, and held office until the conclusion of their
respective terms, 450 and the previously enacted (and subsequently
reenacted) statute, which provided that all state officers enter upon
the duty of their offices on the first Monday in January following
their election. 451 The three justices-elect argued that their terms of
office commenced on the first Monday in December 1916, the
anniversary of the election of the incumbent judges, while the
defeated justices argued that the newly elected justices took office
on the first Monday in January 1917, as provided by statute. 452
Because the three defeated justices and the two remaining
incumbent justices withdrew from the case, the dispute fell to a
panel of five district court judges acting as members of the supreme
court. 453 The issue was hotly contested, 454 and the district court
447. For an example of the court's failure to consider clear and specific constitutional language,
see infra text accompanying notes 603-53.
448. 35 N.D. 417, 160 N.W. 514(1916).
449. State ex tel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 ND. 417,419, 160 N.W. 514, 515 (1916).
450. Id. at 423-24, 160 N.W. at 517; see also N.D. CONST. art. IV, S 92 (1889) (repealed by art.
amend. 97, Sept. 7, 1976).
451. Robinson, 35 N.D. at 422, 160 N.W. at 517; see COMPLIED LAWS S 1380 (1887).
452. 35 N.D. at 419-20, 160 N.W. at 515-16.
453. Id. at 419, 160 N.W. at 515. The final decision was rendered by four of the five appointed
district court judges due to the unexplained absence of one of the district court judges. Id.
454. See id. at 430, 160 N.W. at 520. Indeed, Justice Robinson, one of the justices-elect, was
referred to as a "revolutionary" by the panel of district judges because he stated in his oral argument
before the court that the justices-elect "would put aside and render nugatory" the acts of the panel of
district judges as well as those of the defeated court as of the date he believed their terms ended. Id.
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judges were understandably thorough in their opinion and analysis.
The court's decision, which held that the justices-elect did not take
office until the first Monday in January, 455 is of little significance
compared to the court's discussion of constitutional interpretation.
In its overview of the various rules of construction of the North
Dakota Constitution, the court in Robinson quoted extensively from
Judge Cooley's treatise on constitutional law:
"The object of construction, as applied to a written
Constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting
it. In the case of all written laws it is the intent of the
lawgiver that is to be enforced, but this intent is to be found in
the instrument itself . . . The whole instrument is to be
examined. ""Every such instrument is adopted as a whole,
and a clause which, standing by itself, might seem of
doubtful import, may yet be made plain by comparison
with other clauses or portions of the same law. It is
therefore a very proper rule of construction that the whole
is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true
intention of each part." "The rule ... is that effect is to be
given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every section
and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make some words idle and
nugatory." The purpose to be accomplished by the
Constitution or any part of its several parts should be
considered, and that will shed great light in construing such
Constitution. "It is possible, however, that after we have
made use of all of the lights which the instrument itself affords,
there may sill be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to explain."
"Among the aids is a contemplation of the object to be
accomplished or the mischief designed to be remedied or
guarded against by the clause in which the ambiguity is
met with. When we once know the reason which alone
determines the will of the lawmakers, we ought to
interpret and apply the words used in a manner suitable
and consonant to that reason and as will be best
calculated to effectuate the intent. "
"The prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the
clue to the real meaning of the ambiguous provision, and
it is especially important to look into it if the Constitution
455. Id. at 429, 160 N.W. at 519-20.
1987]
is the successor to another, and in the particular in
question essential changes have apparently been made."
And finally, as an elementary rule of construction, we
note that which is drawn from contemporaneous and practical
constructions, and "where there has been a practical
construction which has been acquiesced in for a
considerable period, considerations in favor of adhering
to this construction sometimes present themselves to the
courts with a plausibility and force which it is not easy to
resist. '456
The form of analysis enunciated in Robinson (as modified by its
progeny, shown in brackets below) may be outlined out as follows:
Preamble: The object of construction is to give effect to
the intent of the people adopting it.
1. Plain Language Controls: The intent is to be found in the
instrument itself.
2. Harmonizing Rules:
a) The whole instrument is to be examined with a
view to arriving at the true intention of each part;
b) effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole
instrument;
c) if different portions seem to conflict, harmonize
them if possible;
d) when harmonizing lean in favor of construction
which will render every word operative;
[e) special language controls over more general
language;]457 and
[f) if a conflict still exists, apply the more recently
adopted provision. ]458
3. Construing Ambiguous Language: If an ambiguity still
exists, consider:
a) the object to be accomplished;
b) the prior state of the law, especially a predecessor
constitution and any changes made; and
c) contemporaneous and practical constructions,
especially if acquiesced to for a considerable
period.
456. Id. at 421-22, 160 N.W. at 516 (emphasis added) (quoting T. CooLEy, A TREATISE ON THE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) (quoting, sometimes inaccurately, various sections of
chapter IV involving the construction of state constitutions)).
457. For an application of the rule that special language controls general language, see infra text
accompanying note 483.
458, For an application of the rule that a more recently adopted provision controls a prior
provision, see infra text accompanying note 484.
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Under text based analysis, the preamble acts as a lodestar for
the application of the ensuing rules. It serves only as a guide to
direct the application of the rules, and not as a replacement for the
rules. The proper function of the preamble is made clear first by the
language of the preamble, which merely states that the object of the
rules of construction is to give effect to the intention of the people
adopting it, and also by the words immediately following the pre-
amble. The very next sentence in Robinson provides that the intent
is to be found in the instrument itsef. After this reference to a direct
examination of the document, the court lists specific rules
concerning the review of the entire document, and then lists the
nontextual factors to be employed if an ambiguity still exists. Thus,
it is clear that the preamble acts mereley as a general guide to the
application of the rules that follow, and that nontextual factors
apply only after attempting to resolve the question of interpretation
by reviewing the actual text of the constitution. It is this method of
constitutional interpretation, and not a method based on intent,
that the North Dakota Supreme Court consistently employed
during the first twenty-five years of the court's construction of the
North Dakota Constitution. 459 Although the court subsequently
veered from this established path and occasionally fell victim to the
allure of intent based analysis, 460 as well as the undifferentiated use
of statutory rules of construction, 461 the court has usually employed
traditional text based analysis.
1. Plain Language Controls
The primary rule of text based analysis is that in construing a
constitutional provision the court looks first to the language of the
constitution itself to determine its proper construction. The words
contained in the constitution are to be given their plain, ordinary,
and commonly understood meaning. 46 2 According to the North
459. See State ax rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 368, 133 N.W. 1046, 1048 (1911) (text and
context reviewed first before looking to other indicia of intent); State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18
N.D. 31, 34, 119 N.W. 360, 362 (1909) (deeming it "advisable" to first consider and determine the
meaning of the words contained in the constitution before looking to the other indicia of intent);
Doherty v. Ransom County, 5 N.D. 1, 4, 63 N.W. 148, 150 (1895) (using words of constitution to
determine intent); State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, I N.D. 5, 8, 44 N.W. 492, 493 (1890) (a
construction of the constitution that is at variance with all past legislation, the declared wish of the
voters, and the intent and expectation of the framers should not be reached "unless forced thereto by
the clear rules of construction, or the obvious meaning of the language employed").
460. For a discussion of the court's use of intent based analysis, see infra text accompanying
notes 570-653.
461. For a discussion of the court's use of statutory rules of construction, see infra text
accompanying notes 551-62.
462. Verry v, Trenbeath, 148 N.W.2d 567, 574 (N.D. 1967); Cowl v. Wentz, 107 N.W.2d 697,
699 (N.D. 1961); Bronson v. Johnson, 76 N.D. 122, 124, 33 N.W.2d 819, 820 (1948); see also State v.
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Dakota Supreme Court, courts "should aim to give effect to the
purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used.' '463
The supreme court has repeatedly stated that "the wording of
the constitution" is to be applied. 464 In fact, in one of the court's
earliest occasions to construe a state constitutional provision, it
stated that a construction at variance with all past legislation on the
subject, at variance with the declared wish of the voters, and at
variance with the intent and expectation of the framers ought not to
be reached unless such a construction was "forced" upon the court
"by the clear rules of construction, or the obvious meaning of the
language employed.''465 According to this statement, the plain
language of the constitution and the rules of construction take
precedence over both the apparent intent of the framers and the
perceived desires of the voters. In the court's subsequent decisions,
reference to the "clear rules of construction" language
disappeared, leaving only the rule that the plain language
controls. 466
VandeHoven, 388 N.W.2d 857, 860 (N.D. 1986) (interpretation of speedy trial provision using plain
terms of provision); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978) (must
presume that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning); Dawson v. Tobin,
74 N.D. 713, 730-31, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (must not look to extrinsic sources when language
is clear and specific); Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 163, 284 N.W. 238, 256 (1939) (language clear);
State ex rel. Langer v. Olson, 44 N.D. 614, 628, 176 N.W. 528, 533 (1920) (direct and explicit
language of provision); State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918)
(plain and unmistakable language of provision used to determine the purpose and spirit of the
provision manifest); State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 669, 164 N.W. 924, 937 (1917)
(must follow the clear import of constitutional language); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,
373-74, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (1911) (must define words used in provisions in their popular sense).
463. State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); see also Engstad
v. Grand Forks County, 10 N.D. 54, 84 N.W. 577 (1900). In Engstad, the court stated that "[w]e are
not at liberty to indulge in mere conjecture as to what was intended. Our duty is to fairly construe the
language actually employed by the legislature, and from it determine the legislative intent." Id. at
58, 84 N.W. at 578.
464. Doherty v. Ransom County, 5 N.D. 1, 4, 63 N.W. 148, 150 (1895). See generally cases
cited infra notes 467-77 (cases considering the words of the constitution in the first instance).
465. State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, 1 N.D. 5, 11, 44 N.W. 492, 493 (1890).
466. See Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1985) (when the constitutional
provision is clear and unambiguous, the court should follow the text); McCarney v. Meier, 286
N.W.2d 780, 788 (N.D. 1979) (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting) (it is incumbent upon the court to
recognize the change in the constitution and act accordingly); State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286
N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979) (questions must be answered, if possible, from the language of the
provision itself); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978) (it is
assumed that the framers of the constitution made a deliberate choice of words which reflected or
expressed their thoughts); Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973) (questions must
be answered, if possible, from language of the provision itself); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549,
556 (N.D. 1965) (same); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730-31, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (when
there is no ambiguity, the court must accept the provision as it reads); Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D.
368, 371, 182 N.W. 309, 309-10 (1921) (the meaning and intention of the framers and the people
adopting the constitution must be sought first of all in the language of the constitution itself); State ex
rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918) (purpose and spirit of provision is
manifest by the language); State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 668, 164 N.W. 924, 936
(1917) (the courts are not at liberty to declare an act void because of the "spirit" of the constitution
unless this construction is necessarily implied from the express words of the constitution); State ex rel.
Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 368, 133 N.W. 1046, 1048 (1911) (the will of the people, as expressed
by means of the ballot, should not be defeated by either a strained construction or a technical
214
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The court has also repeatedly stated that it is to consider the
words of the constitution first. 467 Any question must be answered, if
possible, from the language of the provision itself,468 and when no
ambiguity exists, the court is compelled to accept the provision as it
reads. 469 For example, the court has stated that "it is improper for
the courts to attempt to construe the provisions so as to legislate
additional requirements or prescriptions which the words of the
provisions do not themselves provide.' '470 The intent perceived by
the court, even if correct, cannot be used to circumvent the express
words of the constitution. The court is not justified in "doing
violence to the fair meaning of the words used" in order to support
an established legislative construction of the constitutional
provision471 or the apparent intent of the framers. 47 2 And although
the court has recognized the imperfection of words as vehicles of
expression, 47" the court has necessarily assumed "that the framers
of the constitution made a deliberate choice of words which
reflected or expressed their thoughts.' 47
The specific rule that the text of the constitution controls the
construction is expressed most ably in the 1946 decision of Dawson
v. Tobin:
"When the words of a man express his meaning plainly,
distinctly, and perfectly there is no occasion to have
meaning); State ex tel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 34, 119 N.W. 360, 362 (1909) (consider the
words of the constitution first); Doherty v. Ransom County, 5 N.D. 1, 4, 63 N.W. 148, 150 (1895)
(applying the appli .able case law and the text of the constitution). For a discussion of the use of
statutory rules of construction, see infra text accompanying notes 551-62.
467. See, e.g., Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 371,182 N.W. 309, 309-10(1921); State ex rel.
McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 34, 119 N.W. 360, 362 (1909). The court has, on occasion, stated
merely that intention and purpose are to be found and deduced primarily from the text. See Cardiff v.
Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978); State v. Feist, 93 N.W.2d 646, 649
(N.D. 1958); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730-31, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946). These
statements, however, were made under the influence of intent based analysis. For a discussion of
intent based analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 570-653.
468. State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979); Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210
N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549,556 (N.D. 1965).
469. Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730-31, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946). The court has stated
that it is not appropriate to use the spirit of the constitution to circumvent the express words of a
particular constitutional provision. See State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N.D. 635, 668, 164 N.W.
924, 936 (1917).
470. Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1985); see also McCarney v. Meier, 286
N.W. 2d 780, 789 (N.D. 1979) (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting) (refusing to construe the constitution in a
manner not consistent with the language of that document); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730, 24
N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (court construing constitution is limited to the language of the constitution
itself); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 368, 133 N.W. 1046, 1048 (1911) (no strained or
technical meaning should be applied when construing constitution).
471. See State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,374, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (1911).
472. See McCarney v, Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); State ex rel. Rausch v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247,258-59,49 N.W.2d 14,21(1951).
473. State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217 (N.D. 1961) (quoting Meredith v.
Kauffman, 293 Ky. 395,398-99,169 S.W.2d 37,38-39(1943)).
474. Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978).
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recourse to any other means of interpretation. . . . The
rule is sometimes stated more completely that a
constitutional provision which is positive and free from all
ambiguity must be accepted by the court as it reads....
In other words the courts are not at liberty to search for its
meaning beyond the instrument, nor are they at liberty
by a resort to the refinements of legal learning, to restrict
an obvious meaning. Language which is plain and easily
understood should be looke to without extrinsic aid for
the meaning intended.' 475
As stated in Goughnour v. Brant, "[i]f the language is plain and free
from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning
intended to be conveyed.' '4 76 The reason for this conclusive
presumption is clear: the court recognizes that the constitution
represents more than the subjective intent of the framers; this
paramount law is the direct expression of the will of the people by
means of the ballot, and it should not suffer impotency by either a
strained construction or reverence of technical meanings.4 77
2. Harmonizing Rules
While continuing to use the harmonizing rules described in
Robinson, the court has incorporated two additional rules to be
applied if the attempt to harmonize the language fails. Since its
earliest decisions, the North Dakota Supreme Court has construed
the words contained in the constitution in the context of the whole
constitution.478 As stated in Robinson and its progeny, the whole
instrument is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true
intention of each part, 479 and effect is to be given, if possible, to the
475. Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730-31, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (footnotes omitted,
emphasis added) (quoting 11 AM. Jun. Constitutional Law'S 64, at 678-79 (1937)).
476:'Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 371, 182 N.W. 309, 309-10 (1921)(emphasis added).
477. See Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 541 (N.D. 1985); State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner,
37 N.D. 635, 668, 164 N.W. 924, 936 (1917); State ex ret. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 368, 133
N.W. 1046, 1048(1911).
478. See State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 47,159 N.W. 281,286 (1916); State ex rel. Miller
v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 368, 133 N.W. 1046, 1048 (1911); State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D.
31, 34-35, 119 N.W. 360, 362 (1909).
479. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916); Cardiff v.
Bismarck Pub, School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978); State ex ret. Sanstead v. Freed, 251
N.W. 2d 898, 908 (N.D. 1977); State ex ret. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 713, 59 N.W.2d
514, 540 (1953); Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 371-72, 182 N.W. 309, 310 (1921); State ex rel.
Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 637, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); see Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210
N.W.2d 100, 103 (N.D. 1973) (construing one constitutional provision in relation to others); Abbey
v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 853 (N.D. 1972) (same); State v. Feist, 93 NW.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1958)
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whole instrument.4 80 If different portions seem to conflict, they are
to be harmonized if possible.48 1 In harmonizing, the court is to lean
in favor of a construction that will render every word operative. 482
The subsequent additions to the Robinson rules are: first, if a conflict
still exists, special language controls over more general language;4 3
and second, the more recently adopted provision controls.4 84
3. Construing Ambiguous Language
If an ambiguity remains after reviewing the text of the
constitution and applying the harmonizing rules, the court may
then broaden its scope of review beyond the "four corners" of the
constitution. According to the supreme court, it is appropriate in
construing the North Dakota Constitution to employ a wider field
of inquiry than in the construction of legislative enactments. 485
Indeed, the court has stated that it actually has a duty to take
judicial notice of the source of constitutional provisions. 488 In order
to resolve an ambiguity, the court looks to the object to be
accomplished, to the prior state of the law (including the origin of
the provision), and to contemporaneous and practical
constructions. 487
(same ; State ex rel. Langer v. Olson, 44N.D. 614,628-29, 176 N.W. 528, 533(1920) (same); see also
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252 (N.D. 1960) (entire section construed as
whole).
480. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421,160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916); McCarney v.
Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105,
107 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 908 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel.
Morris v. Sherman, 63 N.D. 9, 20, 245 N.W. 877, 882 (1932); State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39
N.D. 630, 637, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918).
481. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); Cardiff ,. Bismarck Pub. School
Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 908
(N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D. 1962); Great N. Ry. v.
Duncan, 42 N.D. 346, 353, 176 N.W. 992, 995 (1919); State ex ret. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417,
421,160 NW. 514, 516 (1916); see State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220, 229 (N.D. 1982); State ex rel.
Walker v. Link, 232 N.W. 2d 823, 825, 826 (N.D. 1975); State ex ret. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630,
637, 170 N.W. 121, 124(1918).
482. State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 637, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State ex ret.
Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916); see State ex rel. Morris v. Sherman,
63 N.D. 9, 20-21,245 N.W. 877, 882 (1932).
483. State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823, 826 (N.D. 1975).
484. Id.; State ex rel, Paulson v. Meier, 127 N.W.2d 665, 673 (N.D. 1964); State ex rel. Lein v.
Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D. 1962); see Egbert v. City ofDunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 6, 24 N.W.2d
907, 909 (1946); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 726-27, 24 N.W.2d 737, 743 (1946); State ex rtd.
Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 911-12 (N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
more recently adopted provision should prevail).
485. State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979); Tormaschy v. Hfjelle, 210
N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556 (N.D. 1965) (citing State ex
rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 47, 159 N.W. 281,286 (1916)).
486. State ex ret, Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 48, 159 N.W. 281, 286(1916).
487. See, e.g., State ex re. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421-22,160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916).
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a) The Object to Be Accomplished
In determining the object to be accomplished, the court
attempts to discover the intent of the "constitution makers,' '488 the
intent of the members of the constitutional convention, 4 9 the intent
of the people adopting the constitutional provision, 490  and the
purpose491 and spirit 492 of the provision being construed. Although
the framers' and the people's intent in adopting a provision are not
controlling, these intentions are "proper subjects of consideration
when courts are attempting to arrive at the meaning of ambiguous
language in a statute or Constitution. " 493 The court employs
various sources to determine intent and purpose, including the
journa 4 94 and the debates4 95 of the constitutional convention at
488. Roeslerv, Taylor, 3 N.D. 546,548,58 N.W. 342,343 (1894).
489. Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978); State ex ret.
Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W,2d 53, 56-57 (N.D. 1971); Permann v. Knife River Coal Mining
Co., 180 N.W.2d 146,160 (N.D. 1970), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Haag v. State, 219 N.W.2d
121, 130 (N.D. 1974); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 555 (N.D. 1965); State v. Feist, 93
N.W.2d 646,649-50 (N.D. 1958); Kessler v. Thompson, 75 N.W.2d 172, 181 (N.D. 1956); State v.
Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 513 (N.D. 1955); State ex rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78
N.D. 247, 258-59, 49 N.W.2d 14, 21 (1951); State ex ret..Johnson v. Baker, "4 N.D. 244, 257, 21
N.W.2d 355, 363 (1946); Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 154-55, 284 N.W. 238, 252 (1939); State v.
Norton, 64 N.D. 675, 685-86, 255 N.W. 787, 792 (1934); Becker County Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Wosick, 62 ND. 740, 750, 245 N.W. 454, 456 (1932); Power v. Williams, 3 N.D. 54, 62-63, 205
N.W. 9, 12 (1925); Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 371, 182 N.W. 309, 309-10 (1921); State ex
rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 637-38, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor,
22 N.D. 362, 369, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049 (1911); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 137, 99 N.W. 769,
771 (1904); Doherty v. Ransom County, 5 N.D. 1, 4, 63 N.W. 148,149 (1895); State ex rel. Ohlquist
v. Swan, I N.D. 5, 11,44 N.W. 492,493 (1890).
490. Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894,897 (N.D. 1985); McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780,
783 (N.D. 1979); Cardiffv. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1973); State ex
rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 918 (N.D. 1978); State ex ret. Stockman v. Anderson, 184
N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (N.D. 1971); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 555 (N.D. 1965); State ex rel.
Lein v. Satbre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217
(N.D, 1961); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v, Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252-53 (N.D. 1960); State ex
rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 258, 49 N.W.2d 14, 21 (1951); Egbert v.
City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 7, 24 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1946); State v. Norton, 64 N.D. 675, 685-86,
255 N.W. 787, 792 (1934); State ex rel. Morris v. Sherman, 63 N.D. 9, 17, 245 N.W. 877, 880
(1932); Power v. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 62, 205 N.W. 9, 12 (1925); Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D.
368, 371, 182 N.W. 309, 309-10 (1921); State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 637-38, 170
N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State ex rel. Millerv. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,369, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049 (1911);
Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 137, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904); State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, I ND.
5, 11, 44 N.W. 492, 493 (1890).
491. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 786 (N.D. 1979); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d
549, 556 (N.D. 1965); Sta.e ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State ex rel,
Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217 (N.D. 1961); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103
N.W.2d 245, 255 (N.D. 1960); Kessler v. Thompson, 75 N.W.2d 172, 184-85 (N.D. 1956);
Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 372, 182 N.W. 309, 310 (1921); Great N. Ry. v. Duncan, 42
N.D. 346, 358, 176 N.W. 992, 997 (1919); State ex rel, Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170
NW. 121, 124(1918); State exrel. Linde v, Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514,516 (1916);
State exrTel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 39, 119 N.W. 360, 364(1909).
492. State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State ex rel.
Miller v. Taylor, 22 ND. 362, 373, 133 NW. 1046, 1051 (1911).
493. State exrel. Millerv. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,369, 371, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049, 1050(1911).
494. Cardiffv. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 108-09 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel.
Miller v, Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 369, 133 N.W. 1046,1049 (1911).
495. See Cardiffv. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel.
Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d
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which the provision was drafted, the history of the convention, 496
and the general history of the state, 497 including descriptions of
state history contained in law review articles. 498 Even newspaper
articles' 9 and editorials500 are reviewed by the court to evaluate the
intent of the framers and the people. Indeed, the court has stated
that all facts which form the background of the adoption of a
particular provision may be considered in determing intent5
01
When construing ambiguous language, and especially
constitutional language that is inherently ambiguous, such as the
general standards that serve as the backbone of state constitutional
rights, 502 it is appropriate to take into account the early history of
898, 905 (N.D. 1977); Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 853 (N.D. 1972); Permann v. Knife River
Coal Mining Co., 180 N.W.2d 146, 160 (N.D. 1970), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Haag v.
State, 219 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1974); State ex rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D.
247, 258-59, 49 N.W.2d 14, 21-22 (1951); State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 74 N.D. 244, 257-58, 21
N.W.2d 355, 363 (1946); Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 153-55, 284 N.W. 238, 251 (1939); State ex
rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 425, 160 N.W. 514, 518 (1916); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor,
22 N.D. 362, 369, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049(1911).
496. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 425, 160 N.W. 514, 518 (1916); State ex rel.
Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 369, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049 (1911); State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, 1
N.D. 5, 10-11,44 N.W. 492,493 (1890).
497. State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Sanstead v.
Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 905-07 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53,
57 (N.D. 1971); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556 (N.D. 1965); State v. Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d
508, 512-13 (N.D. 1955); State ex rel. City of Minot v. Gronna, 79 N.D. 673, 684, 59 N.W.2d 514,
524 (1953); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 9-11, 24 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (1946); State v.
Norton, 64 N.D. 675, 681, 255 N.W. 787, 790 (1934); State ex rel, Reese v. Mooney, 64 N.D. 620,
624, 255 N.W. 105, 107 (1934); State ex rel. Morris v. Sherman, 63 N.D. 9, 15, 245 N.W. 877, 880
(1932); Baird v. Burke County, 53 N.D. 140, 150, 205 N.W. 17, 19 (1925); Power v. Williams, 53
N.D. 54, 61-63, 205 N.W. 9, 12-13 (1925); Great N. Ry. v. Duncan, 42 N.D. 346, 357-58, 176
N.W. 992, 997 (1919); State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 428, 160 N.W. 514, 518-19
(1916); State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 47, 159 N.W. 281, 286 (1916); State ex rel. Miller v.
Iaylor, 22 N.D. 362, 370-71, 133 N.W. 1046, 1049-50 (1911); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 138-
39, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904); State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, I N.D. 5, 10-11, 44 N.W. 492, 493
(1890).
498. State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920 n.1 (N.D. 1978) (citing Kuhns, Revising
a StateJudicial Article: Issues for the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, 48 N.D.L. REv. 217, 238-40
(1972); Note, Judicial Selection in North Dakota - Is Constitutional Revision Necessary?, 48 N.D.L. REv.
327 (1972) (authored byJohn W. Dwyer)).
499. State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 907 (N.D. 1977) (relying on an article in
the Bismarck Tribune in deciding whether the North Dakota Constitution prohibits the lieutenant
governor from casting a tie-breaking vote on the final consideration of a state senate bill).
500. Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556-57 (N.D. 1965) (citing McKenzie County v.
Lamb, 70 N.D. 782, 298 NW. 241 (1941) (relying on a publication of the North Dakota County
Commissioners' Association in discussing the appropriation of revenue for highway purposes).
501. State ex rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Stockman v.
Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971).
502. See, e.g., N.D. COST. art. 1, § 8 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); id. art.
I, 5 11 (requiring sufficient sureties and guarantee against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel or
unusual punishments); id. art. I, S 12 (requiring a speedy and public trial, and due process of law);
id, art. I, S 16 (requiring just compensation when private property is taken); id. art. VI, S 2
(providing that the supreme court has original jurisdiction over writs necessary to properly exercise
the supreme court's jurisdiction); id. art. VI, S 8 (providing that the district court has authority to
issue writs necessary to properly exercise the district court's jurisdiction); id. art. VIII, 51 (providing
that schools are to be free from sectarian control); id. art. VIII, 5 2 (requiring uniform system of free
public schools); id. art. VIII, 5 3 (requiring that in all schools instruction will be given "as far as
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North Dakota (including the history surrounding the constitutional
convention), the intentions of the constitutional framers (shown
primarily by the debates of the constitutional convention), and the
differences between the federal and North Dakota constitutions.
Because the court considers the object to be accomplished when
applying both text based analysis (after finding an ambiguity) and
intent based analysis, the factors employed to determine the
underlying object are discussed in Part III of this Article.
b) The Prior State of the Law
In determining the prior state of the law, the court may look
to: (1) the traditional common law; 50 3 (2) prior statutory law,
50 4
including territorial law50 5 and, when applicable, prior federal
law;50 6 and (3) predecessor constitutional provisions upon which a
North Dakota constitutional provision is based,50 7 including the
prior North Dakota constitutional provision when interpreting an
amended provision,508  and the federal constitution when
interpreting a provision added to the North Dakota Constitution
based on the federal constitution. 50 9
practicable in those branches of knowledge that tend to impress upon the mind the vital importance
of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind"); id.
art. VIII, S 4 (requiring the legislature "take such other steps as may be necessary to prevent
illiteracy, secure a reasonable degree of uniformity, and to promote industrial, scientific, and
agricultural improvements"); id. art. IX, S 11 (requiring the legislature to "pass suitable laws for
the safekeeping, transfer, disbursement of state school funds"); id. (requiring the legislature to
require officers handling state school funds to give ample bonds); id. art. X, 5 5 (providing for
uniform taxes upon the same class of property); id. art. XI, 5 3 (requiring that flowing streams and
natural water courses remain the property of the state); id. art. XI, 5 6 (providing for the right of
inspection of public records during reasonable office hours); id. art. XI, 5 22 (providing a debtor the
right "to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life recognized by wholesome laws"); id. art. XIII, 5
1, subd. 1 (requiring "[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment").
503. See, e.g., Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 139-40, 99 N.W. 769, 772 (1904); see also State ex rel.
Morris v. Sherman, 63 N.D. 9, 18-19, 245 N.W. 877, 881 (1932) (common law reviewed, but not
applicable).
504. See, e.g., State ex el. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 920 (N.D. 1978).
505. See, e.g., id.; Power v. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 61, 205 N.W. 9, 12 (1925); State ex rel.
McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 38-40, 119 N.W. 360, 364-65(1909); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131,
138, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904).
506. See, e.g., Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549,558 (N.D. 1965).
507. State ex tel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898,904 (N.D. 1977); Johnson v. Hassett, 217
N.W.2d 771, 774 (N.D. 1974); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 218 (N.D. 1961); State
v, Lohnes, 69 N.W.2d 508, 514 (N.D. 1955); Becker County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wosick, 62 N.D.
740, 756-57,765-66,245 N.W. 454, 459, 463 (1932); State v. First State Bank, 52 N.D. 231, 254-55,
202 N.W. 391,400-01 (1924); State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 464-65, 171 N.W. 213, 215
(1918); State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D, 417, 422, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916); State ex rel.
Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 48-53, 159 N.W. 281, 287-89 (1916); State ex el. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18
N.D. 31. 42-43.119 N.W. 360, 365-66 (1909).
508. See, e.g., Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 372, 182 N.W. 309, 310 (1921).
509. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 908 (N.D. 1977); Power v.




In one of the court's earliest decisions, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that the constitution "shall be held to be
prepared and adopted in reference to existing statutory laws" 510
and that the courts "are bound to presume that the people adopting
a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon
the subjects to which its provisions relate .... ,"511 As stated above,
the court has declared that it has a duty to take judicial notice of the
source of the constitutional provision that is being interpreted.
51 2
And, according to one decision, the court will explore the "form in
which the idea has been fashioned in other states" 513 and consider
the history and experience of other states that have adopted similar
principles.514
In interpreting an ambiguous provision based on a preexisting
constitutional provision, special emphasis is placed on the text of
the preceding constitution and any changes made to that text. 515
When a constitutional provision is drawn verbatim from another
state's constitution, that state's construction of its own constitution
prior to the adoption of the provision by North Dakota is presumed
to be included within the adoption of the new provision.51 6 That
state's construction, however, is not necessarily conclusive upon
the North Dakota Supreme Court, and the court is free to disregard
the other state's construction, although it does not do so lightly. 517
In addition, the differences in language between a predecessor
constitution and the North Dakota Constitution are given great.
weight.
518
When using predecessor constitutions to determine intent, it is
often very difficult to determine which constitution was used as a
basis for the North Dakota constitutional provision. This
determination is especially difficult because the delegates to the
510. Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 139, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904) (quoting People ex rel. Jackson
v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375 (1872)).
511. Id.
512. State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 48, 159 N.W. 281,286 (1916).
513. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915)).
514. Id.; see also State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979) (North Dakota
Supreme Court considered similar language of the New Mexico Constitution when interpreting the
North Dakota Constitution); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 109-13 (N.D.
1978) (considering the similar language of various other state's constitutions).
515. State ex ret. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 422, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916).
516. See, e.g., Becker County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Wosick, 62 N.D. 740, 766, 245 N.W. 454,
463 (1932); State ex ret. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 42, 119 N.W. 360, 365 (1909). For a
discussion of the argument that the interpretation of a state constitutional provision based on the
federal constitution is limited to the present federal interpretation, see infra text acccmpanying notes
870-76.
517. See, e.g., Stateexrt. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459,465, 171 N.W. 213,215 (1918).
518. For a list of cases that have looked to other states' constructions, see supra note 507.
Common sense dictates that any changes made upon a predecessor constitutional provision by the
framers of the North Dakota Constitution were made for a reason, and that the more extensive the
changes, the less persuasive the preexisting interpretation of the other state's constitution.
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constitutional convention had access to the constitutions of every
state then in the Union, as well as personal copies of the proposed
South Dakota Constitution.519 Adding to this difficulty are the
various changes made over the years to each of the constitutions of
the other states. The converse problem develops in determining
whether another state's present constitution - which is now
similar or even identical to the North Dakota Constitution - was
similarly worded in 1889, or, in the alternative, subsequently
infused with the language contained in the North Dakota
Constitution. These problems can be overcome only by expending
large amounts of time in the review of the appropriate materials. 520
It is therefore no wonder that the court, although reneging on its
self-proclaimed duty to take judicial notice of the source of the
relevant constitutional provision, 521 often side steps this prong of
the Robinson analysis and bases its interpretation of ambiguous
provisions either on the apparent intent of the framers or on the
contemporaneous construction of the legislature or some other
governmental body.
c) Contemporaneous and Practical Constructions
The North Dakota Supreme Court has long held that a
contemporaneous and practical construction of the North Dakota
Constitution is relevant to the proper interpretation of that
document, especially when "there has been a practical construction
which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period. ",522
These factors, however, should be employed as the last means of
determining the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision.
Unlike the preceding steps in the Robinson analysis, a
contemporaneous and practical construction of the constitution
necessarily reflects a subsequent understanding of an already adopted
constitutional provision, thereby providing less indication of the
framers' and the people's intent underlying the adoption of that
provision.
519. For a discussion of the information the delegates had before them, see infra text
accompanying notes 687-88.
520. Perhaps the future editors of the North Dakota Law Review would be willing to undertake a
special project, tracing the origin of each provision of the North Dakota Constitution through the
Journal of the convention (making note of all changes made or attempted to be made of the language)
and discovering the possible origin of each provision. Such a work would be an invaluable aid to the
lawyers and judges of the state, and would be a fitting gift to the bar on the occasion of the centennial
of the North Dakota Constitution.
521. State ex tel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 48, 159 N.W. 281, 286 (1916).
522. State ex rel, Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 422, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916) (quoting T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) (quoting, sometimes
inaccurately, various sections of chapter IV involving the construction of state constitutions)).
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A contemporaneous interpretation of a constitutional
provision can be drawn from many sources, including subsequent
legislative enactments, 23 revisions by code commissions, or the
lack of a revision, 524 votes at a statewide election, 525 and even
custom. 526 Moreover, contemporaneous construction is not limited
to constructions by the legislature or the people: constructions by
the executive or judicial departments, as well as other
governmental agencies, may be considered. 527  Of special
significance in determining the intent underlying thie original
provisions of the North Dakota Constitution is the legislation
enacted by the first legislative assembly, for "many members of the
first legislative assembly were men who had participated actively in
the framing of the constitution.... ,,528
A "practical" interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution
generally relates to the court's own judgment of whether the result
is absurd, 529 undesirable, 530 impractical, 531 or unreasonable.5 32 As
may be expected, there may be differences in opinion on whether
the result is actually absurd. And even if the result seems presently
absurd, the particular result may not have seemed absurd to those
who adopted the provision, and may accurately reflect what was
originally intended regardless of the alleged absurdity. In any
event, the practical interpretation analysis occasionally has been
used as an excuse to ignore the text of the constitution and to reach
523. State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 905-06 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Stockman
v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 557-58 (N.D.
1965); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 216-17 (N.D. 1961); State ex re. Rausch v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 258-59, 49 N.W.2d 14, 21 (1951); Egbert v. City of
Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 9-11, 24 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (1946); State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 74 N.D.
244, 258, 21 N.W.2d 355, 363 (1945); Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 138-41, 284 N.W. 238, 243-44
(1939); State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 465-67, 171 N.W. 213, 215-16 (1918); State ex rel.
Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 425-26, 160 N.W. 514, 518-19 (1916); State ex rel. Linde v. Hall,
35 N.D. 34, 48-49, 159 N.W. 281, 286-87 (1916); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 371,
133 N.W. 1046,1050 (1911); State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31,38-39, 119 N.W. 360, 364
(1909); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 139,99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904).
524. Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 139, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904).
525. State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 371, 133 N.W. 1046, 1050 (1911).
526. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lyons v, Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 216 (N.D. 1961).
527. State exrel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 465, 171 N.W. 213, 215-16 (1918).
528. State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 74 N.D. 244, 258, 21 N.W. 2d 355, 363 (1945).
529. Haugland v. Meier, 339 N.W.2d 100, 105 (N.D. 1983); State ex rel. Olson v. Baaken, 329
N.W.2d 575, 578 (N.D. 1983); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679,684 (N.D. 1962).
530. State ex rel. Olson v. Baaken, 329 N.W.2d 575, 578 (N.D. 1983).
531. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reese v. Mooney, 64 N.D. 620,625, 255 N.W. 105, 107 (1934).
532. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State v. Feist, 93
N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1958); State ex rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 260-
61, 49 N.W.2d 14, 22 (1951); see also State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979)
(court may consider the consequences of a particular construction when an ambiguity exists in the
constitution); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978) (court may
resolve a basic constitutional question primarily on the language found in the constitutional
provision).
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a desired result, even if that result is at odds with the clear language
of the constitution. 53
In reference to the length of the acquiescence, the court has not
been specific about what constitutes a "considerable period" of
acquiescence to a legislative or practical construction 534 In
applying this doctrine, the court refers to a "long-continued"
construction (consisting of eighty-five years), 5"5 as well as an
"established" construction of a "very long continuance.' '536 The
court has also described certain contemporaneous and practical
constructions as lasting "years" (fourteen years), 537 "a period of
years" (nineteen years53' and fourteen years539), "many years"
(unspecified number of years), 540 and for a "considerable period"
(twenty-six years). 541
The court has also offered varying descriptions of the weight to
be afforded to a contemporaneous or practical construction
receiving acquiescence for a considerable period. The court has
stated that a contemporaneous and practical construction "is
not easy to resist" 542 and is entitled to great weight in determining
the real intent and purpose of constitutional provisions and
requirements.5 43 According to the court, these constructions "tend
to show the understanding of the people on the subject, and are
proper subjects of consideration when courts are attempting to
arrive at the meaning of ambiguous language in a statute or
533. &e, e.g., McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979); State ex re. Lein v. Sathre,.
113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962); State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 171 N.W. 213 (1918). For
a discussion of these cases, see mnfra text accompanying notes 603-53.
534. &ee, e.g., State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971) (14 years);
State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 422, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916) (26 years).
535. Stateex ret. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898,905 (N.D. 1977).
536. State ex ret. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362, 374, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (1911) (stating that
the construction of two legislative assemblies is not an established construction, but may be used, in
conjunction with a subsequent vote of the people, as an indication of the meaning of the provision).
537. State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971).
538. State ex ret. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 38-39, 119 N.W. 360, 364 (1909).
539. Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 138, 99 N.W. 769, 771 (1904).
540. State ex rl. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 216 (N.D. 1961).
541. State cx ret. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 422, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916).
542. Id. at 422, 428, 160 N.W. at 516, 519 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903) (quoting, sometimes inaccurately, various sections of
chapter IV involving the construction of state constitutions)).
543. Id. at 428, 160 N.W. at 519; see also State ex ret. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57
(N.D. 1971) (the construction that the legislature has placed on a constitutional provision, followed
by years of subsequent legislation, is entitled to great weight); State ex ret. Linde v. Packard, 35 N.D.
298, 322, 160 N.W. 150, 156 (1916) (contemporaneous construction and interpretation given by the
legislature is entitled to a great deal of weight); State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 39, 119
N.W. 360, 364 (1909) (when legislative construction has been followed by harmonious subsequent
legislation that has been in effect for years, the legislative construction is entitled to great weight in
determining the intent of constitutional provisions); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 139, 99 N.W.
769, 771 (1904) (recommendations of persons familiar with previous legislation of the state is entitled,
to great weight in any contemporaneous construction).
[VOL. 63:157
NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION
Constitution. "544 The court has also stated that a contemporaneous
or practical construction "should not be departed from unless
manifestly erroneous' 545 and that such a construction "is entitled
to great weight, unless it can be said to be a clear usurpation of
power or an abrogation of the text. '"546 On the other hand, the
court has also declared that a contemporaneous or practical
construction "is not controlling" 547 and "is not necessarily binding
on the courts. "1
548
Although a practical or contemporaneous construction may be
considered by the court in interpreting the constitution, these
constructions should not serve as a pretext to disregard the text of
the constitution or to create an ambiguity when none exists. The
court has often stated that the "rules of expediency" have no
application in construing the constitution, and that the court is
obligated to follow the plain mandates of the constitution
irrespective of "public clamor, majority desire, present apparent
need, . . . [or] unreasonableness of constitutional provisions as
particularly applied. ' 549 But, as will be shown, the court has
occasionally failed to heed its own words.
550
4. Application of Statutoty Rules of Construction
In one of its earliest decisions interpreting the North Dakota
Constitution, the North Dakota Supreme Court alluded to "the
clear rules of construction," 551 but did not state whether it was
referring to constitutional or statutory rules of construction.
Apparently the court was referring to constitutional rules of
construction, for in its decisions immediately following this broad
reference the court elaborated on the rules of constitutional
construction while omitting reference to rules of statutory
construction. 55 2
544. State exrel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,371,133 N.W. 1046, 1050(1911).
545. State ex rel. Linde v. Packard, 35 N.D. 298, 322, 160 N.W. 150, 156 (1916).
546. State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D. 362,374, 133 N.W. 1046, 1051 (1911).
547. Id. at 371, 133 N.W. at 1050.
548. State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 31, 38, 119 N.W. 360, 364 (1909).
549. State ex rel. Langer v. Olson, 44 N.D. 614, 630, 176 N.W. 528, 534 (1920); see also
McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979) (courts must follow plain mandates of
constitution regardless of "public clamor, majority desire, or apparent need"); R. RUSSELL, MR.
DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (1906) ("[nJo matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th'
supreme court follows th' iliction returns").
550. For a discussion of instances when the court has deviated from the plain mandates of the
constitution, see infra text accompanying notes 568- 653.
551. State ex rel. Ohlquist v. Swan, I N.D. 5, 11, 44 N.W. 492, 493 (1890).
552. For examples of cases in which the court elaborates on constitutional construction but not
statutory construction, see supra note 466.
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The rules of constitutional construction, described at length in
State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson,5"3 serve as the foundation of the court's
interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution. 554 At least in part,
the traditional rules of constitutional construction parallel the
statutory rules of construction. 555 Because of these similarities, the
court has often stated that the rules of statutory construction may,
to a limited extent, be applied to the interpretation of the
constitution: "Generally speaking, principles of construction
applicable to statutes are also applicable to constitutions, but not to
the extent of defeating the purposes for which a constitution is
drawn. '556 When interpreting the constitution, the court has
occasionally refered to a statutory rule of construction instead of the
constitutional rules of construction delineated in Robinson. The
rules of statutory construction are normally used only as a quick
reference to the corresponding constitutional rules of construction,
and should not be construed as a wholesale adoption of the
statutory rules of construction in the interpretation of the North
Dakota Constitution. 5 7 In one decision the court abbreviated the
statement regarding the general application of the principles of
statutory construction in the interpretation of the state constitution,
and simply stated that "rules applicable to construction of statutes
553. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421-22, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916). For a
discussion of Robinson, see supra text accompanying notes 448-58.
554. For a discussion of Robinson and its impact on later constitutional interpretation, see supra
text accompanying notes 462- 550.
555. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-01 (1975) (rules of statutory construction) with Robinson
preamble, supra p. 211. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-02 (1975) (words are to be understood in
their ordinary sense); id. S 1-02-03 (how statutory language is to be construed); id. 5 1-02-04 (how
conflicts in the expression of numbers are to be resolved with the Robinson plain language controls
rules, supra p. 211. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-07 (1975) (particular language controls
general language); id. S 1-02-08 (resolving conflicting provisions within the same statute); id. S 1-02-
09 (Supp. 1985) (resolving irreconcilable statutes or constitutional amendments passed during the
same session); id. 5 1-02-38(2) (1975) (presumption that "[t]he entire statute is intended to be
effective") with the Robinson harmonizing rules, a p. 211. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-01
(1975) (rules of statutory construction); id. $ 1-02-39 (1), (3) (when court determines legislative
intent, it may consider the object sought to be obtained by the legislation and may consider
legislative history) with the Robinson object to be accomplished language, supra p. 211. Compare
N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-39 (2), (4) (1975) (when court determines legislative intent, it may consider
"[the circumstances under which the statute was enacted" and "[t]he common law or former
statutory provision") with the Robinson prior state of the law language, supra p. 211-12. Compare N.D.
CENT. CODE S 1-02-38 (3), (4) (1975) (it is presumed that in enacting a statute, "[a) just and
reasonable result is intended" and "[a] result feasible of execution is intended"); id. S 1-02-39 (2),
(5), (6) (when a court determines legislative intent, it may consider "[tihe circumstances under
which the statute was enacted," "Ithe consequences of a particular construction," and "Itihe
administrative construction of the statute") wih the Robinson contemporaneous and practical
construction languages, supra p. 212.
556. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252 (N.D. 1960); Egbert v. City of
Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 7, 24 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1946); see also State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251
N.W.2d 898, 908 (N.D. 1977) (rules of statutory construction are also applicable to constitutional
construction); State ex reL. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823, 825 (N.D. 1975).
557. See, e.g., State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823, 825 (N.D. 1975) (rules of statutory
construction provide a basic guideline for constitutional construction).
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are to be resorted to" in construing an ambiguous constitutional
provision.5 58 But when construing the constitution, it is the
constitutional rules of construction that apply, and not the statutory
rules of construction. 55 .
Of greater concern, however, is the court's occasional
declarations that all rules of construction, statutory as well as
constitutional, are subservient to the duty to ascertain and give
effect to the intent and purpose of the framers and the people who
adopted the constitution.5 60 As discussed below,5 1 the adoption of
this view of constitutional construction would serve to destroy the
"plain language controls" rule,5 62 negate the clearly expressed will
of the people, and transform what was intended to be the steadfast
foundation of our political system into shifting sands incapable of
supporting the weight of logic and continuity.
5. Summary: Words Should Be What They Seem
For almost one hundred years the North Dakota Supreme
Court has applied the text of the state constitution in determining
and developing the law. 563 Generally speaking, the North Dakota
Supreme Court uses text based analysis, looking first to the specific
language employed, considering that language in its context to
determine its meaning and to harmonize any conflicting
provisions, and, if the language is still ambiguous, determining the
intent underlying the text of the constitution. 56 4 This traditional
form of analysis, as enunciated in Robinson, is a logical method of
558. Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556 (N.D. 1965); see also Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210
N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973) (quoting the pertinent language from Newman; State ex rel. Link v.
Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (ND. 1979) (same).
559. Even the consistent application of the rules of statutory construction would lead to
unpredictable results. The canons of statutory construction are often contradictory, and it is likely
that each judge would quote them to his or her own ends. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251
N.W.2d 898, 914 (N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the court used a canon of
construction in the case at bar that it refused to use in other cases); see also Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv.
395, 401-06 (1950) (listing numerous canons of construction that are in direct contradiction to each
other).
560. MeCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); State ex rel. Stockman v.
Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 555 (N.D. 1965);
Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946); see also State ex rel. Germain v.
Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918) (primary purpose of constitutional construction
is to effectuate the intent of the framers and the people).
561. For a discussion of the court's reliance on the framers' intent over all rules of construction,
see infra text accompanying notes 880-85.
562. Cf N.D. CENT. CODE 5§ 1-02-02, -03 (1975) (codification of the "plain language
controls" rule in the context of statutory construction).
563. For a list of cases in which the court has applied text based analysis, see supra notes
462-77.
564. For an example of how the court applies the text based analysis, see supra text
accompanying notes 462-550.
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constitutional analysis. Under our system of government, the
constitution is the supreme law of the land. To give effect to the
constitution, it is necessary to give effect to the language contained
therein. When the language is clear, it must be applied. Only when
the language is unclear should the court attempt to provide clarity
and purpose to that language by examining the intent underlying
the constitution.
The supreme court has, on occasion, rejected this traditional
method of interpreting the North Dakota Constitution. 56 5 Within
the context of our political system, such conduct defies logic and
constitutes a usurpation by the court of the will of the people as
expressed in the constitution they adopted. It also subjects the
constitution to even greater varying and inconsistent
interpretations, depending on what intent is perceived by the
various judges who serve on the court. Language, though capable
of different interpretations, is at least partly founded on a
semblance of meaning and direction. While words may have shades
of meanings and contextual subtleties, they at least serve as a
common frame of reference and as anchors to a common
understanding. Intent, however, is relatively free floating, derived
from numerous sources of differing authority, and inherently
dependent on suppositions concerning mental processes.
566
Without at least some fixed point of reference in the interpretation
of the North Dakota Constitution, it is doubtful that the center can
hold,567 and constitutional interpretation will be subject to the
winds of change and the whims of judges.
B. INTENT BASED ANALYSIS
As has been stated, when employing text based analysis the
court looks first to the text of the constitution and considers the
language contained therein as controlling. 56 8 Reference to non-
565. For an example of the court's rejection of text based analysis, see infra text accompanying
notes 603-53.
566. See, e.g., NDJI, Crim. No. 2114 (1985) (North Dakota jury instruction defining intent).
567. Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W. YEATS, THE.SEcoNo COMING, 11. 1-8 (1921).
568. For an example of how text based analysis is applied, see supra text accompanying notes
462-77.
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textual matters is appropriate only when the language is
ambiguous, and only for the limited purpose of giving that
language the actual effect intended by the people who drafted and
adopted the constitution. 56 9 When employing intent based analysis,
however, the court utilizes the intent of the drafters and the people
as the primary factor in the construction of the constitution. In
most of the decisions in which the court has applied intent based
analysis a review of the intent of the people who framed and
adopted the constitution would have been proper even under text
based analysis because the language being construed was
ambiguous. 570 The court, however, has occasionally employed.
intent based analysis not to illuminate the meaning of an
ambiguous provision of the constitution, but instead to defeat the
plain language of the constitution. The court has done this on three
separate occasions in the last ninety-eight years, specifically in
1918, 1962, and 1979.571 This section of the Article contains a'
review of the origin and history of intent based analysis and an
examination of the three decisions in which the court placed the
perceived intent over the text. The section concludes with a critique
of intent based analysis in the interpretation of the North Dakota
Constitution.
1. The Origin
The origin of intent based analysis is found in the court's 1904
decision of Barry v. Truax. 572 This case involved the issue of whether
it was constitutional under North Dakota law for a district court,
despite the defendant's objection, to move the trial of a criminal
action to a county that was different than the county in which the
offense was allegedly committed.5 73 The change of location was
made at the prosecutor's request and pursuant to a North Dakota
statute.5 74 Barry argued that the right to a trial by jury prohibited a
change in venue under these circumstances. 75 Because the North
Dakota Constitution did not specifically address the issue, but
569. For an example of when consideration of nontextual material is appropriate under text
based analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 456-59, 485-550.
570. See infra text accompanying notes 598-99 (discussing the court's opinions that are consistent
under text based analysis and intent based analysis).
571. See State ex ret. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 484, 171 N.W. 213, 224 (1918); State ex Tel.
Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783
(N.D. 1979). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 603-53.
572.13 N.D. 131,99 N.W. 769(1904).
573. Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 135, 99 N.W. 769, 770(1904).
b74. Id. The transfer of venue was related to the defendant's third trial for murder. See id. at
135, 99 N.W. at 769-70; see also State v. Barry, 11 N.D. 428, 92 N.W. 809 (1902) (reversal of
conviction in first trial).
575. Barry, 13 N.D. at 135-36, 99 N.W. at 770.
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rather referred generally to the right to trial by jury, 57 6 the court,
attempted to resolve the inherent ambiguity by reviewing prior
North Dakota law, as well as English common law, to determine
the "well known and commonly understood" meaning of the right
to a trial by jury. 577
The court in Barry first determined that the statute allowing
the change in venue had existed prior to the adoption of the
constitution, and had subsequently survived two code
commissions, 578 the implication being that the framers were cogni-
zant of the preexisting statute and that the code commissioners, by
leaving the statute in the code, believed that it comported with the
constitution. But most of the court's analysis centered on the prior
state of law as exhibited by the common law of England, which
allegedly prohibited a change of venue without the defendant's
concurrence. 57 9 In this context - deciding whether the adoption of
the constitutional provision was intended to employ the common
law of England instead of the preexisting law of the state - the
court issued the following oft-quoted language:
[it is a cardinal rule of construction that a constitution must be so
construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted
it, and, while it will be construed with reference to the
doctrines of the common law, its intent never will be
overruled by them. . . . In short, the question is always
one of intent, and, where the intent is clear, it, and not
the doctrines of the common law, will prevail.
580
Unfortunately, only the italicized language quoted above has found
new life on the pages of decisions in which the court has employed
576. Id., see N.D. CONST. art. I, S 7 (1889) (right to trial by jury) (current version at N.D.
CONsT. art. I, 513).
577. Barry, 13 N.D. at 136-37, 99 N.W. at 770-71. The court noted that:
IT]he constitution does not enumerate the details or incidents of the right of trial by
jury. This omission, however, gives no authority to the legislature or to the courts to
destroy by legislation or by judicial construction any of the substantial elements of the
right of jury trial which were intended to be secured. The constitution refers to "the
right of trial by jury" as a right well known and commonly understood at the time of
its adoption, and it is the right so understood which is secured by it.
Id. at 137, 99 NW. at 770-71.
578. Id. at 138, 99 N.W. at 771. The court noted that "great weight" could be given to the fact
that the commissions left the statute intact, because the secretary and one other member of the first
commission were members of the constitutional convention. Id. at 139, 99 N.W. at 771.
579. See id. at 139-49, 99 N.W. at 771-76.
580. Id. at 140, 99 N.W. at 772 (emphasis added).
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intent based analysis. 581 This language has been employed in
subsequent decisions as a generalization - if not a superseding rule
- concerning all aspects of constitutional construction, 58 2 despite
the fact that this portion of the decision concerned only the
application of the common law of England and the use of that
common law in interpreting the North Dakota Constitution.
Another possible foundation of intent based analysis is,
ironically, the Robinson decision itself. The court in Robinson began
its review of the rules of constitutional construction with a preamble
to those rules: "The object of construction, as applied to a written
Constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting ;f. ''583
Although the very next sentence of Robinson declared the principle
that the plain language of the constitution controls, 584 a number of
North Dakota decisions have relied on the "object of construction"
language contained in Robinson to support intent based analysis.
5 85
2. Subsequent Application
In the cases that have employed intent based analysis, the
supreme court has vacillated in its view of the importance of intent.
The court has variously stated that the constitution "must be
construed to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted"
it,586 that construing the constitution to effectuate the intention of
the framers and the people who adopted it is "a cardinal rule of
constitutional construction,'' 587 is "the object sought,'' 58 is the
581. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217 (N.D. 1961); Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252-53 (N.D. 1960); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 7,
24 N.W.2d 907,909 (1946).
582. See cases cited supra note 581.
583. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916) (emphasis in
original). For a discussion of Robinson and its view of the rules of constitutional construction, see supra
text accompanying notes 439-42.
584, See Robinson, 35 N.D. at 421, 160 N.W. at 516. "[The intent of the lawgiver] is to be found
in the instrument itself." Id.
585. For a discussion of cases that have subsequently applied the Robinson "object of
construction" language, see infra text accompanying notes 588-90, 593.
586. State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State v. Feist, 93 N.W.2d
646, 649 (N.D. 1958) (same language as that quoted in text).
587. State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217 (N.D. 1961); see also Northwestern Bell
Tel, Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252 (N.D. 1960) ("cardinal rule of construction" is that
constitution must be construed to give effect to the intention of the people); Egbert v. City of
Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 7, 24 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1946) (same); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 140, 99
N.W. 769, 772 (1904) (same).
588. State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 57 (N.D. 1971); State ex rel. Linde v.
Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421,160 NW. 514, 516 (1916) (same language as that quoted in text).
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"sole" object sought, 58 9 is the "fundamental aim and object kept in
mind," 590  is the "fundamental purpose," 5 91  is the "great
fundamental purpose,"592 and is the "overriding objective."
593
Additionally, the court has stated that courts "should undertake"
to determine intent,5 94 have a "duty" to determine intent, 595 and
must "make every effort" to determine intent.
596
Twenty North Dakota decisions appear, from at least some of
the language contained in each of them, to support intent based
analysis. 597  Of these twenty decisions, fifteen involve the
construction of ambiguous language,5 98 thereby rendering the
589. Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 555 (N.D. 1965); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713,
730, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (same language as that quoted in text).
590. Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 372, 182 N.W. 309,310 (1921).
591. State ex ret. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 56 (N.D. 1971).
592. State ex rt. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918).
593. State ex ret. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 918 (N.D. 1978).
594. State ex ret. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 905 (N.D. 1977); sec atsoJensen v. State,
373 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Nl.D. 1985).
595. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); Tormasehy v. Hjelle, 210
N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973) (same language as that quoted in text); State ex rd. Stockman v.
Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 56 (N.D. 1971) (citing State ex ret. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.,
78 N.D. 247, 258,49 N.W.2d 14,21 (1951)) (same).
596. Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978).
597. Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894,897 (N.D. 1985); McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780,
783 (N.D. 1979); Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978); State ex
rel. Vogel v. Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 918 (N.D. 1978); State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d
898, 905 (N.D. 1977); Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973); State ex re.
Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (N.D. 1971); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549,
555-56 (N.D. 1965); State ex ret. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State ex rot.
Lyons v. Guy, 107 N.W.2d 211, 217 (N.D. 1961); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103
N.W.2d 245, 252-53 (N.D. 1960); State v. Feist, 93 N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1958); Egbert v. City of
Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 6-7, 24 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1946); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 730, 24
N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946); Power y. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 62-63, 205 N.W. 9, 12 (1925); Goughnour
v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 371, 182 N.W. 309, 310 (1921); State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459,
484, 171 N.W. 213, 221 (1918) (Birdzell, J., concurring); State exrel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630,.
638, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State x rel, Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514,
516 (1916); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131,140,99 N.W. 769, 772 (1904).
598. Jensen v. State, 373 N.W.2d 894, 897 (N.D. 1985) (specific reference to remedial writs
deleted; ambiguity concerning whether court thereby lost the power to issue those particular writs);
Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978) (issue of whether "free"
public schools includes free textbooks considered inherently ambiguous); State ex rel. Vogel v.
Garaas, 261 N.W.2d 914, 917-18 (N.D. 1978) (ambiguity caused by new provision that allowed the
legislature to submit judicial nominations to the governor; ambiguity caused by legislature's failure
to establish committee); State ex rel. Sanstead v. Freed, 251 N.W.2d 898, 904 (N.D. 1977)
(ambiguity caused by two potentially conflicting provisions relating to the power of the lieutenant
governor to break a tie in the senate); Tormaschy v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 101-02 (N.D. 1973)
(inherent ambiguity concerning the application of the term "right-of-way"); State ex rel. Stockman
v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53, 56 (N.D. 1971) (ambiguity caused by the invalidation of one portion
of a provision); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 555 (N.D. 1965) (inherent ambiguity in the
application of the terms "construction, reconstruction, repair or maintenance" relating to acquiring
and controlling advertising rights to land adjacent to highways); State ex rel. Lyons v. Guy, 107
N.W.2d 211, 215-19 (N.D. 1961) (inherent ambiguity in the application of the term "emoluments"
in relation to governor's use of state automobile for official business and an increase in social security
benefits); State v. Feist, 93 N.W.2d 646, 648 (N.D. 1958) (inherent ambiguity in the application of
the terms "such jurisdiction" in relation to determining the appropriate jurisdiction of the district
court and the justices of the peace); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 8-9, 24 N.W.2d 907,909-
10 (1946) (ambiguity caused by the repeal of one provision relating to prohibition and the continued
reference to that provision in another provision relating to the engagement of business by the state'
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court's reference to intent based analysis consistent with the
traditional text based analysis, which requires an examination of
intent when the language is ambiguous. 599 Indeed, it is possible
that in many of these decisions the court realized the existence of an
ambiguity and merely went directly to the examination of intent,
without explicitly stating that the text failed to provide a clear
answer to the question at hand and that reference to nontextual
considerations was therefore required. In two other decisions, the
court simply applied the intent made evident by the language
itself.6°0 This approach is also consistent with the traditional text
based analysis, which requires any question to be answered, if
possible, from the plain meaning of the language of the
provision.601
Thus, of the twenty decisions ostensibly employing intent
based analysis, fifteen involved ambiguous language and two
involved the application of the plain text of the constitution.
Accordingly, seventeen of these twenty decisions were decided in a
manner consistent with text based analysis. Therefore, only the
three remaining decisions serve as true examples of intent based
analysis. However, the court in these three decisions employed, f s
the basis for its use of intent based analysis, the language contained
in one or more of the seventeen decisions discussed above - which
are, in reality, consistent with text based analysis. Thus, by the
frequent omission of this first step of the text based analysis, the
court opened the door to the development of intent based analysis.
and its political subdivisions); Power v. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 60, 205 N.W. 9, 11 (1925) (inherent
ambiguity in the application of the right to a trial by jury in relation to whether the verdict in a
criminal case must be unanimous); Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N.D. 368, 373, 182 N.W. 309, 310
(1921) (inherent ambiguity in the application of the term "district" in relation to whether, when a
county commissioner is attempted to be recalled, the recall petition must be signed by a certain
percentage of the county commissioner's district, or the entire legislative district); State ex rel.
Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 637- 38, 170 N.W. 121, 124 (1918) (ambiguity concerning whether
the constitutional prohibition of certain acts relating to the sale of alcohol impliedly allowed
nonspecified acts, in this case the purchase of alcohol); State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417,
423-24, 160 N.W. 514, 517 (1916) (ambiguity concerning the date thejustices commence their terms
of office, caused by a potential conflict of constitutional provisions); Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131,
136, 99 N.W. 769, 770 (1904) (inherent ambiguity in the application of the right to a jury trial in
relation to the transfer of the trial outside the county in which the offense was allegedly committed).
The court, in seven of these fifteen decisions, merely stated the rule concerning the review of
intent and then immediately referred to the countervailing rule that the text of the constitution
controls. See Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. School Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978); Tormaschy
v. Hjelle, 210 N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1973); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d
245, 252-53 (N.D. 1960); State v. Feist, 93 N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1958); Goughnour v. Brant, 47
N.D. 368, 371,373, 182 NW. 309, 310 (1921); State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630,638, 170
N.W. 121, 124 (1918); State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 421, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916).
599. For a discussion of the role of the intent of a provision in text based analysis, see supra text
accompanying notes 485-550.
600. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 252-54 (N.D. 1960); Dawson v.
Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 731,24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946).
601. See supra text accompanying notes 462-77.
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As a result, the court, on three separate occasions, 60 2 has used this
questionable form of analysis to ignore the text of the constitution
and to ostensibly develop a foundation for its continued use.
3. Review of the Decisions Actually Employing Intent Based
Analysis
The three decisions that serve as a foundation to intent based
analysis are State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall,60 3 State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre,
604
and McCarney v. Meier.605 These decisions were rendered in 1918,
1962, and 1979 respectively, and all touch on the elective
franchise.
a) State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall
The Twichell case involved a challenge to a constitutional
amendment concerning the power of initiative. 606  The
constitutional provision was passed during the heyday of the
Nonpartisan League, a political organization populist in origin and
intent. 60 7 In 1916 the Nonpartisan League swept the countryside
like prairie fire, 608 placing within its grasp the reins of government
power, including, significantly, three of the five seats on the
supreme court.60 9 The League, however, did not possess a majority
of the seats in the state senate, so the League's agenda was hindered
during the 1917 legislative session.610 To enact its full agenda, the
League decided to amend the constitution to raise the debt limit,
simplify the amending process, and authorize the state to engage in
business. 611 The League succeeded in accomplishing this goal,
6 12
but due to an objection to the manner in which one of the
602. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 1979); State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113
N.W.2d 679, 684 (N.D. 1962); State ex relt Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 171 N.W. 213 (1918). For
a discussion of the three cases that have omitted the first step of the text based analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 603-53.
603. 44 N.D. 459, 171 N.W. 213 (1918). For a discussion of Twichell, see infra text
accompanying notes 606-28.
604. 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962). For a discussion of Lein, see infra text accompanying notes
629-36.
605. 286 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979). For a discussion of McCarney, see infra text accompanying
notes 637-53.
606, State ex relTwichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 462-63,171 N.W. 213,214 (1918).
607: See generally E. RobINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA ch. 15 (1966) (discussing the
Nonpartisan League).
608. Id. at 330-37.
609. Id. at 337.
610. Id. at 337-38. The League later won control of the senate in the election of 1918. Id. at 341.
611, Id. at 338, 341.
612. Id. at 341.
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amendments was passed, the final test concerning the validity of the
new amendment fell to the supreme court.
The constitution, in relation to any proposed constitutional
amendment, provided at that time that "such proposed
amendment shall be entered on the journal of the house .... ",613
The issue in Twichell was whether the entire text of the amendment,
or merely a reference to the proposed amendment, must be
"entered on the journal. "614 During the first eight years of
statehood the entire text of proposed amendments appeared in the
journal; however, during the next twenty years the journal
sometimes included the entire text and occasionally contained a
reference to the proposed amendments only by title. 615 The court
placed special emphasis on the fact that no one had challenged this
practice during that twenty year period. 616
A plain reading of the words "such amendment shall be
entered on the journal of the house" required that the
complete text of the amendment, not just a reference to the
amendment, be entered on the journal. The court, however, by a
vote of three-to-two, held that the legislative construction,
demonstrated by the occasional practice of referring to the
amendments in the journal by title only, "is proper and
reasonable, and it complies with the requirements of the section,
not only in spirit, but in letter. . , 617 Thus, according to the
author of the majority opinion, the text of the constitution itself
supported the view that mere reference to the amendment in the
journal was sufficient.
The concurring opinions in Twichell, however, illustrate the
intent based approach actually employed by the court. In his
concurrence, Justice Birdzell recognized that the majority had
actually ignored the plain language of the constitution:
The literal interpretation of the section, it must be
admitted, supports the contention of the plaintiff, but the
decided weight of judicial authority, as well as reason,
613. N.D. CONST. art. XV, S 202 (1889) (recodified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. IV, 5 16).
614. Twichl, 44 N.D. at 464, 171 N.W. at 215.
615. Id. at 516-17, 171 N.W. at 237 (Christianson, J., dissenting). The majority opinion,
however, read the statistics relating to the reference to amendments as follows: "Since 1897, a period
of more than 20 years, practically every amendment to the Constitution was entered on the jourrilal of
the house in the same manner as [this amendment]." Id. at 465, 171 N.W. at 216. The difference
between the two views could perhaps be attributed to the lenses of politics worn by judges. See t
Corinthians 13:12 ("For now we see through a glass, darkly") and the words attributed to Benjamin
Disraeli ("There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics."), reprinted in L. PETER,
PETER's QUOTATIONS: IDAs FOR OUR TIME 477 (1979).
616. See Twichell, 44 N.D. at 465, 171 N.W. at 215.
617. Id. at 467, 171 N.W. at 216.
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appears to us to be contrary to the literal interpretation.
Though courts are generally concerned with ascertaining
the actual intention of the framers of Constitutions, in
order that effect may be given thereto, it will sometimes
happen that too strict an adherence to a literal
interpretation and to a demonstrable actual intention is
apt to defeat the real purpose of a given provision.
618
Justice Birdzell justified his departure from "a literal
interpretation" by stating that, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, the requirement of printing the proposed amendment
in the journal "was expressive of the most convenient way of
making a permanent record of the resolution. "619 But, Justice
Birdzell reasoned, "with the use of modern conveniences such as
the stenographer and the typewriter," which insure a sufficient
degree of accuracy and publicity, courts should hesitate to "impose
a strict compliance with the literal meaning of such provisions. "620
Despite the inconsistent forms of analysis employed in the
majority opinion (allegedly following "the letter" of the section)
and Justice Birdzell's concurrence (refusing to give the section a
"literal interpretation"),621 Justice Robinson tactfully stated that
he "fully" concurred in both of the "well-considered opinions."
6 22
This lack of consistency (and, perhaps, lack of logic) should come as
no surprise given the fact that each of the three justices voting to
uphold the League-sponsored amendment were affiliated with the
Nonpartisan League. 62"
While Chief Justice Bruce's dissent involved other
considerations, 624  Justice Christianson's dissent forcefully
addressed the issue of supplanting the text of the constitution by the
use of intent based analysis. According to Justice Christianson, the
conclusion to be drawn from the text of the provision was
"obvious" 625 - the legislature possessed no right to dispense with
the publication of the proposed amendment. 626  Justice
Christiaason considered the majority opinion not only as "a step
618. Id. at 480-81, 171 N.W. at 222 (Birdzell, J., apparently concurring).
619. Id. at 481, 171 N.W. at 222.
620. Id.
621. Compare id. at 467, 171 N.W. at 216 (Grace, J., apparently writing for the majority) (the
legislative construction "complies with the requirements of the section, not only in spirit, but in
letter") with id. at 480, 171 N.W. at 222 (Birdzell, J., apparently concurring) "[tlhe literal
interpretation of the section, it must be admitted, supports the contention of the.plaintiff").
622. Id. at 506, 171 N.W. at 232 (Robinson,J., concurring).
623. Se E. RoBrNsoN, supra note 607, at 337.
624. Twic/ll, 44 N.D, at 504-06, 171 N.W. at 233-34 (Bruce, CJ., dissenting).
625. Id. at 533, 171 N.W. at 244 (Christianson, J., dissenting).
626. Id. at 531-32, 171 N.W. at 243-44.
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backwards," but also as "an invasion by the judiciary of the
legislative department of government.' '62  Justice Christianson
concluded that "[o]urs is a government by law, and not of men,"
with a constitution that is "equally binding upon all - the majority
as well as the minority.' '628
b) State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre
After a respite of forty-four years, the supreme court in Lein v.
Sathre 629 once again ignored the plain language of the constitution
in favor of what it perceived to be the intention of the people. The
court's decision in Lein involved a recently enacted amendment to
the state constitution dealing with reapportionment. 30 According
to this new provision, the state house of representatives was to be
reapportioned to consist of one representative per senatorial district
(forty-nine), additional representatives for multi-county senatorial
districts of one per county in each multi-county district (twelve),
and "the balance" of all other representative seats distributed in
proportion to the population of the senatorial districts. 631 All the
justices agreed that the provision, though complex, was specific and
without ambiguity.6 32 A problem arose, however, from the fact that
application of the provision created greater disproportion in
representation than two other methods of calculation used "by the
courts and students of the problem.' '633
The majority concluded, after reviewing the statistics, that the
language of the provision "permits" the plain construction, but
"such a construction would lead to a result bordering on the absurd
and aggravate the disporportion.. ."634 The court therefore
rejected the plain language of the constitution and reapportioned
the representatives according to its own method of calculation,
stating that "[wle have no doubt that the purpose of requiring the
Legislature to apportion representatives ... was to provide for an
equalizer to the end that the total representation would nearly
627. Id. at 535, 171 N.W. at 245.
628. Id.
629. State ex re/. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962).
630. Id. at 682; see also Constitutional Measures, Approved, ch. 405, 1961 N.D. Laws 691 (June
28, 1960) (Legislative Districts and Reapportionment).
631. Constitutional Measures, Approved, ch. 405, 1961 N.D. Laws 691 (June 28, 1960).
632. See Lein, 113 N.W.2d at 684, 688.
633. id. at 685. Because the legislature failed to effect reapportionment as provided by the new
provision, the duty to do so was passed by the terms of the provision to a group consisting of the chief
justice, the attorney general, the secretary of state, and the majority and minority leaders of the
house of representatives. Id, at 682-83, The group's proposal was invalidated by the court. Id. at 687.
634. Id. at 684.
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approach absolute equality on the basis of population. . . .
Thus, the court rejected the language of the constitution and
instead employed its own view of the intent of the amendment.
In his concurring opinion Justice Strutz objected to the court's
failure to follow the mandate of the constitution:
The [majority] opinion points out that a literal interpretation of
this provision would lead to absurd results and that this court
therefore should interpret the provision in such a way as to make
effective what ought to be the aim of the provision being interpreted.
A court is permitted to construe a constitutional
provision only where the meaning of that provision is in
doubt. This court has held that, in the construction of a
constitutional provision, words are to be given their
plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning....
I do not believe the provision of Section 35, providing for
the apportionment of the additional representatives, leaves
any room for doubt....
The clear meaning of the language used is that the
balance of fifty-four representatives shall be apportioned
among the senatorial districts "according to the
population of the several senatorial districts," regardless
of whether the senatorial district is composed of one, or
more than one, county. I realize that to give this provision a
literal interpretation will lead to ridiculous results, but Section 35
itself is ridiculous. I do not believe this court should say that black
means white or that up means down, even if by so doing we should
make an absurd provision of the Constitution a little less
preposterous.636
635. Id. The court explicitly stated that "[n]o questions arising under the United States
Constitution are presented to this Court .... ." Id, at 681-82. Nonetheless, the court stated that the
results of the formulas "impel us to hold that the apportionment . . . violates the constitutional
mandate of apportionment according to the population of the several districts." Id. at 687. The
court was apparently referring to "the constitutional mandate" created by one clause of the new
provision, which was taken out of context and clearly was contrary to the plain meaning of the
provision as a whole. In short, the court applied what it perceived to be the spirit of the provision
instead of the text of that provision.
Perhaps the court's "constitutional mandate" was derived from the concept of equal protection.
But the court had previously stated that federal law was not being applied. And, of course, the
provisions constituting the basis of the state's equal protection clause did not apply because,
according to established rules of constitutional construction, the more current provision is given
preference if there is any conflict. See supra text accompanying note 484.
It should be noted that the present constitutional provision does include language requiring the
legislature to "guarantee, as nearly as practicable, that every elector is equal to every other elector in
the state in the power to cast ballots for legislative candidates." N.D. CONST. art. IV, S 2, para. 2.
636. Lein, 113 N.W.2d at 688 (Strutz, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also J. SwIFT,
GULLIVER'S TRAVELS part IV, ch. 5 (1726):
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c) McCarney v. Meier
Pursuant to the North Dakota Constitution, "[e]ach elector
signing a petition [to initiate or refer a measure] shall also write in
the date of signing and his post-office address. "637 The McCarney
case involved the secretary of state's rejection of petitions submitted
for the purpose of obtaining a referral of a particular act of the
legislature. 638 The proponents of the referral submitted the referral
petitions to the secretary of state, who rejected 1,150 signatures
because of the failure of those persons to include their post office
address, which in large cities includes a street address.6 39 Part of
this failure was attributable to the sample printed on the petition,
which used as an example the post office address of a small town
which did not include a street address. 640 The secretary of state
returned the petitions to the sponsors and informed them that, due
to the requirements of the constitution, each person who signed the
petition and did not include a post office address must personally
insert his or her own address. 641 The sponsors did not comply with
the secretary of state's instructions; instead, the sponsors inserted
the house numbers and street addresses of the petitioners by the use
of directories. 642 The secretary of state therefore rejected the
petitiqn. 643
The court, after declaring that constitutional provisions
relating to initiative and referendum "should be given a broad and
[V]ery many men among us were bred up from their youth in the art of proving by
words multiplied for the purpose that white is black, and black is white, according as they
are paid.
It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may
legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions
formerly made against common justice, and the general reason of mankind. These,
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities to justify the most iniquitous
opinion; and they are so lucky in this practice, that it rarely fails of decrees answerable
to their intent and expectation.
Id. (emphasis in original), reprinted in 36 GREAT BOOKS OF THE.WESTERN WORLD 152-53 (M. Hutchins
ed. 1952).
Justice Strutz' opinion is deemed a concurrence, even though Justice Strutz had the opposite
view of the majority, only because the court decided that a restraining order against the secretary of
state would be unnecessary since the court had "no reason to believe that the Secretary of State will
not act in accordance with law and consistent with this opinion without direction or restraint on the
par of this Court." Lein, 113 N.W.2d at 688.
637. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 785 (N.D. 1979) (quoting N.D. CoNsT. art.
amend. 105, S 3 (1979) (recodified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. III, 5 3)).
638. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 782.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 782, 786.
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liberal construction,"644 stated that it was guided "by the principle
that the right of the people to be heard should be maintained."
645 It
therefore held that "under the circumstances of this case,
substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate is
sufficient. '"6 6 Thus, the court approved the addition of the
petitioner's addresses by the sponsors - despite the clear language
of the constitution - because of its desire to prevent what it
perceived as an incorrect result.
Justice VandeWalle, in his special concurrence, stated that he
considered "the requirement that the signer write in his street
address to be directory rather than mandatory" and that he
"would not reject the signature because some other person added
the street address. "647 This view was based on the conclusion that
"the requirement of a street address is only to assist the Secretary of
State in determining whether or not the signer actually signed the
petition and whether or not the signer is an elector of the State.
" t648
Chief Justice Erickstad, in his lone dissent, noted that prior to
1979 the constitution only required the signer of the petition to
"sign his own name and . . . be an elector of the State of North
Dakota. "649 But since the constitution now required that the signer
also write in his post office address, "it is incumbent upon this
court to recognize that change in the constitution and act
accordingly.' '650 According to Chief Justice Erickstad, the change
in the constitution was a response "to the need for constitutional
reform to strengthen the referendum process against the potential
for fraud," 651 and it would be inappropriate to "interpret out of
644. Id. at 785.
645. Id. at 787.
646. Id. at 786. The court noted that although the inclusion of complete addresses would have
made it easier for the Secretary of State to contact the signers of the petition for any verification
procedures, the Secretary of State was able to locate the signers by the information provided. Id. at
786-87.
647. Id. at 787 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Justice VandeWalle's distinction between.
"directory" and "mandatory" provisions is especially hard to comprehend in light of article I, 6 24
of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides that the provisions of the constitution" are
mandatory and prohibitory unless, by express words, they are declared otherwise. N.D. CoNsT. art.
1,524.
648. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 787 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Without stating the
constitutional basis for his view, Justice VandeWalle stated that "filf the party adding the street
address places the wrong address on the petition and if the Secretary of State cannot locate the signer
of the petition, it may be cause for rejecting that signature, but Ido not believe the fact that the street address
is added by someone other than the signer is a valid reason of itsef for rejecting the signature. " Id. (emphasis
added).
649. Id. at 788 (Erickstad, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Hernett v. Meier, 173 N.W.2d 907, 916
(N.D. 1970)).
650. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 788 (Erickstad, C.J., dissenting); see N.D. CoNST. art. amend.
105, 5 3 (1889) (recodified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. III, 5 3).
651. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 792; see N.D. CoNsT. art. amend. 105, 5 3 (1889) (recodified as
amended at N.D. CoNsT. art. Il1, S 3).
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existence the constitutional requirement of a post-office address on
the ground that the signatures of some qualified electors may not be
counted if the requirement is upheld. ",652 Chief Justice Erickstad's
most important comment, however, related to the future prospects
of continued disregard for the mandates of the constitution:
It is unfortunate if some of the signers were misled by the
sample, but such a possible circumstance cannot justify
reading an exception into the Constitution where none
exists. If [the court] could justify such an exception, the vitality of
numerous constitutional mandates would be entirely dependent
upon the acts of governmental officers and employees. Such an
approach is a frail basis upon which to construe constitutional
provisions.653
4. Summary: Speak Well ofJudges, for They Would Be Gods
Although the origin of intent based analysis is found within
traditional text based analysis, it has grown beyond its initial and
proper role. From its beginning as an underlying principle guiding
the application of well established text based rules, it has become a
tool for the destruction of the very rules from which it sprang.
Divining intent is often a subtle art, based more on intuition and
supposition than on a scientific or factual inquiry. Thus, the search
for and discovery of intent by the courts is vulnerable to
sophisticated manipulation, especially when an opinion is merely a
desired result looking for a reason. If any lesson can be drawn from
the three decisions which apply intent based analysis with results
contrary to the plain meaning of the text, it is that the constitution,
in all its majesty, possesses the potential of becoming a frail and
amorphous document.
III. DIVINING INTENT AND PURPOSE
When construing ambiguous language contained in the North
Dakota Constitution (text based analysis) or when attempting to
ascertain intent (intent based analysis), it is essential to consider the
early history of North Dakota, the intentions of the constitutional
framers, and the differences between the federal and North Dakota
constitutions. An examination of these factors reveals three
652. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 791; see N.D. CONST. art. amend. 105, 5 3 (1889) (recodified as
amended at N.D. CoNsT. art. 11I, 5 3).
653. McCarney, 286 N.W.2d at 790-91 (emphasis added).
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primary intentions underlying the North Dakota Constitution: a
reduction, as much as possible, of all outside control of the state by
"big business" and its pawns; an expansion of individual rights;
and a restriction of the power of state government.
A. EARLY NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY
North Dakotans could not help but have engrained in them
attributes of the pioneer spirit - an independence of mind, a
steadfastness of purpose, a concern for others, and a high regard for
personal and property rights. 654 Work was difficult, the living
quarters sparse. Spring brought floods. Summer, dust storms.
Spring and fall, prairie fires. And the winter, living up to its
unchanging tradition, brought "isolation, numbing cold, and
blizzards. "655 But due to the unique history of North Dakota, an
element of radicalism and a strong sense of economic fairness fused
into these attributes, and this fusion changed forever the direction
and demeanor of North Dakota history.
One of the most important factors in the rapid settlement of
North Dakota in the 1870s and 1880s was the opening of the
prairies by the railroads. As stated by Professor Robinson, the
railroads opened North Dakota to the outside world and overcame
its remoteness. 656 However, this luxury of easy transporation and
access to the rest of the world came with a price. The railroads
"controlled the appointments of territorial officials, sent men to the
territorial legislature, and, to retain their influence, delayed
statehood." 657 The extent of their power is reflected in the
astounding fact that the federal government gave the Northern
Pacific Railway ownership of almost one-quarter of what later
became North Dakota. 6
58
The Northern Pacific did not want to lose control. It
orchestrated, with the assistance of the corrupt territorial governor,
Nehemiah Ordway, 659 the removal of the territorial capital from
654. See E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 172-73 (1966). See generally id., ch. 8, 156-73 (describing
the life of the North Dakota pioneer).
655. Id. at 168.
656. Id. at 122-23.
657. Robinson, The Themes of North Dakota History 4, reprinted in 26 NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY
8 (1959) (citing H. LAMAR, DAKOTA TERRITORY, 1861-1889: A STUDY OF FRONTIER POLITICS 190-93,
209-10, 241 (1956)).
658. E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 198. It should be noted, however, that once the boom of
settlers arrived (a boom that was primarily created by the railroads) the Northern Pacific offered its
land to settlers on easy terms. Id at 144, 148,149,
659. Id, at 200-01. Ordway was removed from office by President Arthur about two years after
the relocation of the territorial capitol to Bismarck. Id. at 201.
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Yankton to Bismarck so that it would be located on the Northern
Pacific's main line. 660 The residents of Dakota Territory felt much
like the English colonists, and claimed openly that their interests
were being "subjected to the whims and corrupt acts of persons in
power" - the railroads and their pawns. 661 Thus, the origin of the
movement for statehood stemmed not only from the desire of
independence, but also from the desire to throw off outside control
and to disengage the minions of corruption. 662 Simply put, North
Dakotans were fed up with being the "plaything of outside forces"
begging for fair treatment. 663
B. INTENT OF THECONSTITUTIONAL FRAMERS
In early 1889, Congress finally authorized statehood for North
Dak3ta by passing an enabling act for North Dakota, South
Dakota, Washington, and Montana. 664 One of the requirements of
the enabling act was that each state hold a constitutional
convention for drafting a state constitution to be submitted to the
voters of the state 665
1. Composition
Seventy-five persons were elected to attend the North Dakota
constitutional convention that began on July 4, 1889.666 Thirty-
660. Id. at 200-01.
661. Robinson, The Themes of North Dakota History 7 n. 16, reprinted in 26 NORTH DAKOTA
HISTORY 11 (1959) (quoting the Yankton Press and Dakotian (1887)).
662. E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 199-200. This intent of those who moved for statehood is
best shown by the purpose of the North Dakota Farmers Alliance, an influential prestatehood
organization that sought to unite farmers for "protection against . . . the encroachments of
concentrated capital and the tyranny of monopoly." Id. at 204.
663. Robinson, The Themes of North Dakota History 5, 6, reprinted in 26 NORTH DAKOTA
HISTORY 9, 11(1959).
664. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889). See generally L. OMDAHL, GOVERNING
NORTH DAKOTA, 1985-87 at 18 (1985) (enabling act started process of North Dakota adopting a
constitution); E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 208 (enabling act granted North Dakota statehood); C.
LEIFUR, OUR STATE NORTH DAKOTA 265 (1962) (same); WORKERS OF THE.FEDERAL WRITERS' PROJECT
OF THE.WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION FOR THE.STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, NORTH DAKOTA: A
GUIDE TO THE. NORTHERN PRAIRIE STATE 49 (1938) (same); 1 L. CRAWFORD, HISTORY OF NORTH
DAKOTA 323 (1931) (same); I C. LOUNSBERRY, NORTH DAKOTA: HISTORY AND PEOPLE 384 (1917)
(same); R. BLACK, HISTORY OP THE. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1889 at 15 (1910)
(available at the Legislative Research Counsel Library, Bismarck, North Dakota (same). Based on
the Congressional Record, R. M. Black states that the names considered for North Dakota ranged
from Pembina, Algonquin, back to Pembina, North Dakota, Northern Dakota, once again
Pembina, and finally North Dakota. Id. at 3-5. There was even an attempt to rename the entire
territory "Lincoln," as well as a proposal to allow South Dakota to become a state and rename the
remaining Dakota territory Lincoln, Id. at 10, 11-12. According to Lewis Crawford, by territorial
days "Dakota hard wheat had been so extensively advertised that no one would think of calling the
state by any name that left the word Dakota out." I L. CRAWFORD, supra, at 323.
665. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 676, J 2 (1889). According to the enabling act,
the constitution had to be "Republican in form, making no distinction in civil or political rights on
account of race or color, except as to Indians not taxed, and be not repugnant to The Constitution of
the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence." Id. 5 4.
666. See, e.g., E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 208.
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three delegates came from the Red River Valley counties; the
sparsely settled western part of the state had only six delegates, five
of them from Bismarck and Mandan. 6 7 In relation to occupation,
the delegates consisted of twenty-nine farmers, twenty-five lawyers,
nine merchants, five bankers, three real estate dealers, two
publishers, one doctor, and one railroad man.6 68 And although the
lawyers did most of the talking66 9 (as is their way), one scholar
states, with at least a hint of pride, that "some of the keenest
debaters came from the ranks of the farmers." 670
The common good was uppermost in the minds of the people
who elected the delegates, their first wish to secure the best
constitution that could be framed.6 7 1 According to one newspaper,
"a tendency to lay aside factional feeling and send the very best
men to the constitutional convention" existed among the people of
North Dakota. 672 A prevailing spirit of unity was demonstrated by
the appointments of the chairmanships of the convention. These
chairmanships were made in proportion to the numbers of
delegates of each party, rather than assigning all chairmanships to
delegates of the party in the majority. 67" Indeed, the only vote
following straight party lines was the election of the president of the
convention.6 74
2. Domination of Reform Ideas
The convention, as one scholar states, was "dominated by
reform ideas. It reflected both the radical spirit of the exploited
region and the nation-wide concern about the growth of
monopolies and corruption in government. "675 The state
667. Id.
668. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 17. It should be noted that the classification of "farmer" at the
time of the constitutional convention was quite broad in that it was common "to call oneself a farmer
if one owned farmland and obtained a portion of one's income from that land," even if that person
never plowed a furrow or worked the fields. Letter from Larry Remele to Lynn M. Boughey (Jan.
13, 1987). Mr. Remele is the Director of Education and Interpretation, State Historical Society.
669. See, e.g., I L. CRAwFoRo, supra note 664, at 333 (providing a list of the comparatively small
group of delegates that did most of the speaking during the debates; this list includes sixteen lawyers,
two farmers, one real estate dealer, and a railroad man).
670. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 19 & n.4 (referring specifically to L.D. Bartlett, F. B.
Fancher, and E. D. Wallace, all farmers, as "among the best debaters of the convention").
671. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 17.
672. Id. (quoting Bismarck Daily Tribune, Apr. 17, 1889).
673. 1 C. LouNssav, supra note 664, at 391.
674. Id.
675. E. RosINsoN, supra note 607, at 209. Larry Remele, of the State Historical Society,
comments that ethnicity also played a part in the development of the spirit of reform:
(Your article] follows an interpretation that would be approved by most of the North
Dakotans who have recently researched or written about the state's past. Some
researchers would place a higher emphasis on the factors of ethnicity, importation of
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constitutional convention, unlike its federal counterpart, 678 "sat
with open doors, and the gallery was occupied by an attentive and
appreciative audience of men and women .... ,,677 The spirit of
open government went so far that the privilege of the floor (i.e.,
access to the floor) was extended to members of the press .678
Various reformers from throughout the country were allowed
to present their views to the members of the convention. 679 Of
traditions from elsewhere in the United States (e.g., continuity of culture and
transmittal of tradition within the nation), and the influence of the era in which the
constitution was prepared. The era was one in which major reform movements were
afoot in the United States, such as the revitalized labor movement, the progressive
movement with its emphasis on reform within government and modernization of
institutions, the Australian ballot movement, suffrage, prohibition, expanded access
to voting, and especially the very progressively oriented Farmers Alliance movement.
Those movements coalesced within North Dakota because the state was a mecca for
those who came from other places. When the immigrants (and everyone who came here
was one!) came together in North Dakota and the northern plains, they followed
established political traditions, came together, and compromised their differences. In
so doing, they incorporated the prevailing trends and thinking of the day - and that
thinking tended to be progressive and modernizing. Thus, the North Dakota
Constitution reflected political traditions developed elsewhere, the modern-ness of the
era in which it was written, and the influence of the aggressive people who molded the
document.
Letter from Larry Remele to Lynn M. Boughey (Jan. 13, 1987) (slightly condensed). Mr. Remele is
the Director of Education and Interpretation, State Historical Society.
676. See, e.g., I C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE.RIsE OF AMERICAN CIVLIZATION 312 (rev, trade ed.
1933); see alsoJ. MADISON, NOTEs OF DEBATES IN THE.FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (entry of May
29, 1787). Madison's notes list some of the rules of the federal convention: only members could
inspect the journal, no copies of the journal could be removed without permission of the convention,
and "nothing spoken in the House [could] be printed, or otherwise published or communicated
without leave." Id. at 28. Of special interest is the precautions taken in relation to Benjamin
Franklin: "In their anxiety for security the delegates took every precaution against publicity; they
even had a discreet colleague accompany the aged Franklin to his convivial dinners with a view to
checking that amiable gentleman whenever, in unguarded moments, he threatened to divulge secrets
of state." I C. BEARD & M. BEARD, supra, at 312.
677. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 21.
678. JOURNAL OF THE.CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR NORTH DAKOTA HELD AT BISMARCK,
THURSDAY, JULY 4 TO AUO. 17, 1889 at 2 [hereinafterJOURNAL]; see also R. BLACK, supra note 664, at
23. The convention subsequently provided, as one of the convention rules, that "reporters or other
persons as shall have permission given them by the president of the convention, shall be permitted to
come within the bar of the convention during its session." JOURNAL at 11 (rule 36). Interestingly, the
convention considered withdrawing the privilege of one newspaper because it had "cast a slur" in
one of its editorials on the president of the convention. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE.PROCEEDINOS AND
DEBATES OF THE.FIR5T CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA, ASSEMBLED IN THE.CITY OF
BISMARCK, JULY 4H co Avo. 17TH, J889 at 27 [hereinafter DEBATES]. The resolution, however, was
tabled, ostensibly because "the criticism came before the Convention was organized." Id. at 28.
679. The Reverend R. C. Wiley of the National Reform Association asked the convention to
maintain the Sabbath, restrict the grounds for divorce (some states had one divorce in every twelve
marriages, while in Denver the statistics showed an "unthinkable" one divorce in every four
marriages), require the schools to teach "the principles of virtue and Christian morality" and allow
Bibles in the classroom (while remaining, of course, non-sectarian), and include in the preamble
reference to God and Christ (partly to protect the state, because "[tjhe anarchists of this and every
country are mostly atheists"). DEBATES, supra note 678, at 49-50. Henry Blackwell of the Women's
Suffrage Association spoke on behalf of providing women the vote on all matters. Id. at 34. United
States Senators Stewart and Regan of the Committee on Irrigation and Arid Lands spoke briefly on
irrigation and extensively on the "debt" issue and expanding the gold standard to include silver. Id.
at 405-10. Major Powell, Director of the Geological Survey, urged strongly that the constitution
should "IhIold the waters in the hands of the people" so that the state's "great agricultural sources"
would not fall "into the hands of the few." Id. at 412. A "Mr. Bruel of Minneapolis" also spoke on
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greatest significance were the speeches of Territorial Governor
Arthur C. Mellette and Judge Thomas M. Cooley, a nationally
known constitutional scholar who at that time was serving as the
chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission.680 Governor
Mellette discussed what he considered to be one of the greatest evils
of government: "excessive legislation - the constant change every
two years of the laws, and the squabbles and debates over the
different questions that constantly arise." 6 1 To prevent this evil,
the governor recommended that the new constitution embody "the
fundamental law of the land and make it permanent. "682 According
to Mellette, "the modern tendency is to embrace in the
Constitution as much of the necessary legislation of the State as can
be done with perfect safety. ''683
Judge Cooley, on the other hand, advised the members of the
convention not to legislate too much:
[I]f I were to drop a single word of advice - although I
scarcely feel that it is within my province to do that - it
would be simply this: In your Constitution-making
remember that times change, that men change, that new
things are invented, new devices, new schemes, new
plans, new uses of corporate power. . . . Don't, in your
constitution-making, legislate too much. In your Constitution you
are tying the hands of the people. Don't do that to any such
extent as to prevent the Legislature hereafter from
meeting all evils that may be within the reach of proper
legislation. Leave something for them. Take care to put
proper restrictions upon them, but at the same time leave
what properly belongs to the field of legislation, to the
the subject of "the Single Tax," although the debates do not contain the text of his speech. See
.JOURNAL, supra note 678, at 156.
One particularly touchy moment came after Senator Regan, a former cabinet member of the
confederacy, spoke on irrigation. M. N. Johnson of Lakota stated that while the senator spoke, his
mind went back twenty-six years to the time when those of the "Grand Army" were studying
irrigation in the ditches at Vicksburg, on the march that Sheridan made to the sea, and on the
battlefield of Gettysburg, where the sides irrigated the soil with blood and tears. DEBATES, supra note
678, at 413..Just as Johnson was beginning to truly get obstinate, one member interrupted and asked
if he intended "to cast any reflection on the Senator from Texas by his remarks." Id. Johnson barely
had time to say "no," when a member of the convention who had served in the confederate army
moved to adjourn, entirely out of procedure. Id. Nonetheless, the motion was immediately adopted
without discussion with regard to its appropriateness. See id See generally I C. LOUNSEERRY, supra note
664, at 409 (senator from Texas was allowed to present his views).
680, See I C. LOuNSBERRY, supra note 664, at 408. By this time judge Cooley's nationally known
treatise, commonly cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, was in its fifth edition, See T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (5th ed. 1883).





Legislature of the future. You have got to trust somebody in the
future and it is right and proper that each department of government
should be trusted to perform its legitimate function. 6
8 4
Considering the length and breadth of the constitution that was
eventually adopted, clearly the convention did not heed Judge
Cooley's advice. 6 5
3. The Convention
The convention lasted forty-five days, with only thirty-two
days in session. 686 Each of the delegates had access to the
constitutions of every state in the Union, and at the beginning of
the convention the delegates were given a copy of the proposed
South Dakota Constitution. 6 7 But of all the sources available to the
members of the convention, an entire proposed constitution
submitted by Erastus Williams engendered the most interest.
6 88
Williams, a lawyer from Bismarck, forthrightly stated that he
had not written the proposed constitution that he submitted; he was
not so forthright, howevet, concerning the actual author.
6 9
Williams would only state that the document was drafted by an
eastern lawyer and given to him by another North Dakota
lawyer. 690 Much speculation developed concerning the authorship
of the "Williams Constitution," with many newspapers unveiling
the "secret" that United States Senator Evarts was the author,
even though Evarts denied possessing any knowledge of it.691 Years
later, an aide to the late Professor James Bradley Thayer revealed
684. Id, at 66-7 7 (emphasis added).
685. It is interesting to note the historians' "verdict" on whether the convention followed the
advice of Mellette or Cooley. According to Colonel Lounsberry, the convention took "[t]his advice
[of Judge Cooley] and our constitution is comparatively free from legislation, much more so, for
illustration, than the constitutions of South Dakota or Oklahoma." 1 C. LOUNSBERiY, supra note
664, at 408. Lewis Crawford, on the other hand, states that despite Cooley's warning, "apparently
the force of circumstances, the throng of insistent probl-ms frcced upon the attention of the
delegates, caused them to ignore this advice so far as confining the organic law to a simple statement
of division of powers which has been called the ideal of constitution-making." 1 L. CRAWFORD, supra
note 664, at 325; see also E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 210 (distrust of governors and legislatures
caused the delegators of the North Dakota Constitution to limit the powers of those branches of the
North Dakota government).
686. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 24. The federal constitutional convention, on the other hand,
lasted almost four months, from May 25, to September 17, 1887. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, TiE.
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS & DEVELOPMENT 107, 138 (5th ed. 1976). North Dakota's
constitutional convention might have lasted longer but for the farmers' desire to return to harvest. See
R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 24-26.
687. R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 27.
688, See id. at 27-31; 1 C, LOUNSaBERY, supra note 664, at 394.
689. See R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 27-29; 1 C. LoUNSDERRY, supra note 664, at 394.
690. See R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 29.
691, Id. at 29-30.
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that the chairman of the finance committee of the Northern Pacific
Railway had requested Professor Thayer, a noted constitutional
law scholar from Harvard, to draft the document that was
submitted by Williams. 692 Despite this origin, the Williams
Constitution was not pro railroad, and was even described by one
newspaper as a "marvel of strength, sense and diction.''
693
Although the Williams Constitution was the basis of only a part of
the constitution drafted at the convention,6 94 its origin nonetheless
demonstrates the pervasiveness of the railroad's involvement in
early North Dakota politics.
The topics that yielded the most discussion at the convention
included legislative apportionment, 9 5  county and township
organization, 696 taxation, 697 school lands, 698 the use of the
692. See E. RoBINsoN, supria note 664, at 209.
693. 1 C. LOUNSBERRY, supra note 664, at 394. One of Thayer's aides, when finally revealing the
secret in 1905, stated that the corporation "was sincerely desirous that the two new states [North.and
South Dakota) should have the best constitution which could be framed for them." R. BLACK,
supra note 664, at 30. According to Thayer's aide, this is the reason one of the heads of Northern
Pacific asked Thayer to write it. Id. at 30-31. The authorship was concealed, according to the aide,
because the Northern Pacific chairman "was moved only by a single hearted desire to promote the
welfare of the two states, [and] it was feared that a draft constitution prepared by an eastern college
professor, under the direction of a Wall Street lawyer, and at the instance of the head of the largest
corporation in the territory, might fail of adoption if its authorship was known." Id. (quoting
Henry Hardon on the presentation of a portrait of Thayer to the Harvard Law School, reprinted in the
Grand Forks Herald, Mar. 21, 1905).
694. See E. RoBINsoN, supra note 607, at 209 ("Ithe constitution finally adopted by the
convention followed the phrasing of Thayer's draft in many places"); I L. CRAWFORD, supra note
664, at 327 ("Had the constitutional convention done nothing more than to give a perfunctory
ratification of the Thayer draft, there would be little profit in examining the labors of the convention.
But a reading of the debates of the convention would readily convince anyone that the constitution as
finally framed is in no sense a perfunctory piece of work."); 1 C. LouNSBERRY, supra note 664, at 394
("Many of its [the Williams Constitution] provisions were incorporated in the constitution framed
by the convention. "); R. BLACK, supra note 664, at 31 (a "large part" of the Thayer constitution was
adopted by the North and South Dakota conventions).
One scholar describes the origin of our constitution as follows:
From the Omnibus Bill was mainly culled the compact between the state and the
United States. From Illinois the provision for county courts. From Minnesota, the
provision relating to the sale of public school lands, and the investment of, moneys
derived from the sale. From Pennsylvania the provision relating to Board of Pardons.
From New Hampshire, provisions as to amendments to the constitution. From the
Williams constitution came the preamble, and many of the legislative provisions.
From California some material for the taxing of railroads; the inscription of the great
seal, "Liberty and union now and forever, one and inseparable," from a speech of
Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States. From the United States
Constitution some provisions which are embodied in the declaration of rights; ceding
jurisdiction over military posts came from the secretary of war, through General
Ruger.
I C. LOUNSaaRav, supra note 664, at 409-10, Most of the North Dakota Constitution that was based
on the Williams Constitution has been repealed over the years. See N.D. CONST. art. IV (repealed
Dec. 1, 1986).
695. Dm.BATES, supra note 678, at 323-39, 512, 540-41, 544-48, 550-51. A complete index to the
debates is contained in Appendix A.
696. id. at 55, 85-98, 128-33, 430-37, 442-45, 453-56, 610-15, 637- 40.
697. Id. at 457-77, 615-24, 648,649-56.
698. Id. at 158-68, 169-85, 288-93, 519-22, 528-29, 603-10.
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Australian (or secret) ballot, 699 the adoption of a single-house
legislature, 70 0 women's suffrage,70 1 prohibition,702 restriction of
corporations, 70 3 especially the railroads, 70 4 the location of the
capital and other institutions, 705 the creation of separate probate
courts,706 the proposal that the supreme court "ride the circuit," 70 7
and the propriety of allowing the supreme court to render advisory
opinions.
70 8
Especially far sighted was the suggestion of Erastus Williams
to reserve from sale coal lands owned by the state:
At the present time these coal lands are regarded as not
possessing any great value, but ... I think it would be
well to reserve these lands from sale in order to protect the
fuel supply and allow the state of the future to lease them.
... It would be wise to protect these lands and allow the
title to remain in the state. 709
Another interesting suggestion was to require the judge of each
district court, as a precondition to drawing his salary at each
payday, to submit an affidavit stating that "no cause in his court
remains undecided, that has been submitted for decision for the
period of ninety days." '7 1 0 The convention, however, decided to
leave this matter to the legislature "to adopt such regulations as the
necessities of the case may require." 71
C. SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1972
The same types of sources used to determine the intent of the
framers of the constitution are also consulted in determining the
intent underlying an amendment to the constitution. Because
699. Id. at 205, 576-77.
700. Id. at 102-13,114-28.
701. Id. at 34-41, 192-205, 276-84, 573-76.
702. Id. at 145-48.
703. Id. at 81, 112, 172-73, 181, 349-50, 372-74, 379-95, 418, 466-70, 479,486,536, 644.
704. Id. at 349-50, 374-95, 414-18, 424-25, 466-70, 623-24, 644-45.
705. Id. at 60-61, 478-96, 627-37, 646.
706. Id. at 238-45, 293-312, 314-16, 570-71.
707. Id. at 211-14, 258-68, 561.
708. Id. at 228-34, 252-58, 271-75.
709. ld. at 604.
710. ,journal, supra note 678, at 45.
711. Id. It is, therefore, apparent that the legislature's adoption of a proposal that would make
payment of judges contingent upon the currentcy of their docket would not contravene the
constitution.
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amendments to the constitution generally originate in the
legislature, the legislative history of the amendment should be
given the same weight as the debates of the constitutional
convention. This does not mean, however, that the legislative
history is necessarily controlling; but the legislative history does
have great value in determining the intent of the people who
adopted the new provision of the constitution.
The debates and other resource materials of the constitutional
convention of 1972 provide additional evidence of the intent
underlying constitutional changes made since 1973. In the 1970s
North Dakota was one of many states that fell under the influence
of national organizations that promoted the revision of state
constitutions. 712 In 1972 a constitutional convention was called,
and the delegates to that convention created a substantially shorter
and better organized document. 713 Nonetheless, the people of
North Dakota rejected the proposed constitution.71 4 Although the
proposed constitution was not adopted, it still possesses present
value because after .1972 many of the amendments to the
constitution were drawn from the language used in the proposed
constitution of 1972. Therefore the court, in interpreting any
constitutional provisions enacted since 1972, should determine if
the amendment was based in part on the 1972 constitution. If so,
reference to the constitutional convention of 1972 is appropriate in
the evaluation of the intent underlying the provision.
Of the fifty-four constitutional amendments proposed by the
legislature since the rejection of the 1972 constitution, thirty-one
proposals received approval from the voters,7 15 while twenty-three
712. See, e.g., A. STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MAKING: 1938-1968 (1970)
(surveying the major efforts by American states to modernize their constitutions); F. GRAD, THE.
STATE CONSTITUTION: ITS FUNCTION & FORM FOR OUR TIME (1968), reprintedfrom 54 VA. L. REv. 928
(1968) (discussing the movement of revising state constitutions).
713. Cf L. OMDAnL, H, TOMASEK & B. WRIGHT, NORTH DAKOTA GOVERNMENT 10-15 (1973)
(discussing the purpose and eventual effect of the 1972 constitutional convention).
714. 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389 (Apr. 28, 1972).
715. Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 603, 1975 N.D. Laws 1579 (Sept. 3, 1974)
(size ofjuries); id. ch. 604, 1975 N.D. Laws 1580 (Sept. 3, 1974) (open meetings); id. ch. 605, 1975
N.D. Laws 1581 (Nov. 5, 1974) (joint ballot); id. ch. 606, 1975 N.D. Laws 1582 (Nov. 5, 1974)
(removal of judges); id. ch. 596, 1977 N.D. Laws 1374 (Sept. 7, 1976) (legislative sessions and
terms); id. ch. 597, 1977 N.D. Laws 1375 (Nov. 2, 1976) (board of higher education qualifications);
id. ch. 598, 1977 N.D. Laws 1377 (Sept. 7, 1976) (qualifications of electors); id. ch. 599, 1977 N.D.
Laws 1378 (Sept. 7, 1976) (judicial article); id. ch, 600, 1977 N.D. Laws 1381 (Sept. 7, 1976)
(lotteries); id. ch. 691, 1979 N.D. Laws 1726 (Sept. 5, 1978) (repeal of original apportionment and
transition schedule); id. ch. 692, 1979 N.D. Laws 1727 (Sept. 5, 1978) (powers and duties of
lieutenant governor); id. ch. 693, 1979 N.D. Laws 1728 (Sept, 5, 1978) (veterans' bonds and
constitutional convention); id. ch. 694, 1979 N.D. Laws 1729 (Nov. 7, 1978) (open records); id. ch.
695, 1979 N.D. Laws 1730 (Nov. 7, 1978) (elective franchise); id. ch. 696, 1979 N.D. Laws 1731
(Nov. 7, 1978) (initiative, referendum, and recall); id. ch. 654, 1981 N.D. Laws 1816 (Sept. 2, 1980)
(property tax); id. ch. 655, 1981,N.D. Laws 1817 (Sept. 2, 1980) (judicial officerm); id. ch. 656, 1981
N.D. Laws 1819 (Nov. 4, 1980) (state bond security); id. ch. 657, 1981 N.D. Laws 1820 (Nov. 4,
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were rejected. 716  Of the thirty-one proposals that received
approval, five contained substantially similar language and scope
as analogous provisions of the 1972 constitution,717 three contained
at least part of the language, 7 18 and four were similar in concept or
purpose to the language used in the proposed 1972 constitution. 719
1980) (coal development impact trust fund); id. ch. 718, 1983 N.D. Laws 2218 (June 8, 1982)
(political subdivisions); id. ch. 719, 1983 N.D. Laws 2221 (June 8, 1982) (school trust fund); id. ch.
720, 1983 N.D. Laws 2223 (June 8, 1982) (compensation of elected officials, coequal branches of
government); id. ch. 721, 1983 N.D. Laws 2224 (Nov. 2, 1982) (eminent domain); id. ch. 722, 1983
N.D. Laws 2225 (Nov. 2, 1982) (repeal of obsolete constitutional references); id. ch. 705, 1985 N.D.
Laws 2298 (Nov. 6, 1984) (county officer references); id. ch. 706, 1985 N.D. Laws 2300 (June 12,
1984) (legislative article - assembly members); id. ch. 707, 1985 N.D. Laws 2304 (Nov. 6, 1984)
(legislative assembly - procedures); Constitutional Amendments, Proposed, ch. 709, 1985 N.D.
Laws 2311 (approved June 10, 1986) (coal mineral interest exchange); id. ch. 711, 1985 N.D. Laws
2319 (approved June 10, 1986) (board of university and school lands); id. ch. 712, 1985 N.D. Laws
2320 (approved Nov, 4, 1986) (start of governor's and lieutenant governor's term); id. ch. 713, 1985
N.D. Laws 2322 (approved Nov. 4, 1986) (tax commissioner on party ballot).
716. Constitutional Amendments, Disapproved, ch. 607, 1975 N.D. Laws 1583 (Dec. 4, 1973)
(reapportionment); id. ch. 608, 1975 N.D. Laws 1584 (Sept. 3, 1974) (legislative compensation
commission); id. ch. 601, 5§ 1, 2, 1977 N.D. Laws 1382 (Sept. 7, 1976) (education boards); id. ch.
601, S 3, 1977 N.D. Laws 1382 (Sept. 7, 1976) (executive officers); id. ch. 602, 1977 N.D. Laws 1385
(Sept. 7, 1976) (legislative article amendments); id. ch. 697, 1979 N.D. Laws 1734 (Sept. 5, 1978)
(repeal of legislative procedure and authority); id. ch. 698, 1979 N.D. Laws 1735 (Sept. 5, 1978)
(state revenue limitation); id. ch. 699, 1979 N.D. Laws 1736 (Sept. 5, 1978) (political subdivision
bonding limits); id. ch. 700, 1979 N.D. Laws 1737 (Sept. 5, 1978) (corporate authority); id. ch. 701,
1979 N.D. Laws 1738 (Sept. 5, 1978) (salaries of public officers); id ch. 658, 1981 N.D. Laws 1821
(Sept. 2, 1980) (salaries of public officers); id. ch. 659, 1981 N.D. Laws 1822 (Sept. 2, 1980) (medical
center mill levy); id. ch. 660, 1981 N.D. Laws 1823 (Sept. 2, 1980) (taxation of property); id. ch.
661, 1981 N.D. Laws 1824 (Sept. 2, 1980) (emoluments of office); id. ch. 662, 1981 N.D. Laws 1825
(Nov. 4, 1980) (legislative compensation); id. ch. 663, 1981 N.D. Laws 1826 (Nov. 4, 1980)
(legislative article); id. ch. 664, 1981 N.D. Laws 1830 (Nov. 4, 1980) (executive article); id. ch. 723,
1983 N.D. Laws 2228 (June 8, 1982) (legislative article); id. ch. 724, 1983 N.D. Laws 2232 (Nov. 2,
1982) (medical center mill levy); id. ch. 725, 1983 N.D. Laws 2233 (Nov. 2, 1982) (election of
governor and lieutenant governor); id. ch. 726, 1983 N.D. Laws 2234 (Nov. 2, 1982) (board of
higher education nominees); id. ch. 708, 1985 N.D. Laws 2307 (Nov. 6, 1984) (state treasurer);
Constitutional Amendments, Proposed, ch. 710, 1985 N.D. Laws 2314 (disapproved June 10, 1986)
(executive branch).
717. Compare Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 603, 1975 N.D. Laws 1579, 1579
(Sept. 3, 1974) with 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1390 (Apr. 28,
1972) (1972 constitution, art. 1, S 7); compare id. ch. 598, 1977 N.D. Laws 1377, 1377 (Sept. 7, 1976)
with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1407, 1409 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. XIV, S
3); compare id. ch. 695, 1979 N.D. Laws 1730, 1730 (Nov. 7, 1978) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws
1389, 1392 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. II, §51, 2); compare id. ch. 696, 1979 N.D. Laws
1731, 1731 (Nov. 7, 1978) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1413-15 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972
constitution, art. XIV, §51-2); compare id. ch. 718, 1983 N.D. Laws 2218, 2218-20 (June 8, 1982)
with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1397-99 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. VII, 55 1-
11).
718. Compare Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 599, 1977 N.D. Laws 1378, 1378-80
(Sept. 7, 1976) with 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1395-97 (Apr.
28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. VI, §§ 1-15); compare id. ch. 706, 1985 N.D. Laws 2300, 2300-03
(June 12, 1984) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1406-08 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972
constitution, art. XIV, §S 1-8); compare id. ch. 707, 1985 N.D. Laws 2304, 2304-06 (Nov. 6, 1984)
with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1407-09, 1409-11 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art.xIV, S 5 8-12).
719. Compare Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 605, 1975 N.D. Laws 1,581, 1581
(Nov. 5, 1974) with 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1393 (Apr. 28,
1972) (1972 constitution, art. V, 5 1); compare id. ch. 606, 1975 N.D. Laws 1582, 1582 (Nov. 5, 1974)
with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1397 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. VI, S 12);
compare id. ch. 596, 1977 N.D. Laws 1374, 1374 (Sept. 7, 1976) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws
1389, 1408, 1410 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. XIV, 5 7); compare id. ch. 719, 1983 N.D.
Laws 2221, 2221-22 (June 8, 1982) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1400 (Apr. 28, 1972)
(1972 constitution, art. IX, 5§ 1-4).
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Thus, nineteen of the thirty-one proposals that were adopted
were entirely different in language and scope from the proposed
1972 constitution. 72 0 Of the twenty-three proposed amendments
that were rejected, seven contained substantially similar language
and scope, 721 two contained at least part of the language,7 22 and
fourteen contained entirely different language to the language used
in the proposed 1972 constitution. 72-3
Upon review of the proposals passed since 1972 that are based
to some extent on the 1972 constitutional convention, it becomes
apparent that the 1972 convention serves as an appropriate source
720. See Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 604, 1975 N.D. Laws 1580 (Sept. 3, 1974)
(open meetings); id, ch. 605, 1975 N.D. Laws 1581 (Nov. 5, 1974) (joint ballot); id. ch. 597, 1977
N.D. Laws 1375 (Nov. 2, 1976) (board of higher education qualifications); id. ch. 691, 1979 N.D.
Laws 1726 (Sept. 5, 1978) (repeal of original apportionment and transition schedule); id. ch. 692,
1979 N.D. Laws 1727 (Sept. 5, 1978) (powers and duties of lieutenant governor); id. ch. 693, 1979
N.D. Laws 1728 (Sept. 5, 1978) (veterans' bonds and constitutional convention); id. ch. 694, 1979
N.D. Laws 1729 (Nov. 7, 1978) (open records); id. ch. 654, 1981 N.D. Laws 1816 (Sept. 2, 1980)
(property tax); id. ch. 655, 1981 N.D. Laws 1817 (Sept. 2, 1980) (judicial officers); id. ch. 656, 1981
N.D. Laws 1819 (Nov. 4, 1980) (state bond security); id. ch. 657, 1981 N.D. Laws 1820 (Nov. 4,
1980) (coal development impact trust fund); id. ch. 720, 1983 N.D. Laws 2223 (June 8, 1982)
(compensation of elected officials, co-equal branches of government); id. ch. 721, 1983 N.D. Laws
2224 (Nov. 2, 1982) (eminent domain); id. ch. 722, 1983 N.D. Laws 2225 (Nov. 2, 1982) (removal of
obsolete constitutional references); id. ch. 705, 1985 N.D. Laws 2298 (June 12, 1984) (county officer
references); Constitutional Amendments, Proposed, ch. 709, 1985 N.D. Laws 2311 (approvedJune
10, 1986) (coal mineral interest exchange); id. ch. 711, 1985 N.D. Laws 2319 (approved June 10,
1986) (board of university and school lands); id. ch. 712, 1985 N.D. Laws 2320 (Mar. 28, 1985)
(start of governor's and lieutenant governor's term); id. ch. 713, 1985 N.D. Laws 2322 (approved
Nov. 4, 1986) (tax commissioner on party ballot).
721. Compare Constitutional Amendments, Disapproved, ch. 601, 5 2, 1977 N.D. Laws 1382,
1382-83 (Sept. 7, 1976) with 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1399
(Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. VIII, 55 1-3); compare id. ch. 698, 1979 N.D. Laws 1735,
1735 (Sept. 5, 1978) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1400-01 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972
constitution, art. X, 51); compare id. ch. 661, 1981 N.D. Laws 1824, 1824 (Sept. 2, 1980) with id. ch.
529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1410 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. XIV, 5 4); compare id. ch,
662, 1981 N.D. Laws 1825, 1825 (Nov. 4, 1980) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1409 (Apr.
28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. XIV, S 14); compare id. ch. 663, 1981 N.D. Laws 1826, 1826-29
(Nov. 4, 1980) with id. h. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1407-09 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution,
an- XW); eamare a chi. 64, 1981 N.D, Lawa 1830 1830- 34 (Nov . 4, 1980) milk id ch. 529, 1973
N.D. Laws 1389, 1393-95 (Apr. 28, 1972) (1972 constitution, art. V); compare id. ch. 723, 1983
N.D. Laws 2228, 2228-31 (June 8, 1982) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1407-09 (Apr. 28,
1972) (1972 constitution, art. XIV).
722. Compare Constitutional Amendments, Disapproved, ch. 660, 1981 N.D. Laws 1823, 1823
(Sept. 2, 1980) with 1972 Constitution, Disapproved, ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1401 (Apr. 28,
1972) (1972 constitution, art. X, 5 5); Constitutional Amendments, Proposed, ch. 710, 1985 N.D.
Laws 2314, 2314-18 (disapproved.June 10, 1986) with id. ch. 529, 1973 N.D. Laws 1389, 1393-95
(Apr. 28, 1972)(1972 constitution, art. V).
723. See Constitutional Amendments, Disapproved, ch. 607, 1975 N.D. Laws 1583 (Dec. 4,
1973) (reapportionment); id. ch. 608, 1975 N.D. Laws 1584 (Sept. 3, 1974) (legislative compensation
commission); id. ch. 601, 5 3, 1977 N.D. Laws 1382 (Sept. 7, 1976) (executive officers); id. ch. 602,
1977 N.D. Laws 1385 (Sept. 7, 1976) (repeal of original apportionment and transition schedule); id.
ch. 697, 1979 N.D. Laws 1734 (Sept. 5, 1978) (repeal of legislative procedure and authority); id, ch.
698, 1979 N.D. Laws 1735 (Sept. 5, 1978) (political subdivision bonding limits); id, ch. 700, 1979
N.D. Laws 1737 (Sept. 5, 1978) (corporate authority); id. ch. 701, 1979 N.D. Laws 1738 (Sept. 5,
1978) (salaries of public officers); id, ch. 658, 1981 N.D. Laws 1821 (Sept. 2, 1980)(salaries of public
officers); id. ch. 659, 1981 N.D. Laws 1822 (Sept. 2, 1980) (medical center mill levy); id. ch, 724,
1983 N.D. Laws 2232 (Nov. 2, 1982) (medical center mill levy); id. ch. 725, 1983 N.D. Laws 2233
(Nov. 2, 1982) (election of governor and lieutenant governor); id. ch. 726, 1983 N.D. Laws 2234
(Nov. 2, 1982) (board of higher education nominees); id. ch. 708, 1985 N.D. Laws 2307 (June 12,
1984) (state treasurer removal).
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for interpreting the articles concerning the elective franchise,124 the
powers reserved to the people, 725 political subdivisions, 726 the
legislative branch, 727  and the judicial branch. 728  The 1972
constitution also served as a partial basis for the provisions
concerning the size of juries729 and the qualifications of electors. 730
Moreover, the same general concepts contained in the 1972
constitution concerning the joint ballot of the governor and
lieutenant governor, 731 the legislative terms, 732 and the removal of
judges733  were subsequently adopted. And although the
amendments concerning legislative terms and removal of judges
have since been superseded .by more extensive revisions of the
constitution,7 34 the newer provisions still find at least some basis in
the general concepts contained in the 1972 constitution.
The importance of determing the basis of the language of a
particular constitutional provision should not go unnoticed.
Because of the many differences between North Dakota in 1889 and
1972, the intent underlying the original constitution and the
proposed constitution of 1972 will sometimes be different. This
difference may result in differing - and perhaps, on occasion,
opposite - constructions.
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS
1. Differences in Focus, Breadth, and Purpose
a) The State's Limitations on the Powers of
Government and Corporations
Primarily because of concerns relating to the exploitation of
North Dakota and the immediate specter of corruption, the final
724. Constitutional Amendments, Approved, ch. 695, 1979 N.D. Laws 1730 (Nov. 7, 1978)
(elective franchise).
725. Id. ch. 696, 1979 N.D. Laws 1731 (Nov. 7, 1978) (initiative, referendum, and recall).
726. Id. ch. 718, 1983 N.D.Laws 2218 (June 8,1982) (political subdivisions).
727. Id. ch. 706, 1985 N.D. Laws 2300 (June 12, 1984) (legislative article - members); id. ch.
707, 1985 N.D. Laws 2304 (Nov. 6, 1984) (legislative article - procedures).
728. Id. ch. 599, 1977 N.D. Laws 1378 (Sept. 7, 1976) (judicial article).
729. Id. ch. 603, 1975 N.D. Laws 1579 (Sept. 3, 1974) (size of juries).
730. Id. ch. 598, 1977 N.D. Laws 1377 (Sept. 7, 1976) (qualifications of electors).
731. Id. ch. 605, 1975 N.D. Laws 1581 (Nov. 5, 1974) (joint ballot).
732. Id. ch, 596,1977 N.D. Laws 1374 (Sept. 7, 1976) (legislative sessions and terms).
733. Id. ch. 606, 1975 N.D. Laws 1582 (Nov. 5, 1974) (removal ofjudges).
734. See id. ch. 706, 1985 N.D, Laws 2300 (June 12, 1984) (legislative article - members); id,
ch. 707, 1985 N.D. Laws 2304 (Nov. 6, 1984) (legislative article - procedures); id. ch. 599, 1977
N.D. Laws 1378 (Sept. 7, 1976) (judicial article).
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draft of the state constitution was about six times longer than the
federal constitution.7 35 Distrust of power and fear of corruption
resulted in limiting the powers of the governor and providing for
the election of many officers of the executive branch, instead of
gubernatorial appointments.73 6 The length of time in which the
legislature could be in session was limited to sixty days, 737
apparently in keeping with the time honored saying that no one is
safe while the legislature is in session.7 38 Special restrictions were
placed on taxation and incurring debt, 73 9 and extremely specific
provisions, including the insertion of the constitutional prohibition
against vote-swapping, were adopted to define and hopefully
thwart even the simplest forms of corruption. 740 To control the
railroads, the drafters of the constitution created the Board of
Railroad Commissioners, 4 1 declared railroads to be public
highways, 742 and provided the commissioners with the authority to
fix railroad rates within the state. 743
735. E. ROBINSON, supra note 607, at 210.
736. See N.D. CONST. art. III, 5§ 71, 72, 82 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. V
SS 1, 2, 12). For a discussion of the powers of the executive branch of government, see supra text
accompanying notes 167-207.
737. See N.D. CONST. art. II, 5 56 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. IV, S 7).
The constitution has been changed to allow the session to last eighty days. N .D. GONST. art. IV, S 7.
738. See, e.g., In re A. B., I Tuck. 247, 249 (N.Y. Surr. 1866) ("no man's life, liberty or
property are safe while the Legislature is in session"). The comments of one state constitutional law
scholar also illustrate the general distrust of legislatures in the 1800s:
[Procedural limitations on state legislative processes] were adopted throughout tile
nineteenth century in response to perceived state legislative abuses. One observer
during this era noted that "one of the most marked features of all recent State
Constitutions is the distrust shown of the legislature." Last-minute consideration of
important measures, logrolling, mixing substantive provisions in omnibus bills, low
visibility and hasty enactment of important, and sometimes corrupt, legislation, and
the attachment of unrelated provisions to bills in the amendment process - to name a
few of these abuses - led to the adoption of constitutional provisions restricting the
legislative process. These constitutional provisions seek generally to require a more
open and deliberate state legislative process, one that addresses the merits of legislative
proposals in an orderly and rational manner.
Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance & Judicial Enforcement,
17 Puauus: T-FIJOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 91, 91-92 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting Easton, Recent
State Constitutions, 6 HARv. L. RFV. 109-24 (1892)).
739. See N.D. CONST. arts, XI, XII (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. X). For the
restrictions placed on the legislature when taxing and incurring debt, see supra text accompanying
notes 370- 97.
740. See N.D. CONST, art. II, § 40 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsr, art. IV, § 14 (prohibiting
legislators from vote-swapping); N.D. CoNsT. art. III, S 81 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNs'r. art. V,
SI) (prohibiting governor from taking bribes or misusing the veto power). For a discussion of the
prohibition against legislative vote-swapping, see supra text accompanying notes 159-64. For a
discussion of the prohibition against the governor taking bribes or misuing the veto power, see supra
text accompanying notes 203-04.
741. N.D. CoNsr. :rt. 111, 5 82 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CoNsT, art. V, S 1'). The
hoard of railroad commissioners is now known as the public service commission. N.D. CoNsT. art.
V, 5 12. For a discussion of the creation of the public service commission, see supra text
accompanying notes 169 and 176, and note 176.
742. N.D. CoNsr. art. VII, § 142 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST. art. XII, S 13). For a
discussion of the constitutional limitations on railroads, see supra text accompanying notes 415-30.
743. NI). CONST. art. VII, S 142 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST. art, XII, S 13). Authority to
regulate and control railroad rates is now given to the legislature. See id. art. XIII, 5 13.
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b) The State's Solidification and Expansion of
Individual Rights
While limiting the power of the railroads and the various arms
of the new government, the framers also solidified and expanded
the individual rights of the citizens of North Dakota. The first
article of the constitution, placed even before the article creating
the right of the electorate to vote, is entitled the "Declaration of
Rights. '"44
Decidedly more expansive and detailed than its federal
counterpart,7 45 article I of the North Dakota Constitution codified
and expanded upon the language of the Declaration of
Independence and the Federal Bill of Rights. In relation to
individual rights, the North Dakota Constitution includes more
expansive language (which is italicized in the text below)
than contained in the federal constitution. The North Dakota
Constitution includes the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty,
the right to acquire, possess, and protect property and reputation,
and the right to pursue and obtain safety and happiness;7 46 the
recognition of the inherent political power of the people;74 7 the right
to free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship;748
the right to freely write, speak, and publish opinions on all
subjects; 749 the right to assemble in a peaceable manner for the
common good;750 the right to apply for redress of grievances;7 51 the
freedom to obtain employment wherever possible752 the right of the people
to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;7 53 the right to a remedy by due
process of law for any injury; 754 the prohibition against excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment; 755 the right to a
speedy and public trial;756  the prohibition against double
744. It is not without meaning that the constitutional framers chose the rights of the people as
the first section of the North Dakota Constitution, Even the highly vounted Williams Constitution
had the rights of the people as article II, following the article on the designation of the state and the
relation of the state to the United States. SeeJOURNAL, supra note 678, at 64-66. The contents of the
declaration of rights is described in detail at text accompanying notes 2-64.
745. For a comparison of the text of the United States Constitution and the North Dakota
Constitution, see Appendix B.
746. N.D. CoNsr. art. 1, S 1 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. 1, S1).
747. ND. CoNs'. art. 1, $ 2 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 2).
748. N.D. CoNsr. art. I, 5 4 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST. art. I, S 3).
749. N.D. CoNs'r. art. I, S 9 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 5 4).
750. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, 5 10 (1889) (codified at ND. CoNsT. art. I, 5 5).
751. N.D, CONST. art. I, § 10 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST. art. 1, S 5).
752, N.D. CoNsr, art. I, 5 23 (1889) (codified at N.D. CosT. art. I, S 7).
753, N,D. CoNsT, art. 1, § 18 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST, art. 1, S 8).
754, N.D. COST. art. I, 5 22 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT, art. 1, S 9).
755, N.D, CONST. art, I, S 6 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 5 11),
756. N.D. CONST. art. I, J 13 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 5 12).
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jeopardy; 757 the right to trial by jury (which subsequently included
the requirement of a unanimous verdict);758 the prohibition against
imprisonment for debt; 759 the prohibition against taking private
property without just compensation;"" and the prohibition against
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. 
76'
c) Conclusions Drawn from These Differences
The expanded array of basic rights is fundamental to the
North Dakota Constitution. The framers had to choose between
creating a short constitution that simply described the framework of
the government and provided general rights to the people (such as
the federal constitution), or creating a long, detailed constitution
that delved into numerous facets of state government and
individual rights. 762 Although the federal constitution served as a
guide to some aspects of the state constitution, the framers of the
North Dakota Constitution clearly decided to use the federal
constitution only as a starting point, creating a document
substantially more detailed and containing expanded rights. 
763
The consequences of this decision are significant, especially
concerning the interpretation of rights and the circumscription of
the powers of government:
When the federal Constitution and the first state
Constitutions were formed, a Constitution was treated as
establishing a mere outline of government, providing for
the different departments of the governmental machinery
and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights
of citizens, but leaving all matters of administration and
policy to the departments created by the Constitution...
. During the last 50 years state Constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle, and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to
757. N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 513 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 5 12).
758. N.D. CONST. art. 1, S 7 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. [, S 13).
759. N.D. CONST. art. 1, S15 (1889) (codified at N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, 515).
760. N.D. CONST. art. 1, 514 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D. CONST. art. 1, 5 16).
761. N.D. CONST. art. 1, 5 16 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST. art. 1, 5 18).
762. This tension between the adoption of a short or long constitution is most clearly shown by a
comparison of the views given to the delegates by Territorial Governor Mellette andJudge Cooley of
Michigan. For a discussion of these disparate views, see supra text accompanying notes 680-84.
763. For a discussion of the differences between the North Dakota Constitution and the United
States Constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 735-61.
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operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to
that of statutory enactments.
764
Unlike the federal model, in which the first ten amendments were
intended to have limited operation (solely on the federal
government), 765 the rights described in the North Dakota
Constitution are for general application. Given this general
application, the people may assert their individual rights against
anyone - government entities or otherwise. This broad
interpretation of individual rights based on the state constitution is
certainly within the realm of the intent of those who adopted the
North Dakota Constitution, especially in light of the abuses of
power delivered upon North Dakotans by the territorial
government, the railroads, and corporations in general.
7 66
The powers of the state government, although limited by
structural checks and balances and the expansive rights described
above, 767 are in theory inherently broader than the powers of the
federal government. Unlike the federal government, which is
ostensibly limited to those powers actually enumerated in the
federal constitution, the powers of the state government are general
(or plenary) except as limited by either the state or federal
constitutions:
We look in the Constitution of the United States for
grants of legislative power, but in the Constitution of the
state to ascertain if any limitations have been imposed
upon the complete power with which the legislative
department of the state was vested in its creation.
Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution
authorizes, either expressly or by clear implication; while
the state legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on
which its legislation is not prohibited. The law making
power of the state, it is said in one case, recognizes no
restraints and is bound by none except such as are
imposed by the Constitution. 768
764. State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 468, 171 N.W. 213, 217 (1919) (quoting
Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432,69 P. 77(1902), rev'g, 136 Cal. 432, 449(1901)).
765. Brown v. New jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899); see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833) (the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution were intended to apply
solely to the federal government).
766. For a discussion of the abuse of power committed by the territorial government, the
railroads and corporations, see supra text accompanying notes 656-63,675, 692-94, 703-04, 741-42.
767, For a discussion of the limits on the power of slate government, see supra text
accompanying notes 745-61.
768. State v. First State Bank, 52 N.D. 231, 245, 202 N.W. 391, 396 (1924) (quoting T.
Coot.EY, A TRVATISE ON THECONSTITUTIONAt. LIMITATIONS 242 (7th ed. 1903)).
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The combined effect of these differences in the two
constitutions is that under the North Dakota Constitution, the
people possess expansive rights and the arms of state government
possess broad powers that are carefully limited by specific
provisions and extensive checks and balances. But when a conflict
exists between the individual rights of the people and the general
powers of the government, which shall prevail over the other? This
question of priority has been decisively answered by the North
Dakota Supreme Court.
d) Individual Rights vs. Government Powers
One of the most cogent explanations of the superiority of
individual rights over general governmental powers is contained in
Power v. Williams. 69 Power involved a jury verdict in a civil case in
which two of the twelve jurors did not concur in the result.770 The
issue on appeal was whether jury verdicts were required to be
unanimous under the North Dakota Constitution. 7 1  The
constitution did not, at that time, require unanimous verdicts,
stating only that "[tihe right to trial by jury shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate.... ",772 The legislature had recently enacted
a law which provided that, after twelve hours of deliberation, a jury
in a civil action could render a verdict on the agreement of five-
sixths of the jury. 773 Since the constitution did not specifically
address the issue, the court reviewed the intent of the framers as
shown by the debates and the record contained in the journal of the
convention. 774 These materials indicated that at one point during
the convention a member offered an amendment to the provision
relating to juries that would "permit three-fourths of the members
of a jury in civil cases to return a valid verdict. ' 7 75 The proposal
was rejected. 776 The court in Power concluded that this action
demonstrated the framer's intent to require unanimous verdicts,
and construed this requirement into the otherwise abstract
provision addressing the right to trial by jury. 777
769.53 N.D. 54, 205 N.W. 9(1925).
770, Power v. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 57,205 N.W. 9, 10(1925).
771. Id.
772. Id. at 60, 205 N.W. at 11; see N.D. CONST. art. 1, 5 7 (1889) (codified as amended at N.D,
CONST. art. 1, S 13).
773, Power, 53 N.D. at 60, 205 N.W. at 11; see Act of Mar. 1, 1923, cli. 333, 1923 N.D. Laws
504.
774. Power, 53 N.D. at 62-63, 205 N.W. at 12.
775. Id. at 62, 205 N.W. at 12.
776. Id. at 63, 205 N.W. at 12.
777. Id. at 64-65, 205 N.W. at 13.
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The party that was successful in the lower court argued,
however, that the intent of the framers should not be applied,
especially because "the statute was enacted in response to a spirit of
progress, and was prompted by a desire to improve the
administration of justice. ' 7 8 The court, willing to concede the
purpose of the new law, nonetheless placed the argument into
perspective: "not all change is progress; nor is it true that
'whatever is, is right.' "779 The court admitted that occasions may
arise when "an obstinate juror may obstruct the administration of
justice," but recognized the converse possibility that "a firm man
may as frequently prevent an unjust verdict." 7 80 The court went on
to state that "[it is likewise true that our government rests largely
on the theory of majority rule.' '781 Nonetheless, situations exist
under our form of government in which the majority does not
prevail:
In adopting the constitutional system of government we
have agreed to the rule of the majority in matters of civil
and political government, but under definite restrictions,
devised for the protection of certain fundamental rights..
. justice is not a matter of majorities. The majority as well as
the minority may be wrong. 782
Thus, under our form of government, individual rights take
priority over governmental powers, and any change of this precept
and any change of individual rights must be left "to those who have
the power to amend the fundamental law.' '783
2. Differences in Interpretation: Substantive Due Process
The differences between the federal and state constitutions
have great significance to lawyers and judges. The differences in
topics, breadth, focus, and language of the two constitutions
demonstrate entirely different frameworks of analysis. These
differences significantly affect the proper interpretation of the
North Dakota Constitution, especially in relation to language that
778. Id. at 65, 205 N.W. at 13-14.
779. Id. at 65, 205 N.W. at 14 (quoting without reference to the source, ALEXANDER POPE'S AN
ESSAY ON MAN, epistle 1, 1. 294 (1734)).
780. Power, 53 N.D. at 65, 205 N.W. at 14.
781. Id.
782. Id. at 65-66, 205 N.W. at 14 (emphasis added).
783. Id. at 65, 205 N.W. at 14.
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is inherently - and intentionally - ambiguous. The area of
substantive due process exhibits the North Dakota Supreme
Court's historic and continued willingness to develop its own body
of constitutional analysis - even when interpreting language
similar to, and sometimes identical with, that of the United States
Constitution.
78 4
a) Procedural vs. Substantive Due Process
One of the most important issues of modern due process law is
whether the right to due process provides only procedural
protections or, instead, grants certain substantive rights.78 5 In the
last twenty years, constitutional jurisprudence has focused on the
legitimacy of substantive due process. 78 6 Not since the demise of the
Lochner era78 7 has the concept of substantive due process received so
much attention and criticism, primarily because of its role in the
recognition of the right to privacy and its subsequent application to
the right to an abortion. 788 Added to this academic and scholarly
criticism is a cacophony of public comment and discussion, as well
as reflection by judges on the proper role of the judiciary in the
democratic process.789 Although the United States Supreme Court
has not specifically rejected the concept of substantive due process,
it certainly has sent forth a clarion call that the present Court
intends to firmly resist any further expansion of the substantive
reach of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution. 79
0
In contrast, the North Dakota Supreme Court has specifically
recognized that "North Dakota has never renounced substantive
784. The interpretation of language that is identical to the language used in the United States
Constitution is discussed at text accompanying notes 870-76.
785. See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURES 55 15.2-15.3 (1986) (delineating the history of substantive due process on
the federal level).
786. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF.JUDICIAL REviEw 14-21 (1980).
787. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (substantive due process recognized by the
United State Supreme Court).
788. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 786, at 14-21; A. Cox, THEROLE OF THE.SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 111-14 (1976); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, & the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 689 (1976) (criticizing substantive due
process by stating that it is a nightmare from which the United States Supreme Court should
awaken).
789. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK &.j. YOUNG, supra note 785, ch. 23; see also A. Cox,
supra note 788; L. HAND, THE.BiLL OF RIGHTS 1 (1958) (discussing the "function of the United States
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, of declaring invalid the statutes of Congress"); Weschler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959) (same).
790. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (stating "there should be,
therefore, great resistance to expand the substantative reach of" the due process clause).
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due process as a constitutional standard.' '791 Indeed, the North
Dakota Supreme Court recently revitalized the role of substantive
due process in Andrews v. O'Hearn,792 a decision in which the court
attempted to synthesize its previous decisions applying one of the
due process clauses of the North Dakota Constitution. 793 Although
the court in Andrews did not employ the due process clause to
correct the alleged error, it nonetheless recognized the concept of
substantive due process as a well established right under North
Dakota law. 794 Because the court's decision in Andrews recognized a
well established right while refusing to apply that right to the
circumstances of the case, a complete understanding of the decision
is impossible without first reviewing the decisions upon which it
was based.
b) The Development of North Dakota Substantive Due
Process
The relevant portion of section 9 of article I provides that
"[all courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
process of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay." '7 95 Dividing section 9 into its component parts is
essential to understanding it clearly. The quoted portion of section
9 has three distinct due process components. 796 The first clause
provides that all courts shall be open.7 97 This clause guarantees
access to our state system of justice, and is known as the open-
courts provision.7 98 The second clause provides that every person
shall have remedy by due process of law for any injury done to his
or her lands, goods, person or reputation. 799 This clause is known
as the right to remedy provision. 800 The third clause provides that
right and justice must be administered without sale, denial, or
delay.80 1 This clause is the administration ofjustice provision.
802
791. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978) (citing Johnson v. Hassett, 217
N,W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974), andJohnson v. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123 (N.D. 1978)).
792. 387 N.W.2d 716(N.D. 1986).
793. SeeAndrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 723 (N.D. 1986); N.D. CoNSr. art. 1, S9.
794, SeeAndrews, 387 N.W.2d at 723.
795. N.D. CONST. art. 1, 5 9.
796. See id., The final clause of 5 9 relates to sovereign immunity and does not involve the issue
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Three early North Dakota decisions employed article I, section
9, to create substantive rights: Trustee Loan Co. v. Botz,80 3 Meyerle v.
Pioneer Publishing Co.,804 and Divide County v. Baird. 8
0 5
Botz involved an action to quiet title. 80 6 The land owned by
Botz was sold to Trustee Loan Company for failure to pay certain
taxes and special assessments. 80 7  Because various statutory
provisions had not been followed, such as providing notice of the
sale and prior notice of the end of the redemption period, the court
declared the sale invalid and the deed subsequently issued by the
county auditor void.80 8 The supreme court also held that the sale of
property for special assessments and general tax, offered together in
one sum, in effect acted to sell the property for a substantial and
excessive sum over the actual taxes assessed and levied on the
property, thereby violating section 9.809 Although the court did not
state how section 9 was violated, it is clear that the court was
invoking a substantive, rather than just a procedural, right.
Meyerle involved an action for libel.810 A Mandan newspaper
published an article reporting that the plaintiff determined by star-
gazing that the world was going to end on a certain day, and that he
therefore invited his family to dinner the day before with the stated
intention of killing himself and any other family members who so
consented.""' The newspaper attempted to have the suit dismissed
because Meyerle had failed to request a retraction before bringing
suit, as required by statutory law. 812 The court nonetheless
concluded that a request for retraction was not necessary because of
the terms of section 9: "By the Constitution, the right of free speech
and free publication is guaranteed. By this Constitution, the right
of redress for injuries done through the abuse of this privilege is also
guaranteed. ' 813 The court then referred specifically to the right of
redress contained in section 9 for "a wrong perpetrated upon a
person's reputation, 8 14 holding that in this case Meyerle did not
need to request a retraction before initiating suit.815 Thus, the court
803. 37 N.D. 230, 164 N.W. 14(1917).
804. 45 N.D. 568,178 N.W. 792 (1920).
805. 55 N.D. 45, 212 N.W. 236(1926).
806. Trustee Loan Co. v. Botz, 37 N.D. 230, 235, 164 N.W. 14, 15 (1917).
807. Id. at 238, 164 N.W. at 16.
808. Id. at 239-43, 164 N.W. at 16-18.
809. Seeid. at 231, 164 N.W. at 14.
810. Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co_, 45 N.D. 568, 570, 178 N.W. 792, 793 (1920).
811. Id. at 570-71, 178 N.W. at 793.
812. Id. at 571, 178 N.W. at 793.
813. Id. at 573, 178 N.W. at 794.
814. See id. at 574, 178 N.W. at 794; N.D. CONST. art. I, S 9 (1889) (codified at N.D. CONST.
at. I, § 4).
815. Meyerle, 45 N.D. at 577, 178 N.W. at 796. Although the court stated that 5 9 may be used
to redress a wrong perpetrated upon a person's reputation, the court stated that it did not reach any
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- contrary to the terms of the applicable statute - used section 9
to create a substantive right to sue for libel for loss of reputation.
The supreme court also used section 9 to create a substantive
right in Baird. Baird involved the deposit of county funds in a bank
that subsequently became insolvent. 81 6 Before depositing the funds,
the county received a special pledge from the bank as security.
81 7
The bank, however, had no authority to provide this pledge.8 18
Indeed, both the county and the bank had violated state law under
the particular facts of this case. 819 The supreme court recognized
the equitable doctrine that requires a court to leave the parties to an
illegal transaction as the court finds them,8 20 but nonetheless
refused to allow the county to reap the benefits of its improper
conduct at the expense of the innocent depositors of the bank. The
supreme court used section 9 to create the remedy:
The basis of the rule that the courts will leave the parties
to an illegal contract where it [sic] finds them is that it
[sic] will not aid or reward a wrongdoer. Here the
depositors are guilty of no wrong; shall they be punished
for the misdeeds of the guilty? When the wrong was done,
they were powerless to speak or prevent it; now an officer
of the court is charged with the duty of protecting their
interest. Shall we say to him that there is no remedy whereby the
innocent may be protected from the consequences of the unlawful
conduct of others? Section 22 [current version, with minor
modifications, of section 9] of our Constitution provides
that: "The Courts shall be open, and every man for any
injury done him . .. shall have remedy by due process of
law.... "
And yet it is said that the court, after fEnding the
injury, can only slap the defunct bank and the delinquent
county on the wrist, and say to the depositors: "We must
leave you where we find you [ .... 1"
constitutional issue in the case. Id. Rather, the court stated that the intent of the statute requiring
retraction before bringing suit was to provide an opportunity for the publisher to mitigate damages,
not to require a retraction before a plaintiff may bring suit. Id A simple reading of the statute,
however, amply demonstrates that such a construction of the statute is not consistent with the
language of the statute. See id. at 572, 178 N.W. at 793 (quoting N.D. COMP. LAWS S 9562 (1913)
(present form codified at N.D. CENT. CODE $14-02-08 (Supp. 1985)).
816. Divide County v. Baird, 55 N.D. 45, 49, 212 N.W. 236, 238(1926).
817. Id. at 49, 212 N.W. at 237.
818. Id. at 58, 212 N.W. at 241.
819. Id. at 64, 212 N.W. at 244.
820. Id.
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To state the position ought to be sufficient to demonstrate its
utterly untenable character. Such a holding would be a confession of
judicial impotence to which this court is not prepared to subscribe.
It would mean a notice to the people of this state that we are alike
powerless to correct the wrongs which have been committed in the
past and to prevent their repetition in the future. Once the parties
are successful in executing their unlawful purpose, the
victims of the legal fraud ... are helpless, and this court
can do no more than convert itself into a debating society
where legal theories may be expounded without practical
or useful results. A tribunal without power to do justice is not a
court of equity, but an academy. If we are powerless to give effect to
the plainly expressed purpose of the Legislature to protect
depositors, it is a usurpation to assume the name and put on the
semblance of a court of equity. 
82 1
One could argue, of course, that the decisions of Boz, Meyerle,
and Baird were rendered in the Lochner era, and therefore reflect,
nothing more than the North Dakota Supreme Court blindly
following the United States Supreme Court when the North Dakota
court applied its version of substantive due process. This argument
fails, however, in light of the decisions of the North Dakota
Supreme Court in j924 and 1978 that created substantive rights
based on various North Dakota constitutional provisions (including
the due process clauses, but not stating which one was actually
employed), 22 and the decisions spanning from 1911 to 1978 that
82 i. Id. at 64-65, 212 N.W. at 244 (emphasis added).
822. Ste Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 131 (N.D. 1978); State ex re. Dushek v. Waland,
51 N.D. 710, 201 N.W. 680 (1924). The court in these cases resorted to the unfortunate practice of
recognizing substantive rights while referring to several provisions, including 5 9, without explicitly
stating which provision was actually employed.
In Amnwson the court held the medical malpractice act unconstitutioaal. Aneson, 270 N.W.2d at
138; set Medical Negligence Recovery Act, ch. 251, 1977 N.D. Laws 583 (repealed 1983). The court
referred to the complaint, which asserted a violation of sections 22 (uniform operation of laws), 9 and
12 (the due process provisions), and 21 (one of the privileges and immunities clauses). Id. at 129; see
N.D. CONST. art. 1, $S 9, 12, 21, 22. In addition, the court made reference to article VI, $ 3, which
relates to the supreme court's rule making authority. Id. at 131; see N.D. CoNsr. art. VI, $ 3. Section
26-40.1-05, which concerned the change of infoimaed consent from a subjective to an objective
standard, was apparently declared unconstitutionvi a.i unreasonable and arbitrary. See id. at 133-34.
Sections 26-40.1-16 apd -17, which concerned the modification or termination of judgments, were
narrowly construed to prevent unconstitutionality u~aler sections 9 and 21 of the North Dakota
Constitution. Id. at 137; see N.D. CorisT. art. 1, $59, 21.
In Watland the court invalidated a penalty asserrd against employers who were unsuccessful on
appeal in worker's compensation cases. Watdan4 51 N D. at 729, 201 N.W. at 687. In making this
determination, the court referred to $ 22 (due process aald open courts) (current version, with minor
modifications, at $ 9, and $ 13 (due process) (current version, with minor modifications, at 5 12. Id.
at 722, 201 N.W. at 684; siv N.D. COmST. art. I, 5 9, 12. The court held that the statute was "a
denial of that right ofjudicial review to which an employ..r is entitled under our Constitution." Id. at
729, 201 N.W. at 687.
264
1987] NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION 265
explicitly construe section 9 as not providing a substantive right
applicable to the facts at hand (instead of finding that section 9
never provides substantive rights).823 The recent decision in
Andrews, discussed below, also applied section 9 in relation to
creating a substantive right, but refused to employ that provision to
provide a remedy.
824
Analysis of these decisions demonstrates that prior to 1986, the
North Dakota Supreme Court used section 9 to invalidate a form of
double taxation, 2 5 to create a remedy for libel and slander,82 6 and
to provide remedies to prevent an inequitable result
8 27
Additionally, section 9 was used, either alone or in combination
with other provisions of the constitution, to invalidate a statute that
changed the informed consent law from a suj.cctive to an objective
standard828 and to invalidate a penalty incurred following an
unsuccessful appeal.8 29 The supreme court, however, refused to use
section 9 to prohibit the retroactive applic-ation of the Uniform
Parentage Act,830 to invalidate a provision allowing conclusive
findings of fact regarding the existence of slum conditions,8 31 to
invalidate a provision making assessments of the State Board of
Equalization final,8 32 to invalidate a provision disallowing a person
to sue for injuries after accepting worker's compensation
benefits, 83" to consider the destruction of a diseased mare as
recoverable,83 4 to invalidate the procedures for the removal of
sheriffs, 835 and to order the reconvening of a district court for
trial.8 3
6
c) Andrews v. O'Hearn
In Andrews the North Dakota Supreme Court attempted to
synthesize these decisions and provide a structure of analysis in
823. Ohlsen v.J.S. (In reW. M. V.), 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1978); Ferch v. Housing Auth., 79
N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849 (1953); Northern Pac. Ry. v. State, 71 N.D. 93, 299 N.W. 696 (1941);
Ethen v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 67" N.D. 394, 244 N.W. 32 (1932);
Crandall v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D. 636, 207 N.W. 551 (1926);
Neer v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 40 N.D. 340, 168 N.W. 601 (1918); State v. Frazier, 39 N.D.
430, 167 N.W. 510 (1918); Stockwell v. Crawford, 21 N.D. 261, 130 N.W.225 (1911).
824. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D. 1986). For a discussion of Andrews, see
infra text accompanying notes 837-51.
825. Trustee Loan Co. v. Botz, 37 N.D. 230, 164 N.W. 14 (1917).
826. Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568, 574, 178 N.W. 792, 794 (1920).
827. Divide County v. Baird, 55 N.D. 45, 64-65, 212 N.W. 236, 244 (1926).
828. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978).
829. State ex tel. Dushek v. Watland, 51 N.D. 710, 729-30, 201 N.W. 680, 687 (1924).
830. Ohlsen v.J.S. (In reW. M. V.), 268 N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1978).
831. Ferch v. Housing Auth., 79 N.D. 764, 793, 59 N.W.2d 849, 868 (1953).
832. Northern Pacific Ry. v. State, 71 N.D. 93, 100, 299 N.W. 696, 699-700 (1941).
833. Ethan v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 62 N.D. 394, 402, 244 N.W.
32, 35-36 (1932); Crandall v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D. 636, 643-
44, 207 N.W. 551, 553-54 (1925).
834. Near v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 40 N.D. 340, 352-60, 168 N.W. 601,604-07 (1918).
835. State v. Frazier, 39 N.D. 430, 443, 167 N.W. 510, 513 (1918).
836. Stockwall v. Crawford, 21 N.D. 261,265, 130 N.W. 225, 227 (1911).
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which to employ section 9. The Andrews case involved a malpractice
action against five doctors and several medical related
corporations. 837 The jury found two doctors and one hospital
negligent, but concluded that the defendant's acts were not the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.8 38 The plaintiffs
presented juror affidavits to demonstrate that the jury had
employed an erroneous definition of proximate cause. 839 A rule of
evidence prohibited the use of such affidavits,84 0 and the plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent this rule by arguing that article I, section
9 of the North Dakota Constitution " 'provides a guarantee of
justice to the individual civil litigant' and the 'guarantee is
unfilfilled where, as here, individual litigants are forced to suffer a
clear miscarriage ofjustice.' "841 Although the court refused to find
a remedy under section 9 for the alleged error, it nonetheless
recognized that "this court has, on occasion, used this provision of
the North Dakota Constitution to correct a substantive error...
",842 The court went on to set forth the general principles used in
determining whether to employ section 9 to create substantive
rights and reviewed the types of situations in which substantive due
process may be employed.
8 43
The supreme court stated in Andrews that section 9 "has been
repeatedly construed as a guarantee of access to our state system of
justice. "844 The court went on to state that even if a more broad
interpretation of this section were warranted, "[s]ection 9 never
has been construed as an absolute right; indeed, this court once
stated that the provision must be interpreted in light of the
'superior rights of the public and the necessities of the occasion.'
"1845 The court then stated that the various decisions interpreting
section 9 do not require a remedy for every wrong and concluded
that these decisions demonstrated the nonabsolute character of that
section. 8
46
Of greater importance, however, is the court's recognition
that section 9 has indeed been used "to correct a substantive
837. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D. 1986).
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. See id. at 718-23. Rule 606(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides that "ajuror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations"
except as to extreneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or a chance verdict. N.D.R. Evm.
606(b).
841. Andrews, 387 N.W.2d at 723.
842. Id.
843. Id.
844. Id. It would have been more accurate for the court to state that S 9 has been primarily
construed as a guarantee of access to our state system ofjustice.




error" 47 and that, in particular circumstances, section 9 should be
employed "to protect a litigant against a deprivation of due
process, to avert a harsh result that is otherwise inevitable, or to
prevent the destruction of the only opportunity for an appropriate
remedy.. . . "8,48 The court concluded that none of these situations
existed in the Andrews case.8 49 The court then discussed the proper
limit of section 9 in the creation of substantive rights:
[W]e do not believe that Section 9 was intended to
promote this court to the position of a super-legislature in
charge of ensuring perfect justice and complete remedies,
thereby supplanting the traditional function of the jury,
the standards employed to evaluate a jury decision, and
the rules of evidence, such as Rule 606(b), that protect
jury independence by preventing judicial overseeing of
the internal workings of the jury.
850
Even if not construed as providing an automatic remedy for every
wrong, the decision in Andrews demonstrates that substantive due
process is a viable concept under North Dakota law, regardless of
the failure of the federal courts to fully recognize the concept.
851
The reach of the concept of substantive due process under
North Dakota law depends greatly on the portion of section 9 that
applies. Of the various portions of section 9, the open-courts
provision and the administration of justice provision have been so
broadly construed that they approximate absolute rights, 52 while
the right to remedy provision has been applied according to a
sliding-scale analysis in which the supreme court balances the
injury involved against the harm caused by the lack of remedy or
due process. 53 Although it is clear that the supreme court does not
intend to use substantive due process to correct every potential error,
it is also clear that the court intends to use it to prevent many
injustices. According to the court, section 9 should be employed
whenever it is necessary "to protect a litigant against a deprivation





851. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's failure to fully recognize
substantative due process remedies, see supra text accompanying notes 785-90.
852. See, e.g., KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1980); Malin v.
LaMoure County, 27 N.D. 140,152,145 N.W. 582, 586(1914).
853. For a discussion of the different interpretations of various positions of article 9, see supra
text accompanying notes 796-851.
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or to prevent the destruction of the only opportunity for an
appropriate remedy .... "854 Thus, section 9 may well become the
savings clause for many rights and remedies.
3. Differences in Interpretation: Right to Counsel
The court in Andrews, by its review of the application of
substantive due process under North Dakota law, demonstrated
that concepts which are found in both the federal and state
constitutions are subject to differing interpretations, and that
broader rights may be found in the application of the state
constitution. Although Andrews involved a civil matter, the court
has also found greater rights under the state constitution in
criminal cases. In State v. Orr 855 the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the defendant's federal constitutional right to
counsel had not been denied, but nonetheless found a violation of
the North Dakota provision relating to the right to counsel.
85 6
Orr involved the enhancement of a sentence for a driving under
the influence (DUI) conviction based on a previous uncounseled
conviction for DUI. 8"7 Orr argued that the previous uncounseled
conviction "could not be used to enhance his punishment for the
subsequent DUI conviction . . . when there was no proof that he
was advised of, and waived, his right to counsel before pleading
guilty to the earlier DUI charge.'"158 The court determined that the
State failed to show a waiver of Orr's right to counsel, thereby
necessitating a review of the law of sentence enhancement.85 9 After
considering the applicable federal law, the court ruled that Orr's
federal constitutional rights had not been violated.
860
Despite the court's refusal to find a violation of a federal
constitutional right, the court concluded that the state violated
Orr's right to counsel secured by article I, section 12 of the North
Dakota Constitution. 61 Section 12, which contains language
slightly different from its federal counterpart, provides that the
"accused shall have the right ... to appear and defend in person
854. Andrews, 387 N.W.2d at 723.
855. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985); see Comment, A Defendant's Prior Uncounseled Misdemeanor
Convictions May Not Be Used to Enhance Punishment Pursuant to North Dakota's Driving Under the Influence
Statute, 63 N.D.L. REv. 301 (1987) (authored by Patrick Stevens).
856. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171,176, 178-79 (N.D. 1985); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.D.
CoNsT. art. 1, S 12.
857. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 173.
858. Id.
859. Id. at 173.
860. Id. at 176.
861. Id. at 178-79.
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with counsel." 862 According to the court, this right to counsel "has
long been zealously guarded not only by the courts of this State,...
but also by the Legislature as far back as 1895."1863 The court noted
that the right to counsel under the North Dakota Constitution is
fundamental, and that the "special regard for the intrinsic value of
[section] 12 has been exercised independently of any compulsion
under federal law or the federal constitution. '864 The court went on
to follow the logic of several earlier United States Supreme Court
decisions which "recognize in unequivocal fashion that an
uncounseled conviction is too unreliable to support zhe sanction of
imprisonment. ' 86 5 The court concluded that the use of an
uncounseled conviction to enhance a punishment violated the right
to counsel provision of the North Dakota Constitution, holding
that, absent a valid waiver, a "resulting [uncounseled] conviction
cannot . . . be used to enhance a term of imprisonment for a
subsequent offense."
866
Of special interest is the concurrence of Justice VandeWalle,
which Chief Justice Erickstad joined. 867 Justice VandeWalle was
willing to concur with the majority opinion, but only because of his
belief that "uncounseled convictions are not always reliable," and
that the rules of criminal procedure specify that the record below
"should reflect that a defendant was advised of his right to
counsel" and that he voluntarily waived that right. 868 Because the
trial court record did not reflect a voluntary waiver of counsel,
Justice VandeWalle believed that it was unnecessary to determine
the constitutional question. 869 Justice VandeWalle therefore stated
that he would "reserve for another day the question of whether or
not our constitutional provision provides greater protection than
does the Sixth Amendment [to the federal constitution].
' 870
Regardless of Justice VandeWalle and Chief Justice Erickstad's
desire to reserve this question for another day, it is clear that this
862. N.D. CONST. art. 1, S 12. The federal constitutional provision includes the language that
"the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI.
863. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177 (citations omitted).
864. Id. at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).
865. Id. at 178; see, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (holding that no person may
be imprisoned for any offense unless represented by counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
35-36 (1972) (stating that uncounseled convictions are unreliable).
866. Or, 375 N.W.2d at 178-79; N.D. CONST. art. !, S 12.
867. See Or, 375 N.W.2d at 180-81 (VandeWalle,J., concurring).
868. Id. at 181 (footnote omitted); see also N.D.R. CRIM. P. 1 l(f) (providing that a verbatim
record shall be made of the court's advice to the defendant, which shows the court's inquiry into the
voluntariness of a plea submitted by the defendant).
869. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 181 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
870. Id. at 180.
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issue was answered by the majority decision in Orr. Orr did indeed
receive greater protection under the state constitution.
The court has, on occasion, asserted the proposition that a
state constitutional provision must be construed as providing only
the same protection as a similar federal provision. 871 This view
should be rejected soundly by the court. The argument in favor of
this view is apparently based on the contention that, by adopting
language similar to a federal provision, the North Dakota
constitutional framers intended that the federal construction be
applied to the similar state provision. It is hard to imagine a more
dubious proposition than that a new state should, at its inception,
forever surrender the right to interpret its own constitution, and, in
effect, render the provisions of that constitution a superfluous
repition of the federal constitution. The drafters of the North
Dakota Constitution used the Bill of Rights only as a starting point.
Thus, the real significance is not the occasional remaining
similarities, but rather the general expansion and broadening of the
federal language in the state version.8 72 Even in those situations in
which identical language is employed, the inherently abstract
nature of these provisions requires that they be interpreted in light
of the intent of the framers and the people who adopted the
constitution, and not as mere appendages to the varying
interpretations of the federal constitution.813
871. It should be noted that the court has addressed this issue before. In State v. Allesi, Chief
Justice Erickstad proposed the view that, in relation to the state's double jeopardy provision, the
framers of the North Dakota Constitution intended the state's double jeopardy clause to be
interpreted consistently with the federal clause. State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805, 817-18 (N.D.
1974). This assertion, which ostensibly received majority support by the concurrences of Justices
Knudson and Paulson, should be given little precedential value for several reasons. First, the
assertion is implicated by the more recent decisions of Orr and Andrews, each of which provided
greater protection under the state constitutional provisions than their federal counterparts. See
Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1986); State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1986).
Second, as discussed above in the text immediately following the reference to this footnote, the
proposition is questionable as a matter of logic. See infra text accompanying notes 872-73. And third,
there is serious doubt, as this Article demonstrates, that the framers of the state constitution intended
such a limiting interpretation of the rights of the people. See supra text accompanying notes 654-711,
735-68, and infra text accompanying notes 877-79.
In addition, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that this assertion of automatic adoption of the
federal interpretation will receive the support of a majority of the present court. Of the three justices
in Allesi who agreed with the proposition, two are no longer members of the court and the other has
explicitly recognized the potential of a broader interpretation of the state constitution. See City of
Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 766 (N.D. 1984) (wherein ChiefJustice Erickstad stated that
"we may provide the citizens of our state, as a matter of state constitutional law, greater protection
than the safeguards guaranteed in the Federal Constitution"). In any event, it is hoped that when the
issue of interpretation of identical language is before the court, it will be soundly rejected based on
logic, practicality, and history,
872. For a discussion of the framers' of the North Dakota Constitution expansive view of
personal rights, see supra text accompanying notes 735-68.
873. For a discussion of the historical influences on the framers, and the framers' expansive view
of individual rights, see supra text accompanying notes 654-711.
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As discussed above, the rights contained in the first article of
the constitution must be broadly construed to enhance the rights of
individuals. 874 It must also be remembered that the Bill of Rights
initially applied only to the federal government. 875 The original
federal system envisioned the states, and not the federal
government, as being charged with protecting the rights of the
people. This fact, combined with the unique history of North
Dakota, the substantial expansion made upon the federal model of
rights by the framers of the North Dakota Constitution, and the
supreme court's recent willingness to interpret the state
constitution more broadly than the federal constitution, should
dispel any thoughts of limiting the North Dakota Constitution to
the interpretation of its federal counterpart merely because some of
the language contained in the two documents is identical.876
E. SUMMARY: FORGET NOT YET THE TRIED INTENT 877
The history of North Dakota, the intention of the framers, and
the text of the lengthy North Dakota Constitution amply
demonstrate that the framers and the people of North Dakota
874. See supra text accompanying notes 745-68.
875. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1883) (refusing to apply the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution to legislation of the states).
876. Nor should the court necessarily employ the federal frame of analysis when construing
similar state provisions. A good example of the danger of merely superimposing the federal
framework on state constitutional analysis is the court's recent decision in Hanson v. Williams County,
in which the court applied the intermediate standard of review of equal protection analysis
(developed by the United States Supreme Court) in a situation that amply demonstrates the inherent
weaknesses of that standard. See Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323-28 (N.D. 1986).
On a close analysis it becomes apparent that the intermediate review standard is nothing more than a
balancing test. If this is true, the attempt to apply the standard under the terms of the equal
protection clause, which concerns itself with classifications instead of countervailing interests, is
comparing apples with oranges.
The court in Hanson would have been much better off - and, incidentally, could have reached
the same result - had it employed either the state's traditional due process analysis or the traditional
"equal protection" analysis developed pursuant to the privileges and immunities clause. Employing
due process analysis, the court could have determined if the statute of repose (as well as all statutes of
repose) violated the plaintiff's rights under article I, § 12. See N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 12 (due process
provision). For a discussion of the North Dakota due process balancing test, see supra text
accompanying notes 803-36 and 842-54. The court could have also simply decided to reject the
confusing and often contradictory intermediate standard of review and instead reverted back to its
original formulation of the state's privileges and immunities clause (see Vermont Loan & Trust Co.
v. Whithed, 2 N.D. 82, 49 N.W. 318 (1891)), which served nicely until the court adopted the
concepts and forms of analysis of the United States Supreme Court.
The appropriateness of the intermediate standard of review is, however, beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally F. DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME & PUNISHMENT (1866), closing sentence
("That might be the subject of a new story - our present story is ended").
877. Forget not yet the tried intent
of such a truth as I have meant;
My great travail so gladly spent
Forget not yet.
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intended three results from their constitution: a reduction, as much
as possible, of all outside control of the state by "big business" and
its pawns;8 78 and expansion of individual rights;879 and a restriction
of the power of state government by specific limitations and
extensive checks and balances.86 0 The constitutional framers
created a structure of government that is, in essential respects,
quite different from its federal counterpart. The result has been an
understandable development by the North Dakota Supreme Court
of a decidedly independent direction and focus in the interpretation
of the North Dakota Constitution, shown especially in the
expansion of individual rights under article I. This direction and
focus should continue unabated, for to do otherwise is to forget the
general intent underlying the North Dakota Constitution, as well as
the expanded individual rights meant to be given substance by that
document.
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT METHOD OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. TEXT BASED VS. INTENT BASED ANALYSIS
Perhaps the most important issue in North Dakota
constitutional law is the supreme court's choice between text based
or intent based analysis. These two opposing methods of analysis
have been variously applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court
over the last ninety-eight years, with understandably varying
results.881 As stated earlier, the court's possibly inadvertent use of
intent based analysis language has, on at least three occasions,
resulted in the abrogation of the text of the constitution. 8 2 This
Forget not then thine own approved,
The which so long hath thee so loved,
Whose steadfast faith yet never moved;
Forget not this.
T. WYA',,r, FORoET NOT YET, 11. 1-4, 17-20 (1557).
878. For a discussion of the attempts to restrict out of state business control over the state, see
supra text accompanying notes 657-63, 675, 735, 740-43.
879. For a discussion of the framers' expansive view of individual rights, see supra text
accompanying notes 685, 744-83.
880. For a discussion of specific limitations and checks and balances on the power of state
government, see supra text accompanying notes 685, 736-40, 768-83.
881. For a discussion of the application of both the text based and the intent based analysis, see
supra text accompanying notes 448-653.
882. For a discussion of when the inadvertent use of intent based analysis has abrogated the text
of the constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 603-53.
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result is clearly contrary to the frequently applied rule that the plain
language of the constitution controls.
8 83
By reviewing the two methods of interpretation, this Article
has attempted to demonstrate, by the court's own words and logic,
the superiority of text based analysis over intent based analysis.
The fact that we live under a constitutional form of government
should be enough to convince the court to apply the clear mandates
of the constitution and adopt text based analysis. But judges are
human, and certain situations exist when the desire to "do justice"
overcomes reason and proper authority. On these occasions, there
have been those - such as Justice Christianson, Chief Justice
Strutz, and Chief Justice Erickstad - who Lave refused to join in
stepping beyond the proper bounds of their judicial function, and
have stood in defense of the court's sworn duty to uphold the
constitution.
But aside from the 'uty to uphold the constitution (and one
must assume that this duty includes upholding its terms), practical
reasons exist that demand the exclusive adoption of text based
analysis. The most important of these is consistency of
interpretation. While the underlying intent of a constitutional
provision may be in the eye of the beholder, the language of a
provision remains constant. Although decisions interpreting a
provision may disclose subtle nuances of meaning, the language
remains constant, serving as an anchor to future interpretations. It
is true that the same words may be read in slightly different ways by
different people, but at least those words will provide a consistent
foundation for construction of the constitution. Intent based
analysis, however, possesses no specific foundation at all, and
instead relies on numerous sources, each of which is likely to be
seen and weighed differently by different people. 884 This lack of
foundation prevents consistent and progressive interpretation,
leaving each decision destined to become an island severed from the
geography of reason.
Of course one could argue that judges must be free to apply the
spirit of the laws - that "it is a Constitution that we are
expounding.''885 But this famous statement referred to provisions
883. For a discussion of the plain language rule of construction, see supra text accompanying
notes 462-77.
884. Attempts to determine intent are often best described as conclusions looking for reasons.
When searching for intent, judges sometimes appear as the diviners of old, walking swiftly along the
landscape of law looking for a spot, perhaps perviously determined based on irrelevant factors; and
then, lo and behold, the magic divining rod jumps downward to the dispositive spot, and once again
justice is served.
885. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C:J.) (emphasis
in original) (construing the necessary and proper clause).
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which were designed to require interpretation, provisions that are
inherently abstract and require judicial construction to fulfill their
intended purpose. Properly understood, these famous words apply
equally well to the specific and unambiguous provisions of the
constitution: this is a constitution we are expounding - it is the
paramount law, reflecting the direct will of the people, and its plain
terms must be strictly followed.
The judges of North Dakota are obliged to uphold the state
constitution, and any refusal to apply the plain dictates of that
constitution is an abrogation of duty. This is true even when
application of the plain text will cause an absurd result. If an
absurdity results from the application of the plain dictates of the
constitution, so be it. The judges did not create the absurdity. On
balance, an occasional absurd result is better than the constant
blurring and shifting of constitutional interpretations. Courts do a
great disservice by ignoring the plain dictates of the law. What was
once plain becomes muddled, and the entire constitution - every
sentence, every phrase, and every word - is called into doubt and
subjected to vacillating interpretations.
If the supreme court is unwilling to reject intent based analysis
completely, it should at least choose between the two methods of
analysis, for the use of both creates substantial uncertainty and
confusion. Even the wrong selection is better than the inconsistent
use of both methods, for at least then lawyers and judges will know
whether the language of the constitution controls or whether they
should ignore the actual text of the constitution and focus their
research on other sources in search of evidence of the underlying
intent. And if the court should insist on retaining intent based
analysis, it should impede the inherent dangers of this form of
analysis by strictly limiting it to the area of law in which it has
actually been employed: cases related to the expression of the will of
the people by the ballot.88 6
B. PRINCIPLED DECISION MAKING vs. RESULT ORIENTED
DECISION MAKING
The continued recognition of intent based analysis poses
danger beyond mere inconsistency: it provides the court with the
means to reject the terms of the constitution and reach any result it
886. For a discussion of when the inadvertent use of intent based analysis has abrogated the text
of the constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 603-53.
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desires. There is much to be said for result orientation, but only if
we prefer "to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians."
8 8 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court often demonstrates a
propensity to apply result oriented analysis in areas outside the
domain of constitutional law.8 88 But result oriented decisions in
constitutional cases, through the use of intent based analysis, would
place every provision of the constitution in doubt. Every case would
be rendered susceptible to appeal and reversal because the court
could justify any result by relying on the perceived intent
underlying the provision. As such, any litigant that loses in a lower
court might as well appeal, regardless of the language of the
constitution. This result cannot be countenanced. The court must
employ the traditional structure of judicial analysis, which is to
ascertain the relevant facts, apply the applicable law, and then
determine the appropriate result. 88 9 Some judges unfortunately
believe, however, that the appropriate manner of judicial decision
making is to simply decide what result is preferred, and then search
out the law and facts which justify that particular result. This form
of analysis often results in the application of an inappropriate
theory of law, the perversion of a well established standard of
review, or an unrealistic martialing of the facts. The attendant
result to the scholar and practitioner is an inability to discern any
principled basis or long term analytic flow from the decisions of the
court. The scholar is left confounded and confused, and the
practitioner is placed in the position of not being able to give
realistic advice to clients. The result is as simple as it is intolerable:
the rule of law becomes merely the rule of judges, which perforce is
everchanging and inconstant.
C. THE ROLE OF THE-JUDICIARY UNDER A CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM 89 0
The proper role of judges, and more specifically the
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation to be employed
887. L. HAND, THE-BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
888. See, e.g., Paulson v. Meinke, 389 N.W.2d 798, 803 (N.D. 1986) (VandeWalle, J.,
dissenting) ("[u]nder the guise of 'erroneous conceptions of the law of implied trusts,' the majority
has undertaken to retry this case").
889. Of course, use of this analysis does not mean that the court should unquestionably follow
the previously established law. On the contrary, when the court determines that it is appropriate to
expand or reject a previous decision, it clearly retains the right to do so. And, if the law requires
rejection, or perhaps the addition of an exception, then the court should act accordingly. But the
court should alter the law openly, and in an intellectually honest manner. It is one thing to change
the law, and entirely another thing to sidestep the law while ostensibly leaving it in place.
890. Although there are those that would scoff at any reference to the early philosophical
underpinnings relating to the role ofjudges, such a person fails to realize that reference to these early
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by judges, is primarily a function of the form of government.
Despite the differences in content and focus, the governmental
system adopted by the North Dakota Constitution iG derived, at
least in its design and basic framework, from the United States
Constitution. Thus, a proper understanding of the role of judges
under the federal system can provide insight into the proper role of
judges under our state system of government.
At the time of the founding of the United States, political
theorists divided government into three categories: republican,
ruied by the people; aristocratic, ruled by a portion of the people;
and monarchical, ruled by one person.89' The framers of the
United States Constitution attempted to combine the attributes of
monarchical and republican forms of government.892 The United
States government, which is a confederated republic,893 does not
fall precisely under either of these two categories.
One of the sources most often used to determine the intent of
the framers of the federal constitution is The Federalist, a
compilation of essays written by John Madison, John Jay, and
Alexander Hamilton in support of the ratification of the
constitution. According to one of the essays in The Federalist, the
future federal government was envisioned to be " 'composed of
small republics,' " but with " 'all the advantages of large
monarchies.' ",894 The role of judges and the method of
interpretation is different under each system of government.8 95
Montesquieu's distinction between the functions of a monarchical
judge and a republican judge is especially illuminating on this
point:
T1n despotic governments there are no laws; the judge
himself is his own rule. There are laws in monarchies;
and where these are explicit, the judge conforms to them;
where they are otherwise, he endeavors to investigate
philosophers is for the purpose of establishing a common foundation and language for discussion.
The author, by use of these philosophers, does not intend to imply that these philosophers have
necessarily produced the definitive works on this subject. Their works do provide, however,
archetypes of present-day arguments. And as anyone who has been a judge or worked for a judge
knows, a good judge is constantly concerned with his or her proper role as a nondemocratic element
within the structure of an ostensibly democratic society.
891. . e, e.g., J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE.TRuE ORIGINAL EXTENT & END OF CIvIl.
GOVERNMENT ch. X (1690) (also known as the SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT), reprinted in 35
GREAT BOOKS OF THE. WESTERN WORLD 55 (1952). Some political theorists of the time used
"democracy" instead of "republic," and "oligarchy" instead of "aristocracy."
892. THE.FEDERALIST No. 9 (A. Hamilton), reprinked in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE.WEsTERN WORLD
49(1952).
893, Id.
894. Id. at 48.
895. MONTESQUIEU, THE.SPIRIT OF THE.LAws, bk VI, ch. 5 (1748), reprited in 38 GREAT BOOKS
OF THE.WESTERN WORLD 35 (1952).
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their spirit. In republics, the very nature of the
constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of the
law .... 896
Because our system of government is framed as a combination
of the attributes of the monarchical and republican forms of
government, the proper role of judges under our political system
falls between the republican duty to follow the letter of the law, and
the monarchical duty to conform to explicit laws and investigate the
spirit of the laws which are not explicit.89 7 Under this system
of government, judges have a duty to follow the letter of any
explicit law, and when the law is not explicit, to investigate the
spirit of the law.898 This framework is obviously consistent with text
based analysis. Thus, even the basic philosophic foundations of our
form of government require the use of text based analysis and the
rejection of intent based analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Constitution is an extremely lengthy and
detailed document which includes provisions that address a host of
subjects. During the ascendancy of rights under the United States
896. MONTESQUEU, THE.SpiRIT OF THE.LAws, bk VI, ch. 5 (1748), reprinted in 38 GrEAT BOOKS
OF THE.WESTERN WORLD 35 (1952).
897. Another aspect of our system of government is the limit on majority rule. A primary
consideration of the framers of the North Dakota Constitution was distrust of power and fear of
corruption. The framers of the state constitution therefore attempted to create a limited constitution.
See supra text and accompanying notes 659-63, 675, 684-85, 787-850. "By a limited Constitution,"
states Hamilton in The Federalist,
I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no expost-facto
laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through
the medium of the courts ofjustie, whose du!y it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.
THE. FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added), reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE.
WESTERN WORLD 230 (1952). Accordingly, under the federal framework, the courts are required to
assert their duty and guarantee that the rights and privileges of the people are preserved. For a
discussion of the differences between the North Dakota and United States Constitutions, see supra
text accompanying notes 735-68. Partly because of these concerns, the framers of the North Dakota
Constitution solidified and expanded the individual rights of the citizens of North Dakota. For a
discussion of the expansive view of individual rights held by the framers of the North Dakota
Constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 744-61. Thus, the duty of the courts of North
Dakota to preserve the rights and privileges of the people is even more extensive than under the
federal constitution.
898. By the same token, any disregard of the letter of the law or any explicit law is, under this
framework, commensurate with the despotic form of government, in which the "judge himself is his
own rule." MONTESQUIEU, THE.SPIRIT OF THELAws, bk VI, ch. 5 (1748), repinted in 38 GREAT BooKs
OF THEoWEsTERN WORLD 35 (1952).
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Constitution in the third quarter of this century, the North Dakota
Constitution, as well as most other state constitutions, was
generally ignored as a foundation of rights. But, due to the ever
increasing restriction of federal rights by the United States
Supreme Court, the North Dakota Supreme Court will undoubted-
ly be faced in the near future with an onslaught of cases in which
parties seek to assert or develop state constitutional rights. 899 This is
especially true given the North Dakota Supreme Court's recent
decision in State v. Orr, 900 in which the court found no federally
protected right but nonetheless found that right under the state
constitution, and Andrews v. OrHearn,90' in which the court
recognized as established the concept of substantive due process
under North Dakota constitutional law despite the general rejection
of this concept by the United States Supreme Court. The decisions
in Andrews and Orr demonstrate the independence of the North
Dakota Supreme Court from the federal framework in relation to
lawyers and judges to the vast potential of the North Dakota
Constitution has begun.
In construing the North Dakota Constitution, the supreme
court should conclusively reject intent based analysis and instead
adopt text based analysis, as described most fully in State
ex rel. Linde v. Robinson90 2 and expanded by subsequent decisions.
Following text based analysis, the court looks first to the plain
language of the document, deriving from the text itself the intent
and purpose of the words. If necessary, the words are harmonized
with conflicting language contained in the constitution, and effect is
given, if possible, to the whole instrument. If a conflict cannot be
resolved by harmonizing the language, the more recently adopted
provision controls, and special language controls more general
language. If after applying these rules an ambiguity still exists, the
court then - and only then - is justified in broadening its scope of
review beyond the document in an attempt to determine the intent
899. The North Dakota Supreme Court's increased interest in state constitutional issues is
demonstrated by the following statistics. From 1964 to 1974, the court actually discussed the state
constitution, as opposed to a mere citation to the constitution, in 152 decisions (5, 13, 13, 10, 14, 11,
13, 19, 15, 19, and 24, respectively). From 1975 to 1985, the court discussed the state constitution in
382 decisions (18, 24, 29, 34, 46, 36, 43. 40, 44, 26, and 42, respectively) (West Law search
conducted by author). Thus, during the first eleven year time period, the court discussed the state
constitution an average of 14 times per year, while during the next eleven years the court did so an
average of 35 times per year, or two and one-half times more frequently. This trend has continued.
In 1986, the court discussed the state constitution in 33 decisions (West Law search conducted by
articles editor).
900. 375 N.W.2D 171 (ND. 1986). FoR A DISCUSStON OF OrY, see supra text accompanying notes
855-75.
901. 387 N.W.2d 716 (ND. 1986). For a discussion of Andrew5, see supra text accompanying
notes 837-54.




underlying the provision. Intent is determined by looking to the
object to be accomplished, the prior state of the law, and the
contemporaneous and practical constructions of that provision. A
plethora of sources are available to aid the courts in determining
the intent underlying the constitutional provisions. In making this
determination, focus should be placed on the early history of North
Dakota, the intent of the constitutional framers, and the differences
between the state and federal constitutions, including the
differences of interpretation of the two constitutions. These
considerations require the court to construe the North Dakota
Constitution in a manner that enhances individual rights, limits the
potential of abuse by the powers of government, and restricts
detrimental activities of outside interests, especially large
corporations.
Text based analysis is by far the better method of analysis in
terms of logic, practicality, and the role of the judiciary under a
constitutional framework. In those decisions in which the supreme
court has ignored the text of the constitution and employed intent
based analysis, Justice Christianson, Chief Justice Strutz, and
Chief Justice Erickstad were unfortunately unable to convince their
fellow brethren of the error of their ways. Nonetheless, perhaps
their well chosen words will someday guide the court into a new era
of constitutional interpretation. The exclusive adoption of text
based analysis by the North Dakota Supreme Court would permit
and encourage the continued and progressive development of the
law, and provide lawyers and judges with at least a modicum of
certainty with regard to the future interpretation of the North
Dakota Constitution.
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INDEX OF APPENDIX A DEBATES OF
CONSTITUTIONAI. CONVENTION OF 1889
advisory opinions 228-29, 230-34, 252-58, 271-75
amendment of constitution, see constitution
appeal, right of railroads to appeal rate regulation 379-97, 584-99
apportionment 323-39, 512, 540-41, 544-48, 550-51
size of legislature 142-44, 285-86
arbitration between employers and employees 418-24, 523-26
attorney general, advisory opinions 230-34, 274-75
attorney general, salary 558-60
black listing 365-71,532-37, 626-27
Board of University and School Lands, control over school
Iands 609
bonds attested as pursuant to law 439-4(0
boundary discrepancy between North Dakota and South Dakota
47-48, 52-53, 504-05
bribery 350
capital punishment, imethods of inflicting 360-61
child labor 506-11
city deficit, limit on 430-37
clerk of convention, presentation to 656-57
commissioners 445-53
committee on education, compact with the United States 68
committee on revision, duties and function 71-76, 78-85, 154-55,
171-72, 432-33, 438, 538-39, 556-57
compact with the United States 67-68
education, public schools 68
conciliation tribunes 524
constitution, amendment by legislative proposal 497-503
amendment by legislative proposal, majority vs. two-thirds
vote 497, 502-03, 624-25
amendment by legislative proposal, majority vs. three-fifths
vote 501
amendment of 497-503
amendment, vote of people every seven years whether to call a
constitutional convention 497-501





printing and distribution 246-51
printing of synopsis 249
constitution vs. legislation, black listing 366
child labor 507
county and township organization 450
county government 88-92, 95-96, 98
county office salaries 454
elective franchise 187, 193, 198-200
woman suffrage 192-93, 197-204, 276-84
location of institutions 483
regulation of railroads 396
school lands 177, 180-81
taxation 461, 618
temperance 145-47
use of institutions 491-92
constitution vs. people's vote, location of public institutions 478,
628
corporations, compliance with laws 373-74
defined 418
dependence on 112
fear of 81, 112, 172-73, 181,349-50,379-95,479, 486,536,




county and township organization 55, 85-98
boundaries 87-88
county boards 88-90




county boundaries, change in indebtedness following movement
440-41
county court, jurisdiction 315, 351, 570-71
county courts vs. probate courts 238-45, 293-312, 314-16, 570-71
county deficit, limit on 430-37
county officers, remain in office and draw salaries 55
county offices, election of clerk of district court 637-39
election of district attorney 639-40
terms 442-45, 455-56, 614-15
salaries 453-55
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county organization, board of supervisors vs. county, new, size of
610-11
county seats, location 441
courts, fees 305-07; see also supreme court, district courts, county
courts, justices of the peace, conciliation tribunes
debates, publication 76-78, 134-39, 572-73, 656
deficit (state), limit on 426-30
(city and county), limit on 430-37
delegates, listing by district 23-24
dissention between farmers and railroads 19
district courts, judges, diminishment or increase in compensation
227-28




election of superintendent of public instruction 154
enabling act requirements 152
levels 152-54, 603
school district system 603
election of president (Fancher) 24-26
elective franchise 185-91
Australian ballot 205, 576-77
Indian vote 185, 197, 279
Negro vote 197, 279
precinct residency 185-87
registration of voters 206-11, 582-84
residency of foreigners 187-91
taxation without representation 189; see also apportionment
woman suffrage 192-205, 573-76
woman suffrage, decision to be left to the people 192-205,
276-84
woman suffrage, restricted to school matters 205, 573-76
woman suffrage, substitution of minority report for majority
report 192-97, 205
exemption laws 312-14
Farmers' Alliance 218, 340, 349
federalism, regulation of railroads 378, 414
first legislative session, length 344-45
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veto power, overriding by legislature 556-57
grand jury, legislature may abolish 364-65
Habeas Corpus, writ of 237-38
impeachment 155-58
for crimes 155-56
habitual drunkenness vs. any use of alcohol 155-58
incompetents, sale of real estate 346-47, 552-53
indictment and information 364-65
institutions, location 60-61, 478-96, 627-37, 646
receipt of indignation telegrams 646
use of, constitution vs. legislature 491-92
irrigation 412-13
judges, diminishment or increase in compensation 227-28
unavailability or incapacity 275-76
jury, verdict on three-fourths majority 361-63
justices of the peace 299-300, 302-03, 309, 316, 351-57
appeals from 299
jurisdiction 299-300, 302-03, 351-57
may be abolished by legislature 357
labor, commission of 320
labor relations 418-24
lands, state owned, coal 603-04; see also school lands
legislative process, duplicate copies of bill 345-46
legislhtive session, length 344-45
legislators, money for postage, stationary, and expenses 350
restriction on appointments 551-52
salary of 339-44, 552
legislature, size 142-44, 285-86; see also apportionment
suspicious of 92-93, 94, 96
lieutenant governor, salary 321-23, 557-59
literacy 124
loaning public credit, internal improvements 437
lobbying 81, 83, 486
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minority representation 347-49




municipal corporations, indebtedness 182-83
title of article on 601, 602-03
water systems 183
newspapers 350
printing of constitution 249
privilege of the floor 27-28
oath of office 349-50, 625-26
organization, committee action on files 100-02
committee appointments 41-43
committee on credentials 22-24
discharge of committee clerks 246
election of officers 32
joint commission 32-33
printing ofjournal 62-64
printing of resolutions 54, 56, 59-60, 62-64
readings of resolutions 56
resolutions, origination in committee 56-59
rules of the house 29-31, 268-71
temporary 20-21
pardons, governor vs. board of pardons 317-20
preamble, reference to God 357-60, 460, 531-32
president of convention, presentation to 648-49
press, privilege of the floor 27-28
probate courts, see county courts
prohibition 145-48
property, taking private property for public use 600, 601-02
of women 625
public institutions, see institutions
privilege of the floor, exclusion of publisher of Devils Lake Capital
27-28
present and former territorial officials 22-23
press 27-28
railroads, mergers 374-78, 414-18
oppression by 379-95
parallel and competing lines 374-78, 414-18
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passes 349-50, 424-25, 644-45
public highways 378, 379-95
regulation of rates 379-97, 584-99
taxation 466-70, 623-24
recess of convention, farming and business matters 149-51
registration of voters 206-11, 577-78, 582-84
schedule, matters of temporary nature 55
school lands 158-82
Board of University and School Lands 609
commissioner of 321
cultivation and improvement 181-82, 519-21, 521-22
final payment 604-08
land speculation 164-65, 172-73, 515-16
leasing lands under cultivation 519-21
limitation of size sold 164-68, 172- 73, 513-18
price 166-70, 173-74, 288-93
proceeds from violations of laws 159
restricting amount leased 181, 608-10
safekeeping of funds 522-23, 529, 530
sale based on appraised value 180
sale restricted to settlers 164-68, 172-73
sale vs. lease 159-63
taxation, failure to pay 513
terms of sale 174-78
seal, motto 505-06
seat of government, special committee 60
secretary of state, receipt of duplicate copies of bills 345-46
senators, terms of office 541-44
separation of powers, non self-executing provisions 132-33
session, length of 344-45
single house question 102-13, 114-28; see also apportionment
South Dakota Constitution, copies provided to members 99-100
speech of Blackwell, Secretary of the Woman Suffrage Association
34-41
Judge Cooley 65-67
Major Powell, Director of the Geologic Survey 410-12
Mellette, Territorial Governor 44-47
Rev. Wiley, National Reform Organization 48-52
Richardson, Secretary of the Territory 19
Senator Stewart of Nevada 397-405
Senator Regan of Texas 405-10
special or local laws, prohibition of 347
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state boundaries 504-05
state deficit, limit on 426-30
state lands, coal 603-04
stenographer, compensation 68-70
streams and water ways, state property 523, 526-28
suffrage, see elective franchise
supreme court, advisory opinions 228-34, 252-58, 271-75
clerk, appoint vs. elect 217-22, 270, 561-62
elected at general elections 215-17, 561
eligibility ofjudges 222-27
judges, diminishment or increase in compensation 227-28
length of first terms of office 215-17
promulgation of rules 229-30
riding the circuit 211-14, 258-68, 561
rules of admission 229-30
syllabus 229
taxation 457-77
assessment of land 470-74
collection through state 474
gross earnings tax 465, 615-23, 648,649-56
poll tax 475-77
property of church and charitable organizations 457-65
railroads and corporations 466-70
uniform 458, 461, 464
telegraph companies, regulation of 378-79, 395
temperance, decision to be left to people 145-47
township organization 448-53, 611-14
trial by jury, three-fourths majority 361-63
trusts, see monopolies
unicameral house, see single house question, apportionment
veto, overriding by legislature 556-57
voting, spreading vote among candidates or giving all votes to one
candidate, see minority representation
woman's suffrage, see elective franchise






UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-NORTH DAKOTA
CONSTITUTION




RIGHT TO PETITION FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or of the right of
the people peacably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.
N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship,
without discrimiration or preference
shall be forever guaranteed in this
state, and no person shall be rendered
incompetent to be a witness or a juror
on account of his opinion on matters
of religious belief; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of
this state.
N.D. Const. art. XIII, S 1(1).
Perfect toleration of religious
sentiment shall be secured, and no
inhabitant of this state shall ever be
molested in person or property on
19871
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account of his or her mode of religious
worship.
N.D. CONsT. art. I, 5 4. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Every man may freely write, speak and
publish his opinion on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that
privilege. In all civil and criminal
trials for libel the truth may be given
in evidence, and shall be a sufficient
defense when the matter is published
with good motives and for justifiable
ends; and the jury shall have the same
power of giving a general verdict as in
other cases; and in all indictments or
informations for liables the jury shall
have the right to determine the law
and the facts under the direction of the
court as in other cases.
N.D. CONsT. art. I, 5 5. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
RIGHT TO PETITION FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
The citizens have a right, in a peaceable
manner, to assemble together for the
common good, and to apply to those
invested with the powers of government
for the redress of grievances, or for other
proper purposes, by petition, address
or remonstrance.
U.S. CONST. amend. 2. RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the




N.D. CONST. art. I, $ 1. RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
All individuals are by nature equally
free and independent and have certain
inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation;
pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness; and to keep and bear arms for
the defense of their person, family,
property, and the state, and for lawful
hunting, recreational, and other
lawful purposes, which shall not be
infringed.
U.S. CONST. amend. III. QUARTERING SOLDIERS
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor
in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.
N.D. CONST. art. I, $ 19. QUARTERING SOLDIERS
The military shall be subordinate to
the civil power. No standing army
shall be maintained by this state in
time of peace, and no soldier shall, in
time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the owner; nor in time
of war, except in the manner prescribed by
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURES
The right to the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
N.D. CoNsT. art. I, 5 8. UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURES
The right to the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons and things to
be seized.





RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND
JUST COMPENSATION
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or navalforces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subjectfor the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall




N.D. CONST. art. I, 510. RIGHT TO GRANDJURY
Until otherwise provided by law, no
person shall, for a felony, be proceeded
against criminally, otherwise than by
indictment, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia when
in actual service in time of war or public
danger. In all other cases, offenses shall
be prosecuted criminally by
indictment or information. The
legislative assembly may change,
regulate or abolish the grand jury
system.




RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
In criminal prosecutions in any court
whatever, the party accused shall have
the right to a speedy and public trial;
to have the process of the court to
compel the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf; and to appear and defend
in person and with counsel. No personal
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, nor be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, libery, or property, without
due process of law.
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N.D. CONST. art. I, S 16. RIGHT TOJUST
COMPENSATION
Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just
compensation having been first made to,
or paid into court for the owner,
unless the owner chooses to accept
annual payments as may be provided
for by law. No right of way shall be
appropriated to the use of any
corporation until full compensation
therefor be first made in money or
ascertained and paid into court for the
owner, unless the owner chooses
annual payments as may be provided
by law, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by
such corporation. Compensation shall
be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury
be waived. When the state or any of its
departments, agencies or political
subdivisions seeks to acquire right of
way, it may take possession upon
makng an offer to purchase and by
depositing the amount of such offer
with the clerk of the district court of
the county wherein the right of way is
located. The clerk shall immediately
notify the owner of such deposit. The
owner may thereupon appeal to the
court in the manner provided by law,
and may have a jury trial, unless a
jury be waived, to determine the
damages, which damages the owner
may choose to accept in annual
payments as may be provided for by
law. Annual payments shall not be
subject to escalator clauses but may be
supplemented by interest earned.
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the
common law.





In criminal prosecutions in any court
whatever, the party accused shall have
the right to a speedy and public trial; to have
the process of the court to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
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and to appear and defend in person and
with counsel. No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense,
nor be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S13. RIGHT TO TRIAL BYJURY
The right of trial byjury shall be secured
to all, and remain inviolate. A person
accused of a crime for which he may
be confined for a period of more than
one year has the right of trial by a jury
of twelve. The legislative assembly
may determine the size of the jury for
all other cases, provided that the jury
consists of at least six members. All
verdicts must be unanimous.





Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.





All persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital
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offenses when the proof is evident or
the presumption great. Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual
punishments be inflicted. Witnesses shall
not be unreasonably detained, nor be
confined in any room where criminals
are actuaily imprisoned.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 5 1. PROHIBITION AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 6.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
unless for the punishment of crime, shall
ever be tolerated in this state.








All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
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nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, S 2, cl. 1. PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.
N.D. CoNsT. art. I, $ 21. PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES
No special privileges or immunities
shall ever be granted which may not
be altered, revoked or repealed by the
legislative assembly; nor shall any
citizen or class of citizens be granted
privikges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not be granted to all
citizens.
U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, cl. 2. RIGHT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
The privikge of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.
N.D. CONST. art. I, $ 14. RIGHT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended unless, when in case




U.S. CONST. art. I, S 9, cl. 3. PROHIBITION AGAINST
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
EX POST FACTO LAWS
No Bill of A ttainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.
U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 10, cl. 1. PROHIBITION AGAINST
IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS
No State shall enter into any Treaty,
alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 18. PROHIBITION AGAINST
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
EX POST FACTO LAWS
IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligations of contracts
shall ever be passed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, 5 3, cl. 1.
Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering
to their Ener;es, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
the Testimoy of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court.
TREASON
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N.D. CONST. art. I, $ 17. TREASON
Treason against the state shall consist only
in levying war against it, adhering to its
enemies or giving them aid and comfort. No
person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the evidence of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or confession in open court.
OTHER PROVISIONS
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 2. POWER IN THE PEOPLE
All political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for
the protection, security and benefit of
the people, and they have a right to
alter or reform the same whenever the
public good may require.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 20. LIMIT OF GENERAL
POWERS
To guard against transgressions of the
high powers which we have delegated,
we declare that everything in this
article is excepted out of the general
powers of government and shall
forever remain inviolate.
N.D. CONST. art. I, 1 24. PROVISIONS MANDATORY
The provisions of this constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory unless, by




N.D. CONST. art. I, § 22. UNIFORM OPERATION OF
LAWS
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 23. SUPREME LAW OF THE
LAND
The state of North Dakota is an
inseparable part of the American
union and the Constitution of the
United States is the supreme law of
the land.
N.D. CONST. art. I, 5 7. RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT
Every citizen of this state shall be free
to obtain employment wherever
possible, and any person, corporation,
or agent thereof, maliciously
interfering or hindering in any way,
any citizen from obtaining or enjoying
employment already obtained, from
any other corporation or person, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.D. CONST. art. I, S 9. RIGHT TOJUSTICE
All courts shall be open, and every
man for any injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy by due process of law,
and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits
may be brought against the state in
such manner, in such courts, and in
such cases, as the legislative assembly
may, by law, direct.
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No person shall be imprisoned for
debt unless upon refusal to deliver up
his estate for the benefit of his
creditors, in such manner as shall be
prescribed by law; or in cases of tort;
or where there is a strong presumption
of fraud.
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